







PROF. ORESTE FERRARA

CAUSES AND PRETEXTS OF THE WORLD WAR

A SEARCHING EXAMINATION INTO THE PLAY AND COUNTERPLAY
OF EUROPEAN POLITICS FROM THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR
TO THE OUTBURST OF THE GREAT WORLD WAR

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To
The Memory
of the
HONORABLE NIEL PRIMROSE
*who so frequently
discussed with the author
the ideas for which
he laid down
his life.*

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CAUSES AND PRETEXTS
OF THE WORLD WAR

THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER I

THE INEVITABLE WAR

THE famous maxim *si vis pacem, para bellum** appeared until recently to have found its most complete application in Europe; but now it is evident that Europe's tranquillity was only an external semblance. Based on a supposed equilibrium, it was dictated by exigency and by nothing else. Armed peace was bound to lead to war. A pretext, not even a cause, sufficed to unchain it.

Just as in the physiological system an organ must function, so in the social system must an army.† Therefore it was natural that the conflagration should soon spread to all countries which possessed an armed

* Colonel H. Frobenius in "The German Empire's Hour of Destiny" (translated from the German), demands that this rendering be substituted for that over the door of the great hall in the Peace Palace which reads *si vis pacem, para justitia*.

† Arturo Labriola; "International Disarmament," in the *Forum*, January 1, 1915.

THE WORLD WAR

force to put in the field; but later, since our civilization is a collectivity with overlapping relations between its various elements, the conflict became a general one.

Innumerable times has war been avoided because the presumed combatants found a solution. Within the last twenty years the cases of Fachoda, Agadir, Bosnia and Herzegovina have followed each other and each time diplomacy has prevented war merely because the probable combatants had not reached the necessary degree of preparation. But more recently, in spite of peace conferences, diplomatic declarations, and sovereigns exchanging visits and embraces; in spite of internal problems, financial penuriousness, insistent pacifism, threatening socialism, and antipatriotic syndicalism—in spite of all this, the increase of armaments kept presaging the proximity of war. Finally a deed sad in itself but unimportant from the international point of view precipitated the stupendous conflict; and the proportions this has assumed make us ask if civilization is a myth. Did the great retrogressions of the past have the same simple causes and follow the same direction as this of today? And ought this to serve as a future warning to Europe?

The civilization of that older part of the globe has extended to this fertile America which, more secure, with a higher conception of human existence and a more ample spirit for social activity, hoped to defend unmenaced the brilliant legacy of prosperity which the unflagging labor of past generations left her; but

the strong inclination of American opinion toward those combatants whose ideal was liberty, who were least prepared to resist brute force and found themselves the possible prey of the more vigorous and less scrupulous combatant, finally crystallized into action. The European War became a World War.



CHAPTER II

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 1870

THE war of 1870 turned Germany and France into natural enemies. The victory of the former was so ostentatious and complete that it offended the public sentiment of the latter. On the other hand, although the conqueror did not realize it, the conquered was by no means annihilated. Bismarck, Teutonic, without pity or mercy, believed that the Treaty of Frankfort would destroy the national wealth and the integrity of the *patrie*; but this was not so. True, for France the humiliation was enormous, the loss of territory appreciable, the payment of the exorbitant war indemnity not less serious. It is no wonder that the glassy eyes of the septuagenarian Thiers shed tears of grief on the night when he and Jules Favre returned from Versailles to Paris after the interview with Bismarck.* But resurrection was possible and it came unexpectedly soon. Bismarck could not deny that he had miscalculated.

Looking back from this distance we can see how,

* G. Hanotaux; "Histoire de la France Contemporaine," Vol. I.

with her three victorious wars, Germany accelerated her union, acquired new territories, covered herself with laurels, and prepared her hegemony over Europe. But these same successes were creating for her an implacable enemy whose existence must necessarily be dedicated to preparing her ruin and putting onto her shoulders the weight of too great a glory.

When one examines the political history of Europe for the past century it is easy to trace the upward course of the little kingdom of Prussia since 1815, and to see that even though Sadowa and Sédan followed each other quickly it was not necessarily these deeds of blood which brought about the unity of the Empire, for this had been a Napoleonic conception before ever it became an aspiration of the states composing it. It was one of Bismarck's exaggerations to believe, as Prokesch-Osten ironically put it, that Prussia was the centre of the universe; but it cannot be denied that the decline of Austria (whose policy was in feeble hands and whose armies were not living up to past glories) along with the careful Prussian policy and the intellectual and scientific movement of 1850, gave Prussia the right to claim the inheritance of Frederick the Great.

The personal temperament of Bismarck and the inconceivable errors of the Second Empire as to its foreign policy rapidly forced events out of their normal course into abrupt moves and finally, war. Nor is this surprising when these same French errors caused Thiers to publicly exclaim during the famous

discussion of 1867 that Napoleon III was "the real author of German unity"; and when they caused King William of Prussia to say something even more incriminating, namely: that Napoleon III "had been working his own ruin ever since 1866 because he had failed to attack the Prussian army in the rear." Thus the Franco-Prussian War came, and France paid dear for her blunders. But Germany's decisive victory, her glory acquired through an injury that completely crushed the enemy, could not do otherwise than distil a spirit of revenge in the soul of every Frenchman, and at the same time arouse in other nations a sentiment of distrust and even of fear.

Sédan in 1870 left behind it a sediment of profound hatred, of undying bitterness, which Leipzig in 1813 had not caused. The great Prussian triumphs had been excessively easy.



CHAPTER III

FRANCE AND RUSSIA

CONQUERED and isolated, France's first duty was to establish her new republican institutions, reinforce her army, and reorganize her finance. All this she did more rapidly than was expected. Next she sought to establish alliances and in short to isolate her terrible enemy. How well she succeeded is demonstrated by present events.

France's most powerful neighbors were Germany, Italy and England. Of these the first, ever since she defeated Austria at Sadowa, had bound that nation to her by skilful international policy of the only sort that Germany ever practiced with success; their union, moreover, rested upon common racial origin. The second, Italy, had twice improved her prospects of unity, thanks to Bismarck. The third, England, though she appeared indifferent to Continental affairs and was absorbed in great work elsewhere, was nevertheless considered the *hereditary enemy*. France consequently could only turn her eyes to Russia and offer her an offensive and defensive alliance. The idea was not without precedent. It had been advanced by men

like Chateaubriand and the Duke of Richelieu; but the interior régime of both countries, along with the political mistakes of the Second Empire and the Third Republic, had excluded all possibility of union. The Crimean War and the intervention in Polish affairs for instance could hardly serve as links to bind the two nations. As to the Polish intervention, Napoleon III himself, as an excuse for not contracting one of the best alliances on the Continent, had to affirm that the Polish cause was very popular in France.* In addition there was the grave crisis of the Commune, the new form of government adopted after 1871, the popular French approval when Berezowski shot at the Czar on his visit to Paris in 1867, the subsequent tolerance which the Republic, respectful of its own laws, manifested to the Nihilists. All this would never have permitted accord, much less real alliance, between the two great powers of Eastern and Western Europe.

In Bismarck's attitude toward Russia there was a marked contrast. He could be flexible when necessity required (as witness his trips to Biarritz before 1866 in order to insure Napoleon III's abstaining from the war he was planning against Austria) and he now used all his arts upon the Czar to bring about the alliance which he designated "of the Three Emperors"—German, Austrian, and Russian. This, to be sure, did not incline Russia toward Francophilism; nor did the Russophobia of French politicians, products mostly of the revolution—men like Grévy, or like Floquet, who

* Discourse of the Crown, November 5, 1863.

in 1867 greeted the Czar in the Palace of Justice with the cry, *Long live Poland!* In face of all this one can understand the difficulty of throwing a bridge across Germany and uniting the Muscovite Empire with the French Republic.

But necessity is superior to human wishes. It happened that Russia was able to do France a signal service and this became the first step toward reciprocal sympathy and awakened a gratitude of the kind which countries long cherish. In 1875 Germany, noting her rival's recuperation, and seeing her reorganize her army which both the Peace preliminaries of Versailles and the Treaty of Frankfort had failed to definitely limit, wished again to assault her brutally. Bismarck became more threatening than ever; his official organ, the *Post*, spoke openly of war, and other German papers followed its lead. Marshal MacMahon received warning from two European personages that war would break out in the spring. But the Czar understood that the moment had come when he could no longer remain passive; through Prince Orloff, Russian Ambassador in Paris, and more directly through General Le Flo, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, he gave hope and encouragement to the French cabinet. It was then that Prince Gortschakoff, commenting on the Czar's words to Le Flo and underlining them, first hinted at a common action should Germany wantonly attack France.*

* Gabriel Hanotaux; "Histoire de la France Contemporaine," Vol. III.

But neither the good intentions of Czar Alexander II, nor the sympathetic expressions of Gortschakoff, nor the enigmatic words of diplomats of the old school, were sufficient for an alliance. France had to learn that she could expect no benefit from the quixotic spirit for sentimental intervention which had animated the foreign policy of the Second Empire. Such chivalry left her lonely, for no other nation was willing to commit a similar fatal error. Russia, with all her good intentions, could not be expected to draw her sword at the opportune moment unless she had a motive of self-interest or a previous promise of reciprocal utility. While this was slowly dawning on France, Bismarck, who knew well this egoism of international politics and who besides was a good gambler, hastened to offer that which soon might have been demanded—a free hand to Russia in Eastern Europe while he claimed the same in Western.

France's uneasiness and consequent desire for a union were easy to understand; but Russia's pro-French proposals did not go beyond mere words. For them to do so the two nations must feel a common necessity. Such a necessity confronted them when the Austro-German Treaty of alliance was celebrated. It directed German policy toward the Orient, or at least prevented it from ignoring that question, and the fact was intelligently exploited by French politicians, diplomats, and financiers. An alliance *de facto* was begun in 1880. This culminated in the formal treaty, dated August 22, 1891, and signed by Ribot and De Moren-

heim representing the two respective countries. Bismarck had been dismissed the year before, for the new Emperor wished no leading-strings; and the old tiger, from his retirement, kept clawing at his successors because of this alliance; but he himself could not have prevented it. From the day its need first became apparent in 1878, when Russia came out worsted from the Congress of Berlin, it had been shaping itself as a treaty in the minds of all.*

With France and Russia allied, the equilibrium broken in 1870 by the Franco-Prussian War was now re-established, and Germany ceased to be the arbiter of the destinies of Europe.†

The rejoicing in France was extraordinary and has been sustained with but few intermissions. In fact the jubilation was exaggerated to such a point that Count de Witte, who should have been far from displeased by it, said one day to the distinguished French publicist André Tardieu: "For ten years now you have been making Franco-Russian manifestation both in season and out of season."

These explosions of popular sentiment expressed how persistent had been the past nightmare and how useful was the new union implying supreme defense; but nevertheless there arose in the course of twenty years two moments of suspicious reserve. The first, when Muscovite prestige was humbled on the plains

* Gabriel Hanotaux; "La Politique de l'équilibre," page 124.

† André Tardieu; "Les questions actuelles de la politique étrangère en Europe"; also "La politique extérieure de l'Allemagne."

of Manchuria and thereby weakened in all Europe. Immediately the event proved to France the importance of a strong ally, for in the period that followed she again had to suffer Teuton impertinences. The second, and more transitory, during the last Balkan War when France followed her own policy independent of her ally; that is to say, she furthered her own Eastern interests without stopping to think that however considerable these may have been, Russia's only reason for keeping up the alliance was that her concern lay in Eastern Europe, just as France's lay principally in Western. On both these occasions the enthusiasm for the Franco-Russian accord waned somewhat, but adjustments and explanations were soon forthcoming. Russia began the reorganization of her army and the costly change of her war material, and the two nations with new zest bent themselves toward the common defense. If Prussian militarism provoked it, they would be prepared to attack their vigilant rival at the opportune moment.

CHAPTER IV

FRANCE AND ENGLAND

“THE Englishman is our hereditary enemy.” Until recently this classic dictum was on the lips of every Frenchman; this was the opinion which the two nations separated by the Channel had of each other. And the fact is, however much they have tried to explain since the *Entente Cordiale* that the idea was erroneous,* it is none the less true that long-standing rivalry had kept up intermittent war between them. This condition constituted the inheritance of both countries and there was no reason why the past should not foretell the future. The Hundred Years War terminated in 1453; the War of the League of Augsburg, from 1688 to 1693; the War of the Spanish Succession, from 1701 to 1713; of the Austrian Succession, from 1744 to 1748; the Seven Years War, from 1756 to 1763; the American troubles from 1778 to 1783; the Continental Wars from 1793 to 1802, and again from 1803 to 1815—this long list together with the

* Ives Guyot; “L’Entente Cordiale au point de vue économique,” in the *Journal des Economistes*, May 15, 1914.

friction and threats of the Restoration Period, the Monarchy of July, the Second Empire, and the Third Republic, justifies the old belief in hereditary enmity; nor could suspicion be dissipated by brief periods of friendship such as occurred in 1830, 1840, and 1872, '74, and '75.

The attitude, moreover, is explicable on other grounds. Because of her geographical situation England's safety demanded the supremacy of the seas. This she had maintained by fighting against Spain, Holland, and France; to maintain it to-day she must fight against Germany. Back in 1762 after the Dutch and Spaniards had lost their naval power and Germany's had not yet loomed on the horizon, the Earl of Chatham outlined England's policy in unequivocal terms when he declared: "His Majesty's ministers must never forget this great principle—this directing principle of all our policy; namely: the only thing that England need fear in the world is that France should become a maritime, commercial, and colonial power."

These words have always expressed English public spirit, for supremacy on the seas also meant political strength and national wealth.

In proportion as France increased her colonial acquisitions and her maritime strength, the hereditary enemy's aversion to her increased. It was considerably aggravated when the minister Jules Ferry launched his country on the road to conquest, an initiative which even Bismarck favored, being only too delighted to see the French armies turn in some other direction

than the eastern frontier. Although French prudence sought to make known the national projects to England and to obtain from her a certain approbation, still every acquisition was fraught with danger. It is known that at the Congress of Berlin, Lord Salisbury almost counseled the conquest of Tunis to Waddington, First French Plenipotentiary (or at least he counseled intervention which in African affairs is the same thing). The taking over of Madagascar was recognized by England in the treaty of August 5, 1890. The same with Senegal, Dahomey, and the Congo, where "French interests were in constant opposition with British and where peace was established only with difficulty." * Yet there were moments of grave crisis, produced apparently by insignificant causes, but whose real roots ran deep in the colonial policy in general and the African in particular. "For twenty years the world watched a veritable steeplechase; especially between France and England." † Africa, considered the *res nullius* of political law, was marked off by geographers, explorers, and above all by officials charged with important missions. Every aspiration grew into an interest and every interest into a right. England won the steeplechase, but was not able to prevent her rival from occupying those portions of second-rate quality or which were not included in the preëstablished imperial plan. France had to suffer

* E. Lemonon; "L'Europe et la politique brittanique," Paris, 1912, page 87.

† René Millet; "Politique extérieure," 1898-1905, page 155.

humiliations such as Fachoda, which, though no more serious than others, is better known because of the enormous noise made over it in the French press.

In 1898 when Delcassé replaced the eminent Gabriel Hanotaux as foreign minister, there was a radical change in French policy. This statesman succeeded, whenever an opportune moment presented itself, in pacifying animosities and drawing nearer to the cabinet of St. James; thus he turned international relations into another channel and rescued France from her traditional policy of troublesome aggressions, petulant reservations, and never-ending discussions. Delcassé it was, also, who dedicated his efforts to the isolation of Germany, leaving her the only ally congruous with racial affinity and geographical situation.

The ultimate state of things was a triumph for this minister and King Edward VII.

Little by little England saw France, while not relinquishing colonial transactions, resigned to accepting her, England's, vast imperial horizons. A sympathetic policy was initiated in 1898 which culminated in the treaty of April 8, 1904. This treaty regulated, or we might say liquidated, all colonial difficulties and permitted the union of the two countries. France had finally comprehended that England's friendship in Europe was worth more than any strip of African or Asiatic territory, and those nationalists who had intended to protest on Edward VII's arrival in Paris in 1903, instead applauded. The hereditary enemy had been converted into a sincere friend; but this could

never have happened had not Germany acquired a maritime and commercial power greater and more dangerous than France's; and the friend could never have been changed into an ally had not the Russian troops suffered one defeat after another on the wide plains of Manchuria.

To-day the immutable field of Waterloo gazes without amazement on other allies than those of a century ago.



CHAPTER V

RUSSIA AND ENGLAND

THE Anglo-French entente encountered one very grave obstacle. France had an ally, Russia, who nursed no end of grievances against England and England against her. With the whole question of Asia between them it was impossible to be opposed to each other there and allied to each other in Europe. In the Mediterranean, in the Persian Gulf, in far-off India, Muscovite power threatened British; England saw that all that immense Asiatic empire which she had consolidated with so much labor might be lost. Hence her traditional attitude of distrust toward Russia. Although the more direct struggle for Asiatic influence developed between 1894 and 1907 it can be said that Russia was competing there ages before. In Persia she had been able, through London's blunder, to establish a clever and profitable policy about the time mentioned. She filled the impoverished Persian exchequer with rubles while England refused to lend a shilling, and her reward was a constantly growing commerce and a promise from the Persian government to give no railroad concessions without the consent of St. Petersburg. But not even all this adroit diplomacy could palliate

the bad impression left by an unsuccessful war; and so it happened that the defeats in Manchuria cost Russia her Asiatic prestige, and the fact was skilfully exploited by the English to their own benefit.*

This by no means accomplished Russia's expulsion, however. In the north of the extensive region under consideration she continued to dominate in spite of internal political fluctuations, while the British held sway in the Persian Gulf region. After checking a Russian invasion of Afghanistan the limits of the Russian frontier were determined by a treaty signed by the two on March 11, 1895. That Russia had directed herself eastward before considering a more definite expansion north and a more favorable one south, the occupation of Turkestan and the laying of the Transcaspian Railroad are conclusive evidence; and as for Afghanistan, in spite of St. Petersburg's declarations of disinterestedness in 1869, 1874, and 1883, it is nevertheless true that she had sporadically acted to the contrary. England always vigorously upheld her own advantage in Afghanistan even to assuming its defense, by the treaty of 1893, in case it should be attacked by a foreign nation. This was an effort evidently to reaffirm the British protectorate and to exclude Russia from all sphere of influence.† When Russia tried the same expansion in Thibet the same English measures opposed her.

* L. de St. Victor de St. Blancard; "L'Accord anglo-russe du 31 Aout, 1907," in the *Annales des sciences politiques*.

† "L'Accord anglo-russe," page 49.

Thus were the great Russian interests in Asia—may one say appetites?—in opposition to British ambitions. Just as a check was put by Great Britain on territorial or commercial expansion in the south, so toward the north when Russia tried to hold Manchuria, to aspire to Korea, and to have decisive influence at the court of Pekin; all of which Russia was doing in order to augment her trade with the Celestial Empire and later consider it as an enormous Russian dependency. But England thereupon urged Japan to defend her interests (and England's own) with a result that is well known. Bismarck had previously said, satisfied at seeing Russia engaged in other affairs than European, "There is nothing for Russia in Europe but nihilism and other diseases. Her mission is in Asia. There she stands for civilization." The old wolf, knowing well Russia's weak spot, held the image of nihilism before her eyes to serve his own ends. Obviously a Russia absorbed with Asiatic expansion signified a Germany unmenaced at the back and free to concentrate on western Europe.

And yet Russia had a legitimate right to mix in European affairs, or more strictly speaking, in Balkan affairs. A common origin, commercial relations, contiguity, the navigation of the Black Sea, and most of all Russia's Mediterranean aspirations, all called her in that direction. But the Congress of Berlin in 1878 foiled her. It prevented her from enjoying the fruits of her recent victory over the Turks, and definitely fixed her situation in southern Europe. After this, dis-

illusionized perhaps, and finding outlet in increased Asiatic activities, she kept aloof from the turbulent peninsula, only to find when she came back that the situation had radically changed. It was no longer England she had to face. It was Austria who, to Russia's discomfiture, had powerfully established herself there while Germany was directing covetous glances toward Turkey, both European and Asiatic.

Thus in short time and in the natural course of events it ceased to be England and France who thwarted Russia in her Balkan policy, and Austria and Germany took their place. This is precisely one of those variations which international policy frequently exhibits. The Crimean War was now a thing of the remote past; and of the remote past also was Bismarck's contemptuous remark, "The whole Balkan question is not worth a Pomeranian soldier's solid bones."

The natural sequel was the treaty of August 31, 1907, which established the entente between England and Russia. The Franco-English treaty had prepared the way for it, England's moderate attitude toward victorious Japan made it possible, and the conversations between Count Cassini and Sir Arthur Nicholson during the Conference of Algeciras shaped it. As finally signed it comprised, besides a general declaration, three distinct conventions relative to affairs in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, and a declaration by Sir Edward Grey concerning the Persian Gulf. Thus were the English-Russian quarrels of so many years

adjusted and future ones eliminated as far as the human mind could forestall them. Once more exigency had been stronger than tradition. Between the former rivals in Asia and the Balkans had risen Germany; curbing the boundless Asiatic ambition of Russia were Mukden and Tsushima; disturbing the one dream of English statesmen was the ever-increasing naval force of the Central Empire. Result, the Anglo-Russian entente.

England could now be tranquil; the road to India was not to be so quickly traveled.*

* André Tardieu; "La France et les Alliances."



CHAPTER VI

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

AS already stated, the *Alliance of the Three Emperors* had been a Bismarckian idea. This logical conception was quite worthy of the great statesman, since it would make Germany mistress of the European situation, and Europe in his scheme was the only important field of action. By it she would give her moral support to Russia's Asiatic aspirations—moral support only since Germany was then far from possessing a fleet that could hinder England's policy in that same continent. By it, Austria having been conquered and excluded from the Germanic community, could return only by means of a treaty which would make her recognize the supremacy of Prussia and which would command Austrian aid in Prussia's Balkan policy. By it, both Russia and Austria would serve to maintain the German hegemony over all continental Europe and keep out England; the territorial conquests granted by the Treaty of Frankfort would be consolidated; and lastly this alliance of the three empires would have a salutary effect on internal order and do away with those revolutionary flickers with which

the restless and frothing Latin world had contaminated the Saxon and the Slav.

But logical though it all appeared, Bismarck had to be content with uniting only two of the desired three. The Triple Alliance came later but with Italy, not Russia, as the third power.

The union of Germany and Austria concerted in 1879 was the fruit of the Great Chancellor's genius and France's traditional policy of errors (not yet reformed by Delcassé). Prior to it Bismarck, having realized the difficulty of bringing the three great empires under one single policy which would assign Asia to Russia, the Balkans to Austria, and the Occident to Germany, had been oscillating between Austria and Russia. As the latter was growing ever stronger while Austria appeared to be growing weaker, the chancellor inclined more to the Czar. Emperor William I also had undisguised preference for the Russians. But when in 1875 the Czar and his chancellor Gortshakoff prevented Germany from again attacking France and completing the inadequate work of 1870, the consequence was the hostile German attitude revealed in the Congress and Treaty of Berlin. This ended all hopes of a treaty with the Bey had occupied Tunis, and the appointed were the Russian reactionaries who expected that the union would put a curb on nihilism.

Bismarck soon managed Austria, and Count Andrassy decided to accept the German advances.* On

* S. L. Driault; "Problèmes politiques et sociaux," Paris, 1911, page 259.

October 7, 1879, was signed the secret and merely defensive treaty by virtue of which if one of the two empires should be attacked by Russia the other was to help with the totality of its forces; and if one of the two should be attacked by some other power supported by Russia the unattacked must help with its whole army; but if one of the two were attacked by some other power not aided by Russia the unattacked must maintain a benevolent neutrality.

Two years later Italy became a party to this agreement. Not all the causes which brought her into such an unpopular alliance are known. France in pursuance of a treaty with the Bey had occupied Tunis, and the act was considered in Italy not only as an aggression but as an indication of a future policy of violence and violation. Yet this could hardly have been the only or even the principal cause of her joining Austria. Though she considered that France had defrauded her of a territory over which she claimed historic rights, elsewhere she was forced to see even more legitimate hopes crushed or at least postponed. Under the none too gentle rule of Austria were living great numbers of Italians in extensive tracts that were both geographically and historically an object of aspiration to the new Italian kingdom. One of the most widely accepted hypotheses regarding the Triple Alliance is that Bismarck, by friendly advances to the Holy See, made the Italians fear that the Roman question would come up for reconsideration. Be this as it may, Italy became part of the Triple Alliance in 1881 and it was

Austria, her ancient enemy, who brought it about. That is to say, the negotiations were carried on/by Count Kalmoky, the Austrian Minister, and Pasquale Stanislao Mancini.

Although this Alliance forced Italy into greater expenditures than her economic condition warranted, it nevertheless guaranteed the as yet unstable national unity.

For many years the policy of the Triple Alliance was the policy of Germany. Only recently did Italy emancipate herself and try to make new *ententes* on the margin—a proceeding which caused Von Bülow to exclaim that they had permitted her to take a waltz turn with France. Delcassé meanwhile was telling France that she need never fear aggression from Italy.

The Triple Alliance, renewed whenever it was about to expire, was always a defensive alliance and as such superior to the Franco-Russian, the Anglo-French, and the Anglo-Russian. But so far as Italy is concerned, she was in recent years harping more on the letter of the bond and forgetting its spirit. The Central Empires, on the contrary, kept identifying themselves more and more with a common international policy which was almost a precursor of national union in case of a victorious war. It was even said of the late Archduke that his Pan-Germanic tendencies were so pronounced that he seemed more German than Austrian.* While Italy, by means of accord with the

* André Chéradame; "England, France, and Russia," in the *Quarterly Review*, October, 1909.

Mediterranean powers, continued emancipating herself from Berlin, Austria kept drawing nearer till the relationship came to signify a phenomenon of Pan-Germanism rather than an alliance in the strict international sense.



CHAPTER VII

THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS

REVIEWING the conditions which induced Italy to fall into the arms of the Triple Alliance, thus subordinating herself to Germany and becoming the friend of Austria, we find that Bismarck's strategem had made her apprehensive of finding herself forsaken, especially with regard to the Papal question. But however unpopular the new bond was, as long as England looked upon it with not unfriendly eyes, Italy remained secure and satisfied. The newly unified nation found herself guaranteed on land by the armies of the two great Central Empires; while the equilibrium which England maintained in the Mediterranean conceded free Italian action in the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas. To be sure it also gave France a certain hegemony over the western Mediterranean (far from contenting Gambetta, however, who aspired to make it "the theatre of French action"); but the reassuring fact was that England was still prime arbiter in the whole extension of those waters which had been the great highway of Phoenicians and Carthaginians, and the *mare nostrum* of the Romans.

The friendship between England and Italy was traditional. Gladstone, with that noble policy which could recognize the aspirations of idealists and at the same time keep his country in contact with realities—Gladstone, it will be recalled, had given the Italian patriots full approval by affirming that the Bourbon rule in Naples was “the negation of God.” English cruisers looked on indulgently when the celebrated *Expedition of the Thousand* sallied out from Cuarto under the orders of Garibaldi, to land in Marsala. From that British intervention which helped to win Palermo, to the official recognition of young and growing Free Italy, the British spirit had been saturating the people, and the friendship which then sprang up has always been strong enough to withstand all strain. France, too, helped in these difficult moments; but the effect was very different. England risked nothing in favoring Italian unity; France, on the other hand, gave her blood, her money, and her honor in a cause from which she could expect no benefits. But she did it with many reservations. Napoleon III’s Treaty of Villafranca, for instance, came as a cruel surprise after a whole series of helpful victories; likewise Minister Rouher’s “Never;” likewise the whole Catholic agitation in favor of maintaining the temporal power of the Pope. In face of so many sad disillusionments, the benefits received from France paled beside England’s less positive, but less meddlesome, sympathy.

When England decided to occupy Egypt she urged Italy to accompany her; but the latter declined on the

ground of not being prepared for colonial activities and not understanding the art of intervention in foreign countries (she who herself had been the scene of so much intervention!). Upon the statesmen who rejected this gratuitously offered opportunity, many reproaches have been heaped; but such judgment results from inappreciation of the conjuncture of events at that time.

Bismarck always kept in mind England's friendship for Italy. The old statesman was accustomed to resolve all his problems within a narrow circle (soon snapped for better or worse by the nation he built up); and apart from his argument that the unity of the Italian peninsula was in line with his own project for a great central empire, his thorough estimate of British power would alone have predisposed him to favor Italian unity.

With such importance and honor did Italy regard England's friendship that in 1896 Premier Rudini affirmed with satisfaction that the English compact completed the system of Italian alliances.* In 1897 Italy gave up Kassala which she had recently wrested from the Dervishes, in order that the British might consolidate the conquest of the Sudan. In the light of such long-standing and cordial feeling the clouds which formed over the question of Tripoli, or when Chamberlain's imperialism dreamed of changing the language of Malta, were quickly dissipated.

That the *Entente Cordiale* between England and

* E. Lemonon, "L'Europe et la politique brittanique," page 189.

France should serve as a basis for a Mediterranean entente between France and Italy was in the course of things. But even on this point Bismarck wished to keep the two countries apart and wrote accordingly to Giuseppe Mazzini: "The Mediterranean constitutes an inheritance difficult to divide among the heirs." And so it happened that France and Italy with so many historic memories in common, so many reasons for uniting, continued to suffer the consequence of the exclusory policy of their respective governments. Under this influence, the masses in each indulged in reciprocal acts of hostility* and it was some time before misgivings and suspicions were quenched by a flow of satisfactory explanations. As already mentioned, the credit of putting an end to this useless and ignoble enmity, and of initiating an epoch of peace and mutual understanding, is due to Delcassé. The good relationship he was able to create heralded Italy's benevolent attitude at the outburst of the present war and her subsequent entrance into it on the side of the Allies.

The accord between Italy and France determined the action of one and the other in the cases of Tripoli and Morocco; and so sure was Delcassé of the good-will both of the Italian people and their government, that at the very time when the Triple Alliance was being renewed in 1902, he did not hesitate to affirm from the tribunal of the Chamber that "neither directly nor indirectly is the policy of Italy, as a consequence of her alliances, directed against France. In no case will her

* A. Billot, "La France et l'Italie."

policy constitute a threat for us, either in diplomatic form, or in protocols, or in international military stipulations. In no case, nor in any form, can Italy be the instrument of, or a party to, an aggression against our nation.*

And, in effect, Italy kept her pledges when the incident of Morocco gave France reason to fear an attack; and again at the Conference of Algeciras, where her chief delegate, the aged Marchese Visconti-Venosta, gave France a support which was doubly useful because in addition to representing a factor of the Triple Alliance, he was a diplomat of great prestige.†

France on her side fulfilled her obligations during the Italian-Turkish war. There were momentary difficulties over the steamer *Manouba*, but these had no real importance, and indeed the question would never have been raised had the present president of the Republic, who was then foreign minister, been animated by the same conciliatory feeling as his predecessor Delcassé.

In addition to the *Manouba* incident there was the pro-Greek sentiment born of the Balkan War, when Italy for a moment united with her allies in aggressive action as to Albania and Epirus; but the rancor inspired by Austria, more powerful and threatening than ever, brought into relief the solid base on which the Italo-French accord had been built up.

* Cited by André Tardieu in "La France et les Alliances."

† André Tardieu; "La Conférence d'Algéciras."

CHAPTER VIII

THE FRANCO-JAPANESE AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE AGREEMENTS

ENGLAND was also back of the Franco-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese agreements. English statesmen understood that the British nation could not defend its enormous empire if engaged in a European war. The increasing naval and military force of Japan, as revealed in the latter's wars against China and Russia, gave them considerable uneasiness; they saw that even were England victorious in a war in Europe her Asiatic empire might be endangered; hence the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905. This treaty was exclusively Asiatic. By virtue of it the two powers were to reciprocally defend the territories thus far obtained and to maintain the integrity of China. It guaranteed occupations already made and left China exclusively under the influence of the English and Japanese. When, in the present war, England authorized Japan's offensive against Germany, the treaty was made to exceed its original well-known intent; but such action it will be observed was limited to Asia, for England probably did not care to awaken future mis-

givings in the United States nor to set a precedent for calling the yellow race into Europe.

In the Russo-Japanese enmity England would have found another problem difficult of solution in case of war. Her treaty with Japan would have missed its perfect application, for while England was allied to Russia and France in Europe, Japan could not be their foe in case of a general war in Asia. Out of these considerations were evolved the Russo-Japanese entente of July 30, 1907, and the Franco-Japanese of June 10, 1907. It appears at first glance impossible that Russia should have so soon forgotten her defeat at the hands of Japan; but since that disastrous war she had been giving signs of wiser foreign policy, and besides, the treaty of peace did not take advantage of her vanquished position. In short the accord which was bound to develop under the aegis of England was anticipated by the Treaty of Portsmouth.

On June 13, 1907, was signed the first agreement between Japan and Russia. In July of the same year the treaty, of a political order and "fortifying the peaceful, amicable, and neighborly relations which have been so satisfactorily reestablished between Russia and Japan, and avoiding the possibility of future misinterpretations" was signed by Iswolsky, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Motone, Japanese Ambassador in Petrograd. It bound the two nations to respect their own territorial integrity and that of China, and also to maintain the so-called "open-door" policy in that country.

The accord between France and Japan was easier of consummation because the friendship of the two nations was traditional. True, it was distressing in the trying days of the Russian and Japanese War, for France to see her ally suffer one defeat after another, and the aid which she gave to the fleet of Rodjestwensk in his difficult voyage through the French possessions appeared likely to cause complications; but the ancient good feeling survived it. The convention was signed on June 10, 1907, by Kurino, Japanese Ambassador in Paris, and Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs. It promised mutual aid in preserving the security and peace of territories occupied by either in the Asiatic continent, and like the previously mentioned treaty, it guarded the integrity of China and the open-door system.

With peace thus assured in the Far East, the three nations, France, England, and Russia could better focus on their European interests and more solidly uphold the Triple Entente to their common good.

Germany also had understood the importance of having, if not an ally, at least a friend in the Far East. Innumerable times had she tried to establish closer associations with Japan. By publishing newspapers in that empire and sending professors and military men there she had impressed the educated classes; but even though she succeeded for a spell in weaning them away from the French influence which had inspired their first steps in the acquisition of European culture, she

never succeeded in winning over the Japanese government.

English diplomacy, more subtle and uniform, never left the field free to Germany for a single moment.



CHAPTER IX

THE POLICY OF GERMANY AND THE "ENCERCLEMENT"

WHILE these events were transpiring and matters were shaping for a European conflict, Germany was applying herself to getting the necessary strength for the decisive moment. This she accomplished not only by foreign arrangements and compacts, but also by creating a formidable army and navy of her own. Her concern for foreign support was limited to Austria, Italy, and in more recent times, Turkey. The advances made to the last named had in reality a double object; they were both military and economic, for Turkey not only represented a military spirit of the highest order and was the leader of the Islamic world, but she was also the highway of Asia; she led to Persia immediately and perhaps to India later. A proof of this assertion—the double interest—may be seen in the difficulties Germany was willing to face in order to construct the Bagdad Railroad across Ottoman Asia and thus unite the North Sea with the Persian Gulf. The very rails themselves seemed to indicate the path of *Greater Germany*.* But unfortunately for both

* B. Combes de Patris; "De Berlin à Bagdad," in the *Revue des sciences politiques*, June 15, 1914, page 357

countries, the sixteen years or so that Germany has devoted to coaching Turkey have been the most disastrous in the latter's existence. Turkey, as German statesmen conceived it, was to balance the ever-growing military force of Russia and serve as a brake to England. If Russia could swell her regiments with the rude, ignorant peasants of her outlying regions, just so surely could Turkey summon the Mohammedan hordes; it was merely a question of organization. It followed logically that Turkey, in order to be efficient as an ally, would have to be guided in her internal policy and to have her army put into shape. These two points attended to, she could be of extraordinary usefulness. Therefore Baron von Marschall, the flower of German diplomacy, was sent to Constantinople, while Baron von der Goltz (who has since played in Belgium the same sorry role as the Duke of Alba) dedicated himself to the development of Turkish militarism. His sympathy during the war against Italy, and the counsels which he gave to the Turkish officers through the medium of the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna will be recalled. In the meantime Germany, exploiting the cupidity of the French financiers, counseled the Turkish government to borrow largely from them with a view to bettering her war material, which was furnished mostly by Krupps'. The end was that Turkey found herself definitely tied to the chariot of the German Empire.

Results, however, were not commensurate with the efforts made. At home the Young Turk party did not

know how to overcome the racial tendency to dejection nor did they find the reorganization of the state on an improved foundation an easy task; and abroad, two unlucky wars were all they could show for their military and diplomatic preparation. These left Turkey reduced to a minimum of European territory, and the poorer by the loss of two vast African provinces.

Yet in spite of defeats she never lost faith in her ally and protector. Staking her national life, her all, on a single card, she has continued to be guided by the Central Empires. Perhaps the game was not unwelcome to Enver Pasha whose personal ambition, like Teutonic audacity, acquired great force in any environment favorable to it.

By this time we see the policy of the Great Chancellor completely abandoned. The Orient which Bismarck despised had become an object to covet; the colonial policy was now the chief concern of statesmen, while the fleet received the Emperor's special solicitude. And in the anxieties of all, England and Russia had supplanted France. In other words, Bismarck's policy had completed its cycle, and a newer and ampler, aiming at all the continents instead of merely western Europe, had taken its place.

After 1870 Germany applied herself to developing her industries and increasing her commerce. Gifted with extraordinary tenacity and genius for order she got every possible advantage out of her military successes; and as to her foreign affairs the Triple Alliance appeared to be the Holy Ark in which she took

shelter. "Germany shut herself up within the Triple Alliance as if in a fortress, and lived securely. Even the Franco-Russian agreement did not alter her sense of quiet. On the contrary it was amusing that her natural rivals should take the trouble to guarantee her own conquests to her, and should bind themselves by the most terrible oaths to stay at home."*

Equally indifferent was Germany to the subsequent Franco-Italian agreement on Mediterranean questions. Chancellor Von Bülow who had referred to it as "a waltz turn" said in more serious and official mood: "We should congratulate ourselves that France and Italy, each with great and important interests in the Mediterranean, have come to an understanding concerning them." The next accord, the Anglo-French, also left German serenity unruffled. No one saw that this settlement, by putting an end to an age-old conflict between the two nations, might serve to set up another against a third party; which third party could be no other than Germany, natural enemy of France and rival of England. A few days after it was signed, that is to say on April 12, 1904, the same chancellor with the same imperturbability affirmed that, so far as German interests were concerned, there was nothing to object to in the said treaty.†

In fact, with regard to France, the nation which was aspiring to the hegemony of Europe preferred that the

* René Millet; "France, Allemagne, Maroc," in the *Revue politique et parlementaire*, June, 1907.

† André Tardieu; "La France et les Alliances," page 191.

statu quo should not alter : she was therefore disposed to extend every sort of neighborly courtesy. At each disaster or misfortune—the death of General Mac Mahon, of Sadi-Carnot, of Marshal Canrobert, of Jules Simon ; on the occasion of the Charity Bazaar Fire, the shipwreck of *La Bourgogne*, and innumerable other lamentable events,—the Kaiser always tried to be the first to send condolence and to have his ambassador persuade the afflicted of his sympathetic sentiments.* The Treaty of Frankfort had given Germany the desired frontier and had served to complete and consolidate her unity ; to maintain its clauses and to do nothing that would interrupt her ever-increasing commerce and industry were the chief desideratum. Any difficulty with France would mean a relapse. Hence the significance of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's exclamation in the Reichstag : "I do not care to go over the past any more than is necessary to know the future."

Germany might well be satisfied, for until the Franco-Russian Alliance this state of things had meant her absolute domination on the Continent, a domination which took a new lease of life when the defeats in Manchuria showed how ineffectual was the Russian army. To counteract this domination France had to direct all her acts ; likewise England, when the day came on which Germany, forgetting the counsels of dead and gone statesmen, took a place, and took it with

* André Tardieu; "La politique extérieure de l'Allemagne, page 63.

unequalled vigor, among the maritime and colonial nations.

Up to this time Germany's relations with France had been the pivot of European politics; now it was her relations with England. To go a step further, the former were influenced by the latter. England saw German commerce increasing and penetrating into those far-off seas where British commerce had never before met a rival; she saw the German fleet increasing and threatening that supremacy which had always safeguarded her progress and her wealth;* and above all she saw jeopardized her ancient prestige which, as Lord Roseberry had declared, formed the base of England's grandeur.

Then there came a moment of severe trial, when England perceived that just as Spain, Holland, and France had threatened her in the past, so was Germany threatening her in the present. This moment was the Transvaal War, which put British resources to a hard test.†

She understood that the supreme effort of her history must be made, that it was one of those crises in which great world questions must be decided, and that she must find out which way the scales inclined. To wait would be to give the enemy more time to prepare. The doctrine of "splendid isolation" had had its day.

* René Pinon; "La rivalité de l'Allemagne et de l'Angleterre," in the *Revue des deux mondes*, March 1, 1909.

† Victor Bérard; "L'Oeuvre d'Edouard VII."

Edward VII's reign merits a eulogy for having known how to interpret the signs of the times.* After a tentative accord with Germany which never materialized and which was attributed to Chamberlain, a marked hostility to that nation took shape in England. If only past history could serve as a guide, this feeling would appear inconceivable; for just as surely as it shows us that England was the hereditary enemy to the Frenchman, it shows her as the ancient ally and constant friend to the Prussian.

In Germany the sentiment was returned, even anticipated, as revealed on such occasions as the German approval of Russian domination in Manchuria, the question of the Bagdad Railway and all it meant for German dreams of expansion, and the attacks on Chamberlain in 1901, when hard and even vulgar terms were applied to him in the Reichstag. All these revealed, as was said, a state of hostility, and could not but initiate that current of suspicion and prevention which precedes all great crises.

Applying Von Bülow's famous axiom, "When one is not sure of making himself loved he should make himself feared," Germany proceeded to augment her marine, for as Baron von Marschall expressed it, "We must sharpen the German sword on sea as well as on land." So vigorously was this done that the English themselves were stupefied. It endangered their maritime policy of the "two power standard." Nor were

* René Pinon; "France et Allemagne," in the *Revue des deux mondes*, part I for April, 1912, page 657.

their misgivings calmed by the discourses of Emperor William II.

From the year 1901 when the silent antagonism began between these two nations, France, prompted by England, asserted herself more positively in international politics, and in serious matters sought the opinion of the Cabinet of St. James. And that same year began the isolation of Germany, the *encerclement* whose success is so manifest in the present moment; then, too, began *la revanche* and the decline of the German hegemony. In all this silent cumulation, the only noisy interruption was the aggressive tone which Germany directed to France in 1904.

The Morocco incident roused her out of her tranquillity and gave her the first positive and unmistakable sign of the hemming-in policy. That Germany should not be gratified at seeing France plan a vast Mediterranean empire is natural, for it was at the expense of Germany's own aspirations; moreover, in it would be recruited a warlike colonial army which could be brought into Europe at the required moment to serve as a balance against the great Teutonic military contingents. To Algeria, long since conquered, France had added Tunis; and next she penetrated slowly but decidedly into Morocco. The Kaiser resolved not to tolerate any expansion whatever and gave his neighbor many a start by way of advising her of his feelings; this produced the desired uneasiness. On his trip to Tangiers he saluted the Sultan with a speech in which he dwelt with immoderate emphasis on his

host's quality of independence. "It is to the Sultan in his capacity as an independent sovereign that I am paying a visit," he said; and again, "I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan, Morocco will remain free, open . . . without annexation, and on a footing of absolute equality . . . for I consider the Sultan a completely free monarch." All these insistent declarations and phrases are comprised in a short discourse of less than seventy words. This time France did not heed the hint; but when Delcassé, more radical, did not wish longer to remain foreign minister and suffer the imperial prosiness, France consented to the calling of a conference sure, as well she might be through her ententes, of its result.

The Conference of Algeciras was a complete triumph for France. Russia stood by her ally resolutely; Spain, except for a few waverings on the part of the Duke of Almodóvar del Rio, was chivalrous and obliging to her neighbors across the Pyrenees; Sir Arthur Nicholson, the English plenipotentiary, firmly and courteously upheld her; Italy, represented by the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, was prodigal in her praise (recalling the treaty which had opened the road to Tripoli for Italy, and which later she, in her turn, had to faithfully uphold); and the United States was not behind in sympathy. Germany, on the other hand, argued, changed about, retraced her steps; followed in it all by her faithful Austria who had neither opinion of her own nor special interest in the matter.* By forcing

* André Tardieu; "La Conférence d'Algéciras."

this diplomatic fencing competition, Germany hoped, as Von Bülow later expressed it, to deal France a *riposte*. The result was a *counter-riposte*.

The Conference of Algeciras made Germany understand her true situation, even though the press of the country preferred not to admit the defeat suffered. Furthermore, the distribution of the English fleet, directed as it evidently was against the empire of the Kaiser, the visits of Edward VII to the Mediterranean states, the frigidity of the meeting between William and Edward, all confirmed Germany in the belief that she was surrounded by a sentiment of mistrust.

Soon it began to be evident that Italy was separating markedly from the Triple Alliance. For twenty years the Italian people had been indulging in *irredentist* meetings in favor of Trieste and Trent, and in November, 1908, and May, 1909, they gave even greater indications of enthusiasm, driven to it by Austria's blunders in domestic policy.

By this time the Irredentist Movement had passed out of the hands of young students like Giuglielmo Oberdank who had offered his blond young head on the Austrian scaffold, and had become the concern of statesmen. Then, too, Russia had entered into Italian politics; and with the visit of the Czar in 1909 to Racconigi, the summer residence of King Victor Emmanuel III, a current of sympathy had been set up between the two countries. Nor must it be forgotten that Victor Emmanuel's romantic love-match was prepared in the Russian court.

Austria's brisk annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a blow to both Russia and France; both nations, and England with them, realized that they must close in their ranks and prepare for the inevitable war. Thus in 1908 England offered to put two divisions at France's disposal in case of an immediate war on the Continent. By this it will be seen that they were exceeding the letter of their agreement.

To such a point did interest side-track conscience that words no longer had their normal meaning but appeared to say something different and even contrary. Emperor William in an interview of November, 1908, tried to tranquillize the English people, and instead the English people gave quite an opposite interpretation to the imperial words. The same Emperor tried incessantly to be on good terms with France, but always, naturally, within the limits of the Treaty of Frankfort, to maintain which he believed that Germany must stake her honor, lose her last man, and spend her last penny. So he said to everybody high and low; and when France would not respond to his advances he exclaimed to one of the ambassadors accredited to Berlin: "I fear for next summer. I am tired of holding out my hand to France and having her ignore it." This was in 1911.

Evidently the Teutonic amiability was not all pure generosity.

To return to the Triple Alliance. At the inspiration of German diplomats it had acquired in the last two years more solidity than at the time of the Italo-Turk-

ish war. Italy, although the German press had cried aloud against her enterprise in Tripoli, was nevertheless indebted to Germany for the temporary possession of the islands in the Ægean Sea; and to Austria for having defended the *statu quo* in the Adriatic during the Balkan War, or at least for having prevented a power which might some day become strong from occupying one of its shores. France, on the other hand, had thrown onto her shoulders the defense of the Greek cause. But soon Italy, irritated by the Trieste incidents which the governor, Hohenlohe, provoked, again showed herself hostile to Austria.

In the years 1912 and 1913 armaments were everywhere augmented. Germany raised the number of her soldiers to 900,000 in time of peace, so that at a given moment she could dash over any frontier; France imitated her by increasing the term of military service to three years, though to do so cost the most violent discussions in Parliament. Russia went on enthusiastically with her army reorganization, and England pushed ahead with her marine; the standing armies of both Italy and Austria were raised and their naval constructions hastened. Meanwhile the chiefs of the various General Staffs exchanged visits, perhaps to prepare the attack or to communicate the plans for it. In short, by 1913 war appeared certain.

The forthcoming incident of Sarajevo was, it is evident, a pretext and not a real cause.

Germany did not intend that the *encerclement* should be complete. She knew her own strength, she

felt ready. Once more, in order to maintain her frontiers and to realize her ambitions (certainly none too modest), she would be forced to fight, even though to do so meant an offensive war. Her pride in her new naval power impelled her to give battle. Her greatness was at stake. The loss of that position in Europe which had formerly been so absolute, obliged her to deal the supreme and decisive blow. Only a noble resolution on her part not to dominate the world would have avoided the conflict; but such a decision was not part of her program.



CHAPTER X

PLANS FRUSTRATED

VON MOLTKE'S plan for 1870 in case Prussia should be attacked in the rear was to throw an army rapidly on France, deliver a crushing defeat, and then turn and defend himself against the other belligerent. And now after forty years this was still the best strategy, especially as the Austrian ally could keep Russia in check, and Italy could engage a large part of the French army by an assault on the south of France. England, though an enemy, could not do much damage on land if she decided to stand by France and Russia; but there was always the chance that she would leave them to fight alone, for had not the British foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, said to the French ambassador, Cambon, that England was not obliged to coöperate in case of war?

All was foreseen but that which, according to the ancients, lay on the knees of Jupiter. Obstacles of the sort that defy even the profoundest human calculation upset the German plans. In the first place England was war-inclined. She knew that another German triumph would not be at the expense of France but

of herself. As expressed in a pamphlet by the well-known English socialist, Robert Blatchford, "The problem of British defense is the defense of France." In former days Albion was not addicted to drawing her sword for others; but Albion, perfidious though her reputation, was never so to herself. Everybody in England knew that Germany was a successful competitor in every field, and that a war which left her victorious would do more harm to England than to any other nation.

The next unforeseen obstacle was Belgium's energetic defense of her neutrality. German diplomats and strategists had believed that she would limit herself to vehement protests, or perhaps would sacrifice a few brigades in order to comply with the obligation of defending herself against invasion. But instead the Belgian soldiers held up the march of a whole powerful army and thus enabled the French to concentrate on the most important points of their unexpectedly invaded frontier.

Then to further frustrate German diplomatic, and more especially military, prevision, came Italy's refusal to participate in an offensive war. As already pointed out the Triple Alliance had been undergoing some readjustment during the previous few years. Italy was still bound officially to Germany and Austria but the people had never given their soul to the alliance. Long before the coalition the aged premier Agostino Depretis, in order to excuse certain necessary concessions to Austria, had confessed, that in his

youth he had taken part in a plot to kidnap the Austrian Emperor;* and Crispi, the statesman most favorable to Germany, used to say that necessity had driven him into union with the Central Powers when affection would have drawn him to France.

When the present storm was brewing Italy had only recently finished a war with Turkey and still had troops in Africa. The worst or at any rate most immediate consequences of the conflict would have fallen upon her; for Germany and Austria having but little coast line could easily defend themselves whereas she would catch the brunt of all the naval attacks. She would suffer a rigid blockade and would have to abandon, and perhaps lose, her newly acquired colony of Tripoli. Therefore as the treaty, strictly speaking, did not bind her to participate in offensive warfare she turned it into the instrument of an unpleasant surprise for her expectant allies, and this without breaking any given pledge. Their paths further diverged when King Victor Emanuel listened, as had his illustrious grandfather, to the groans of the Italian *Irredentists*. He decided to unsheathe his sword but not on the side that twenty years of mutual aid and guarantees would have indicated.

From the course of this war we learn how completely a whole series of previously outlined hypotheses can fall short of application. For instance the pacifist tendency which it was believed would deeply influence the contending parties at the crucial moment, became

* Salvatore Barzilai; "Vita parlamentare."

a dead letter—hardly more than the talk of a few newspapers; the same with the revolutionist and syndicalist tendencies and the great general strike which was to be declared the minute war burst. All were swept away by an avalanche of resurging patriotism, more sanguinary to-day than ever in past centuries. Jaurès, whose fine spirit and profound perception had forced him to affirm that the Triple Alliance was a necessary counterpoise to French Chauvinism, was shot down in Paris, one of the first victims of the war. German socialists marched in the first ranks just as the aged Bebel had said they would, a few years before in the Reichstag. French socialists did the same, and Guesde, high-priest of French Marxism, became a minister without a portfolio.

The beginning of this twentieth century saw more Peace Congresses and Peace Conferences than any other period of history; it heard the word peace repeated more often probably than all the centuries of humanity put together; and yet to-day it is looking upon the most bloody war ever recorded. Such are the contradictions of destiny, the ironies of fate.

And to what has all the preparation led thus far? Germany having had to abandon her plan of rapid entry into Paris, has fallen back on her previously outlined plan of a tenacious resistance; and in her own strength she still confides, chanting her war-song of *Deutschland über Alles*.

Notwithstanding, the final result of the war is beyond all doubt. England having instantly made her-

self mistress of the seas, the enormous merchant fleet which Germany so lovingly and carefully built up lies idle in her own ports or worse still, plies in the service of the enemy. She can use only her submarines whose victims have been all too often innocent non-combatants and whose material booty, while enormous, cannot bring the hoped-for victory. This is a condition which no end of brilliant land engagements can outweigh.

Alone of the great personages who played a leading role in the tragedy of 1870 survives the Spanish-born ex-Empress of the French, Eugénie; and she, of them all, must have least interest and least consolation in the *revanche*. Widow, inconsolable mother, dethroned empress who waited in vain for the husband of heroic name to reinstate her, she will witness the triumph of that Republic which forced her to flee in humiliation. Perhaps she is thinking that the son whom the Zulus sacrificed might have obtained the revenge. But she must recognize that the odious Republicans have known better how to prepare alliances and armies than the husband whose surrender at Sédan was the occasion of her Homeric words to his messenger: "You lie, sir; you mean that he is dead!"

The Republic has succeeded where the Empire failed. France's success has been the product of fifteen years of wise and sure diplomacy. The isolation policy against Germany initiated by Delcassé has borne its fruit. Even Gabriel Hanotaux will have to compliment his fortunate rival and revise his latest writings.*

* Gabriel Hanotaux; "La politique de l'équilibre."

CHAPTER XI

THE VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED

HOW much cause and how much pretext there may be in human disagreements is difficult to determine, especially when the contending minds are cautious and of high calibre. This truth, applicable in all wars, stands out most prominently in the present one; for in spite of all the literature the catastrophe has brought forth we are not yet able to agree unanimously as to which were specific causes and which were mere pretexts.

Nor is this strange. In certain far less complicated international conflicts all the facts have come out later and yet have failed to produce a concordant opinion. The Franco-Prussian War for instance—and this is a reference we are justified not only in making but in reiterating because of its relation of cause and effect to the present—the Franco-Prussian War was undoubtedly desired by Bismarck as a necessary step in German progress as he conceived it; yet to many it still appears rather as a consequence of French Chau-

vinism. Bismarck himself frequently said so and many agree with him. But analysis shows that however patriotic his motives may have been his share of the responsibility was very grave; and this without denying French errors and weaknesses, nor the indelicacies and vanities of the Emperor and Empress, of Olivier and Grammont and Benedetti; to say nothing of the reactionary party who were a dominant factor in spite of the change in the political régime of the Empire. If opinion is not yet unanimous regarding the war of 1870, how much less so could it be regarding the war of 1914.

There is no denying that the present crisis had a warlike preparation based on well-defined interests. Facing each other stood Germany and Russia, the latter threatened in her European prestige through having lost her Asiatic, the former powerful on the sea, pushing her maritime commerce whither she wished, maintaining a colonial policy and defending, in union with Austria, a Balkan policy of conquest and domination; and beyond them both stood England and France, the one waylaid on the ocean highways, the other watching for her revenge. War had to break out, and many a time did its sinister phantom appear on the horizon.

Everything that could preclude war had happened in Europe. The various interests had been delineated by the grouping of states into two great bodies, for

every member of which the future struggle constituted a hope; in its final result every one was seeking the satisfaction of some clearly felt necessity. The development of one of the groups, or of one of the principal nations dominating it, represented danger for the other. The turning-point had to come in this international chess game. When? How? This no one could know. But each player hoped it would come at the moment when his moral and material preparation was best. Each one thought of his own interests, although with different degrees of intensity; and nobody for a moment forgot his own advantage through a platonic love of peace.

In international matters, as in physics, expansion must produce shock. There was England with her mercantile imperialism—had not Chamberlain said that empire and commerce were one?—the product of centuries of constant effort and seemly procedure. And there was Germany with her expansion of violence, a porcedure which time had crowned with success. (Far back in Mirabeau's day he had said that the national industry of Prussia was war.) Germany wished, in revolutionary manner, to strike other nations who by the slowness of their effort had been disguising that lust which economic imperialism implies, while her own greed, precisely through the opposite or rapid method, was made to appear unbounded.

France, aided by her admirable financial organization and impelled by her enormous bureaucracy, had formed two empires, one in Asia and one in Africa. The vanquished of 1870 found easy that which the conqueror was not able to achieve. Even Italy, least powerful and least populated of the Triple Alliance, least in commerce and military force, had managed to conquer for herself vast African territories and magnificent Mediterranean positions; and the same with Russia, whose breast had only recently begun to throb with economic aspirations, and the same with Austria. This last-named, for every colonial conquest, had to break the cord drawn tight around her, and yet she had captured the road to the port of Salonika.

Outside facts throw but little light on underlying causes. It matters very little, for instance, whether the Kaiser one day embraced his royal English cousin or his imperial Russian cousin, and whether one of these returned the embrace with more effusion than the other; nor does it matter whether on some other day this same Kaiser extended his hand to France, and she, to use his own picturesque phrase, pretended not to see it. It is not expressions of affection which are to be examined, but great national interests. It did not help the international situation for the Kaiser to hold out his hand to France and at the same time insist on the Treaty of Frankfort by which she had lost two provinces and suffered the greatest humiliation of

her history; nor did it help matters to talk of family ties and past links in the court of Russia, while the Slavs in the Balkans were being harrassed to the great detriment of Muscovite prestige. Fine words, needless to say, never distracted the eyes of utilitarian Albion from the enormous German fleet; and vice versa; Germany in full hegemony and with her people trained to the point of megalomania in thinking and talking of grandeur, was not going to limit her political, maritime, economic, and financial expansion just to please her adversaries. She had to threaten the rivals which her own greatness was creating, and to refuse every *status quo* which signified enforced but unmerited inferiority, heedless of the truth that historic consequences must be respected unless a nation deliberately wishes to provoke war.

For England the present struggle is just such another phase in her time-honored policy as that which brought her into conflict with Spain, Holland, and France; just such as in future will bring her against any power who tries to take from her the maritime dominance which insures her national existence.

For Germany the war signifies the inevitable complement of William II's political scheme. If he had not kept in mind an armed action which would give the backing of force to his Oriental and maritime expansion, all the effort—chiefly economic—of twenty-

four years, from his 1890 journey to Constantinople to the present day, would have been useless.

When Bismarck was sent into retreat everybody thought it was a *coup de tête* of the new Emperor, the act of a young man who could not brook the presuming authority of his chancellor. To a few it signified a necessity of domestic policy; and still fewer watched from then on for a radical change in foreign policy. Bismarck was content with the past and in its security he expected to live long years of tranquillity. Prussia dominated in Germany and Germany in continental Europe, and this was his serene aspiration and his beatific reality; he was willing to leave far-off colonial vanities to others. William II, however, was dreaming of greater glories. The past did not belong to him. For him it was necessary to be as strong on sea as on land and even to lift his eyes to that Orient which was the object of general European covetousness. His must be the task to beat down the wall which hemmed in the Teuton race. He must extend his policy of hegemony. From Occidental Europe he must go to Oriental, and from there he must look higher and acquire even greater authority over the world. Was it not perhaps on the tomb of "his illustrious ancestor Charlemagne" that he was inspired to pronounce that memorable discourse so imbued with medieval policy?

The grandeur of Germany dictated to him the line

of conduct he must follow; it obliged him "to grasp the trident of Neptune along with the sword of Frederick the Great"; it opened to him the doors of the luxurious and much-coveted Orient. In short, German grandeur interpreted by German mentality meant war. And now that this has come we see with what ingenuousness German statesmen and writers declare: "They denied us that which we had a right to demand; our power was superior to our opportunity."

Ever since 1890 German foreign policy has been indicating the ideas which to-day are openly upheld. The fleet which was constructed, the army which was enlarged, and the military organization which was held in readiness, as if, to use ex-Chancellor Von Bülow's expression, * war might break out the following day—all this was to serve not for guarding a favorable *statu quo* and warning off adversaries, but to offer itself some day on the international market and bid for a greater part of that booty which the powerful states, under the pretext of civilization, were accumulating at the cost of the little and less fortunate ones.

France, Russia, and Austria were all revolving around an unsettled policy. France, in the name of the past, should have been more partizan of war than the others. For them the greatness of the neighboring empire represented a future danger only;

* Count Von Bülow; "Imperial Germany."

for her it represented an unhappy past as well. Add to this the proud spirit of the Frenchman which a glorious history had quickened to a higher pitch than normal. For forty-four years he had been champing the bit and longing for the day when Sédan might be avenged, Metz reconquered; when the statues of the lost provinces would be a living reality to the masses who crossed the Place de la Concorde, instead of a dead hope. And so it was that France, moved by the two opposing sentiments of past injury and present well-being, desired war yet maintained peace. Thus when the Kaiser offered friendship to the nation which had been forced to accept the preliminaries of Versailles with tears in the eyes and groans in the soul, insult was added to injury; the compassion of the victor humiliated the victim. Granted the antagonism, both peoples knew that whatever conflict arose, it would drive them against each other. Evidently destiny had put them on opposite sides forever, and each knew what its future position must be. Such being the collective psychology, the mind of the masses and the preparation of the youth, the tension of the two governments in question can be easily understood. This tension, never relaxed for a single day, was the cause of the alliances in continental Europe. It united France to Russia and it formed the Triple Alliance.

Russia, nevertheless, had oscillated in her international policy. Friend and loyal ally of France she

remained after signing the treaty; but for some time she gave scant attention to France in particular or Europe in general. Pushed by her geographic configuration towards the vast continent of Asia, she mixed in the affairs of China, Thibet, Turkestan, Afghanistan, and above all Korea, Manchuria, and Persia. So absorbed was she in these that she somewhat forgot the Balkan States, their Slavic population, and her influence in Turkey. Lured by the Pacific she forgot her dream of being a Mediterranean power. But so far as Asia was concerned, her disastrous Asiatic war and the Anglo-Russian and the Russo-Japanese treaties all clipped her aspirations; she then went back with greater freedom and calm to that European policy which represented so great a part of her diplomatic and military life.

On returning, however, she found her adversary better prepared, with greater influence and more defined ambitions. Austria was still under the sceptre of Francis Joseph (to whom longevity had made a concession in order that he might live through innumerable family and state afflictions), but the aged Emperor was subject to the influence of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, his heir. This young man opposed his tendencies with all the energy of his fiery character and expounded the system for a Greater Austria based not on economic development and intellectual progress, but on a big fleet and a war-trained army.

And in truth it was the heir-apparent and not the Emperor who represented the true current of public opinion. The whole army of which he was generalissimo approved his plans. Intimate of the Kaiser he received, by reflection as it were, all the favor of the Pan-Germanists and was considered the representative of Austrian militarism and imperialism—an adversary to be feared by Russia. His audacity of character made him less of a Hapsburg than a Bourbon, from which house he inherited abundantly, both as to temperament and political-religious tendencies.*

Balkan difficulties no longer bore the timid aspect of years ago. No longer were they the motive for formal international congresses or for an exchange of notes between European governments. Instead, events were violent. Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexed in face of international stupor, are an example; likewise the expulsion of Montenegro and Servia, and later Greece, from certain parts of the Adriatic shore; and lastly, the repeated threats of war or annexations made to the smaller Balkan States.

Russia's return to intensive Balkan activity was not marked by success. On the contrary her humiliations were continuous and she lost considerable prestige among those of her race who for so many years had looked to her for aid and protection.

* R. W. Seton Watson; "The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, in *The Contemporary Review*, August, 1914.

War was on the point of breaking out at the end of 1908, at the beginning of 1909, and again in 1913, for causes almost identical with the present: that is to say, because of friction between Austrian and Slav interests in the Balkans. The first cloud gathered when the official newspaper of Vienna published on October 7, 1908, the following documents: a proclamation by the Emperor to the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina; a letter to the statesmen representing the powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin; and an Imperial rescript directed to the premiers of Austria and Hungaria. In these documents he proceeded, in spite of Servian and Montenegran interests, in spite of Russian prestige and of the fact that he was violating a treaty signed by many governments, to annex the two provinces mentioned.

The news went out to an unsuspecting world. None of the powers knew of the intention until after it had been consummated. Then, as in the incident which provoked the present war, English initiative, supported by France, suggested that the concerted powers should act in some form yet to be determined in order to obtain from Austria and Servia a solution to the question. But Germany opposed. War between Austria and Russia, precursory to a more general one, appeared on the point of breaking out; but as Russia was not fully prepared the matter was arranged in the best manner possible, thanks to Sir Edward

Grey.* Nevertheless, in order to justify the present conflict and limit Austria's responsibilities, it is now being published that Russia knew Austria's intentions in 1908 and approved them; but subsequent events plainly disprove these tardy statements. As Joaquin de Bartoszewicz justly says in *La Vie Politique dans les deux mondes* (1909-1910), "At the time of the Turkish revolution of the twenty-fourth of July which changed the whole aspect of the old Balkan question, again on the proclamation of Bulgarian independence, and later on the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia showed herself singularly reserved; she was visibly impotent to dictate her point of view in these questions which nevertheless touched her so closely."

Because of the death of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Austria repeated her high-handed acts. She dealt with the small Balkan nations directly without the intervention of Europe, as if their existence and their line of conduct had not always been imposed by the great powers without any one disputing their right to do so. But this time Russia did not turn away her eyes. Instead, she admitted the appeal of the racial tie; Germany stood firm by her ally; France followed the road which both honor and interest pointed out; and the aged Emperor Francis Joseph known for his

* Achille Viallate; *La vie politique dans les deux mondes*, for the year 1908-1909, page 312.

aversion to war,* though freed now from the militaristic domination of his nephew and heir, nevertheless prepared his own grave by opening many others.

* Demetrius C. Boulger; "The Emperor Who Made War," *North American Review*, September, 1914, page 368.



CHAPTER XII

SERVIA'S ASPIRATIONS AND AUSTRIA'S CRIME

THE tragedy of Sarajevo is well known. In company with his wife, the ex-Countess Sophia Chotek, who had been elevated to the dignity of Princess of Hohenberg on her marriage, the Archduke Ferdinand was visiting that city when a young Servian, Gabrilo Princip, killed them both. Princep was driven to the act by a blind patriotism which made him see in the future heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne the embodiment of all the difficulties which beset his country in its unlimited ambition for aggrandizement.

The form in which the affair was carried out was sufficiently unique. As it was well known that the Archduke was going to be the object of an attack, that a plot had been made and men were ready to execute it, public opinion throughout Europe indicted the Austrian police. The first attempt was on the day of his arrival in Sarajevo; soon after occurred the second, and the royal pair were obliged to leave. It is said that the Archduke himself declined courting

further danger but the police assured him there was nothing whatever to fear.

Like many of the Hapsburgs and Bourbons, Francis Ferdinand was a man without poise and easily given over to violence. At court he was little liked, having imposed there a wife whom strict court etiquette repudiated. Who can say what mysteries may not lie back of their tragic deaths! And yet this was not the first time that an heir-apparent, or a political chief, or the head of a royal or imperial family, had lost his life by the homicidal bullet of a fanatic. While it would be unfair to attribute the responsibility to the Servian nation or government, it would be partial to consider the murder within the narrow limits of an individual action. It is evident that Gabrilo Princip was not actuated by the same motives as the starving Caserio who threw himself at President Carnot's coach; or the poor distracted Lucchesi who killed the luckless Empress of this same Austria. To have reproached Italy with the deeds of these two Italian subjects would have been as unjust as to have blamed her for the audacity of William Oberdank when he tried to force the Julian Alps; nor did the respective governments concerned ever think of making such an accusation. But in the present case there can be no doubt that a Servian organization, permitted or tolerated by that government, armed the young man and urged him to his terrible act without the least shud-

der as to its effect on the excitable, almost hysterical, masses. Indeed there was a general and secret satisfaction shown at the death of the prince who was preparing the transformation of the dual monarchy into a triple by adding a Slavic kingdom to the Germanic and the Hungarian. Had Francis Ferdinand lived to accomplish this, it would have been the death-blow to that Servian aspiration, or to speak more exactly, ambition, which aimed to put Servia at the head of a Pan-Slavic Balkan movement; moreover it would have prevented all future Russian intervention in the name of the Slav race. To frustrate him was one of the objects of the *Narodna Odbrana*, a society deeply rooted in the hearts of the Servians, and to which Princip belonged. All the ardent patriots and heroes of the wars against Turkey and Bulgaria were members; and with much the same feeling that a cautious army looks to its intrepid vanguard, the Servian statesmen who were aspiring to make their country an Adriatic power looked toward this society of fanatics.

And yet the time when the Servian King Milan ran to the Emperor Francis Joseph to pay his debts was not very remote. Only with the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903 did the Servian Government definitely change its inclinations. First Austrophile, it soon began to debate between this and the Russian tendency. Under the influence of Paschitch, a Bulgarian by origin but prime minister of

Servia, it became completely Russophile, which, of course, meant completely anti-Austrian.

Giving international relations their just values, it must be admitted that Servia got no benefits whatever from the Austrian friendship. It was purely commercial, while that with Russia was sentimental and racial.* To depend upon the former signified subjection; to be bound to the latter constituted defense. In the article cited, Dumba, the Austrian ambassador to Washington when the war began, writes with much exactitude on the Servian agitation against Austria and what a troublesome little neighbor Servia was because of it; but when he comes to the Muscovite predominance, so great, he says, that the Russian minister in Belgrade was almost a viceroy, he loses his equanimity and misses thereby the just estimate of Servia's Russian tendency. He fails to see it as a policy which, ever since the tragic death of King Alexander, has been more in harmony with the interests of the nation. Neither Alexander nor his predecessor Milan represented the national policy of Servia. Vicious and of petty souls, they were far below the moral height of their nation which was saturating itself with the new spirit of civilization. The Austria to whom these monarchs turned was not a good guide

* Constantin Theodor Dumba; "Why Austria Is at War with Russia," in the *North American Review*, September, 1914, page 346.

for small nations, and had never brought happiness to those who depended on her or were in her sphere of influence. This the Servians knew only too well; they saw themselves restrained in all their expansionist desires, and left to content themselves with a reality that offered no hope; hence the change of policy on Alexander's death.

Without believing that the Servian government was cognizant of the Sarajevo murders, or that it had armed the assassins, it is nevertheless true that the motive for the regrettable act can be found in the great patriotic agitation; and that this, justifiable or not, imperiled the neighborly relations of the two countries.

In Austria it was believed absolutely that the attack had been prepared in Belgrade and that it was officially inspired. All the press gave this version, and the unwarranted, or at least exaggerated, Austrian demand that Viennese officials should investigate the crime, shows how the belief had penetrated government circles. It cannot be supposed that here there was any preconceived idea of intervention, for the deed was unexpected; nor can we admit the hypothesis that grief had so distracted the directing spirits of the nation that it drove them to proceed in an abnormal manner. That the Servian government was responsible for the crime is also the argument upheld in the *German White Book*. "The investigations begun by

the Austro-Hungarian authorities show that the plot to assassinate the Archduke, heir to the throne, was hatched, prepared, and matured in Belgrade; that persons in official positions coöperated, and that the weapons with which it was executed came from the state arsenals of Servia." *

To thrash out the matter is not easy, but it is evident that Austria, deeply moved by the Sarajevo crime and fully aware of Servia's continued hostility, wished to take advantage of the moment and destroy or at least humiliate the little frontier state. Nor must it be forgotten that in the brief period of six years Servia had provoked grave international troubles and was now provoking one of exceptional importance within Austria. It was in this belief and in this state of mind that the ultimatum was sent which brought on the war; but likewise it must be remembered that the war favored Austria's interests. In the *German White Book* an illuminating confession is made with certain Saxon ingenuousness, namely: that the Berlin government knew Austria's intentions of making war on Servia and approved and encouraged them. The exact text is as follows:

Given the circumstances Austria could not but decide that it was incompatible with her dignity and with the

* *Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia*; official publication, page 1.

preservation and stability of the monarchy to continue contemplating passively the happenings on the other side of her frontier. The Imperial and Royal Government informed us of this, her opinion, asking ours.

With all sincerity we were able to declare to our ally that we agreed with her estimate of events, and to assure her that we would approve of whatever action she considered necessary to put an end to the movement initiated in Servia against the stability of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. On making this declaration we knew perfectly well that a possible armed attack by Austria-Hungary on Servia was likely to provoke action on the part of Russia and involve us in a war. But recognizing that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake we could neither recommend a condescension incompatible with her dignity nor deny her our aid in such a difficult moment.*

In this we see the explanation of the attitude assumed by the German Government regarding posterior events. It is a pity that the *White Book* does not publish the text of the notes exchanged between Germany and Austria. Who can say whether in them we might not encounter more than approbation to the Dual Monarchy, instigation even? The vindications of the *White Book* appear to suggest this by admitting that Servia's attitude threatened not only Austria but also Germany, which is tantamount to say-

* Guglielmo Ferrero appears unaware of this part of the Official Memoir of Germany in his book, "La Guerra Europea." In such a careful writer the omission is strange.

ing: Our government had to defend itself in order not to perish caught in the meshes of a diplomacy at once subtle and dangerous; we had to cut the Gordian knot and force Servia to abandon forever her aspirations of aggrandizement.*

From documents published, from certain statements encountered in the *English White Book*, and from official declarations of the Italian Government and the general clamor of the Italian press, it appears that the third ally in the Triple Alliance was as much surprised by events as were the other powers. The *German White Book* reveals that within the Triple Alliance there had been another, closer still, which did not extend to all the powers who had signed the pact; and the revelation, along with other official documents at hand, justifies the neutrality immediately assumed by the kingdom of Italy. There can be no doubt that had Italy been previously consulted she would have advised greater prudence and would have sought a solution of the difficulty as she had done on other occasions, notably in 1913. But Austria preferred other advice; for having followed which she will certainly not go down in diplomatic annals as a model of perspicacity; for, admitting all the extenuat-

* The *Austrian Red Book* throws no light on the previous pourparlers between Germany and Austria which the German Memoir confesses. The very omission implies a confession—“*excusatio non pertita accusatio manifesta.*”

ing circumstances and justifications, admitting the troublesome attitude of Servia and the constant provocations she offered, the ultimatum which Austria sent her on July 23 was without doubt an egregious error and a deliberate incitement to war.



CHAPTER XIII

THE VIOLENT METHOD AND ITS RESULTS

BISMARCK once wrote that "Even governments most inclined to sophism and violence do not wish openly to break their word; that is they try to keep it if predominating interests do not enter into play." He might have said more. He might have said that governments prefer always to execute the most violent and arbitrary actions under the cloak of a high moral duty or of a pressing national interest.

But Austria did not even seek this cloak. Without the subtlety of international formalities or the suavity of diplomacy she briskly faced Servia with a problem, and in doing so committed one of the most audacious acts of modern times—audacious because it ignored the fact that Europe had been exercising continuous tutelage over the Balkan States; audacious because it threw down the glove to Russia; and more than audacious because it disregarded Servia's national rights by dictating over and above the political constitution of that country the fiat of Austria's sovereign

will. However well prepared public opinion may have been, the Austrian note of July 23, 1914, surprised the world. Only Germany remained tranquil, cognizant as was later revealed by her own confession, of what was about to develop.

The note from the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria to the Royal Government of Servia demanded within forty-eight hours an acceptance of the following exorbitant terms:

First. To suppress every publication which excited hatred or disrespect for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and whose general tendency was against the national integrity of the same.

Second. To immediately dissolve the society called *Narodna Odbrana* and every other of the same patriotic tendency, and to prevent them from continuing under some other name or form.

Third. To immediately eliminate from the public schools all men and text-books that might serve to foment the propaganda against Austro-Hungary.

Fourth. To dismiss from military service and from the administration in general such officers and functionaries as the Austro-Hungarian Government should accuse of anti-Austrian propaganda.

Fifth. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement di-

rected against the territorial integrity of said Government.

Sixth. To open a judicial investigation against the accessories to the plot which had as its consequence the assassination of the hereditary prince; *in which investigation delegates of the Austro-Hungarian government would take part.*

Seventh. To instantly condemn to prison Captain Voijac Tankositch and also Milan Ciganovitch, Servian employees found compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry already held in territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Sarajevo) against the authors of the crime of June 28.

Eighth. To prevent by efficient means the participation by Servian authorities in the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss and severely punish those functionaries on the Schabatz and Loznica frontier who were guilty of having aided the perpetrators of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their passage across the same.

Ninth. To give the Imperial and Royal Government explanations of the unjustifiable attitude of high Servian functionaries who in spite of their official position did not hesitate after the crime of Sarajevo to publicly express themselves both in Servia and abroad in a manner hostile to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Tenth. To report within forty-eight hours the execution of the preceding measures.*

These clearly expressed demands were preceded by others of a general sort. After accusing the Servian government of culpable tolerance and declaring this to have been the cause of the crime of Sarajevo, it demanded that a declaration be published on the first page of the *Official Gazette* condemning not only Pan-Servian aspirations but also confessing that state functionaries had abetted the acts directed against Austria-Hungary.

The foregoing note was delivered to Servia by the minister resident in Belgrade, and on the following day it was ordered that it should be communicated to the other governments with explanations of the reasons which the Dual Monarchy had for proceeding in such a manner. These explanations consisted in formulating an accusation against Servia for having failed in the obligation imposed upon her by the treaty of March 31, 1909, in which she recognized the rights of Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herezegovina, and committed herself to maintain neighborly relations and to change her previous policy of protest and opposition. There was further talk of the attacks in Servian newspapers, of the plotting by Servian poli-

* *Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia.* German official publication, page 22, *et seq.*; also *English White Book*, document number 4.

ticians, and, it goes without saying, much talk of the benevolence and forbearance of the Imperial and Royal Government. This note to the European powers terminated by stating that Austria-Hungary was convinced that the measures she had adopted would be in full accord with the sentiments of all civilized nations; and she offered for their inspection all the probationary documentation of the Servian conspiracy and of its connection with the crime of June 28 which cost the hereditary prince his life.

The impression which this note produced in the Servian and other cabinets, especially the Russian to which it was sent with intentional delay, is easy to imagine. Putting aside the sentiment of grief naturally felt for the victims, and even condemning the attitude of Serbia, it must nevertheless be admitted that the Austrian note outraged all the rights of an independent state and overstepped the limits of international law; furthermore, that its drastic form was in itself a provocation. For the purpose of avenging a crime or putting an end to a harmful state of things, armed intervention would have appeared more logical. Unfortunately for humanity international relations are not regulated by the famous Scales; yet even violence has its limits. It is undeniable that in recent years we have witnessed the formation of colonial empires piratically seized, but it is nevertheless true that in such cases the pretext has been one of purely inter-

national order, since to secure the emoluments of a determined territory it was necessary to occupy it, as was done. Deplorable as it certainly is to admit such a procedure in the field of international interests, it is quite different from the case under consideration, where the internal laws of a constitutional European state were violated. With much exactitude could Sir Edward Grey exclaim in the note sent to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, English Ambassador in Vienna, on that same 24th of July: "Never before have I seen one state direct to another independent state a document of such formidable character." *

Austria, in short, claimed governmental rights in Servia. Although limited as to form and time these signified nothing less than a concurrence in the administration of Servian justice. This virtually condemns her; it destroys state sovereignty.

On the arrival of the formidable note the effect in Servia was enormous. From the first moment the government knew what it meant and prepared to transfer the capital from Belgrade, which was too exposed, to Nisch. Paschitch, the Prime Minister, returned precipitously from an electoral trip, and the Austrian note received an answer which was tranquil, serene, adjusted to the rights of nations, very conciliatory, and sufficiently submissive.

* *English White Book*, correspondence respecting the European crisis, page 9.

It began by declaring that Servia had fulfilled her promises of 1909, that the protestations of former times had not been renewed, and that she had made great sacrifices in order to maintain the peace of Europe at the cost of her own legitimate aspirations. She agreed in its totality to the *amende honorable* which Austria insisted should be published in the *Official Gazette*, but in that part where she had to regret the coöperation of Servian officials in anti-Austrian propaganda she desired to add the modifying words "according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government." She declared herself ready to comply with all the points enumerated, demanding definite proofs in individual cases; but she could not accept the fifth clause referring to a judicial investigation by functionaries of that government; instead she answered submissively: "The Royal Government declares that it does not exactly understand the meaning and aim of this demand, by which it must bind itself to permit delegates of the Imperial and Royal Government to intervene in its dominions; but it is disposed to accept all coöperation in conformity with the principles of international law and criminal procedure, and of good neighborliness." *

Servia evidently wished to avoid war. Even if the

* *Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia*; official German publication, page 26, et seq.; also *English White Book*, document number 39.

body of the document did not so indicate the ending was irrefutable proof. To prevent the Austrian note from having the importance of an ultimatum, and the planting of a consequent *casus belli* in case Austria was not satisfied, Servia terminated with the following proposition: "The Royal Servian Government believes that it is to the general interest not to precipitate the solution of this affair; for which reason should the Austro-Hungarian Government not be satisfied with this answer the Servian Government will be disposed to accept a pacific solution either by referring the decision of the question to the International Tribunal of The Hague, or by leaving it to the great powers who coöperated in the note of explanation given by the Servian Government in March, 18-31, 1909." *

In normal times the most exacting government might have been appeased by this reply; but the Vienna cabinet had not sufficient tranquillity or independence to choose the road it ought to follow. Some powerful cause, not yet completely known, launched Austria on a previously traced-out path of violence, and the note of July 23 was but a milestone. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade withdrew and diplomatic relations were severed. This, if not actually constituting a state of war in itself (and Japan had to accept it as such on an analogous occasion in 1904) was a sure

* The two dates are of the two different calendars used, the one in Orthodox countries and the other in Western Europe.

announcement of the proximity of war. And in fact in another few days the Danube was tinged with blood.

Austria's note and her subsequent attitude were interpreted with great gravity by nations and statesmen. At last the pretext for a European war had been found. Many times had the conflict been provoked and many times avoided; always reciprocal fear or the desire of the opposing parties for better preparation had changed the course of events.

In the conduct of Austria-Hungary two extremes are to be noted: first, that she consulted with her ally Germany on the note of July 23; and second, that she hardly gave any news of it whatever to her other ally, Italy. This fact is symptomatic because it meant one of two things: either the Vienna government believed from the very first moment that the conflict would be general and consequently serious and should therefore have warned those nations whom she expected to aid her; or, she believed that it was merely a diplomatic question between two nations, or at most, a circumscribed *casus belli*, in which event her consulting Germany was completely unnecessary. Her doing so was in fact suspicious and appears even more so when we recall that the *German White Book* ingenuously confesses that Germany too felt herself threatened by the Slav attitude, that she feared it might weaken Austria-Hungary, and that she saw

with concern that it might open a breach in the Triple Alliance on that side. Germany makes it clearly understood that Austria's conduct was dictated not only to protect the Dual Monarchy but also Germany's own interests. In fact, but little is lacking to make a full confession that the violent act of Austria was dictated by her.

As we have already said Servia understood that Austria wanted either war or complete hegemony over her. Therefore, at the same time that she was giving the best explanations possible and try to adapt Austria's claims to the exigencies of her own sovereign rights—all of which meant to delay events—she began preparing her forces for defense and soliciting outside help as well.

Mobilization was ordered at once. The archives and the public offices were transferred to Nish and the Skupshtina was convoked there. Paschitch addressed the powers, imploring them to defend the independence of Servia and declaring "if war is inevitable let them make it." * His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent of Servia, addressed the Emperor of Russia, telling him of the Austrian affair and the measures Servia was taking, and begging aid in the following terms: "At the expiration of the time con-

* *Russian Orange Book*; communication of the Russian Chargé d' Affaires in Belgrade to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, document number 1.

ceded we may be attacked by the Austro-Hungarian army, already on our frontier. It is impossible for us to defend ourselves and we supplicate Your Majesty to send aid as soon as possible. Your Majesty's good will, so often manifested in our favor, gives us the firm hope that once more our appeal will be heard by the generous Slav heart. In these difficult moments I interpret the sentiments of the Servian people in imploring that Your Majesty may interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Servia." *

This tragic people had a presentiment of war; they looked back on successive subjugations, and now, with apprehension, they saw one more, perhaps the final. A new Kossovo, which battle did not favor valor and which delivered Servia for five centuries to Ottoman oppression, might deliver her for another five centuries to that of Austria. The promising work of national rehabilitation sung by the bards and paid for by the blood of her warriors was on the point of crumbling. The many dramas of the court would have no national objective. The last reconquest of the kingdom by the Karageorgevitch line would be made void; the victories of General Putnic, barren; the economic and financial independence obtained by enormous sacrifices in the face of acquisitive Austria,

* *Russian Orange Book*; telegram of July 24 from H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Servia to H.M. the Emperor, document number 6.

ephemeral; the Balkan League, product of the efforts of Paschitch, nothing but a dream. All would fall in one moment through an unforeseen and inexplicable event. How many times had the little kingdom taken a chance without meeting such sudden peril! Nor could her last hope be her own effort as it has been in remote times under Duscian, the ancient hero, or Kara George the modern martyr. The cannon would decide forever whether the Obrenovitch line calling on Austria, or the Karageorgevitch calling on Russia, had been most useful to Servia.



CHAPTER XIV

ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION

THAT the Servian incident would have grave consequences was plain to European opinion from the first. The press of the different countries fashioned its point of view according to the interests of its nation and undoubtedly received the *mot d'ordre* from its foreign minister. In France it assumed that tone of gravity the French are so fond of but which they never maintain very long. *Le Temps* on July 23 and 24 was giving considerable space to the Caillaux trial and the English crisis brought about by Ulster's resistance to Home Rule. In the issue of July 25 (published the preceding evening) it took up the Austro-Hungarian threat and straightway declared that out of the ten stipulations there was one which Servia could not possibly accept without destroying her independence—the one admitting Austria's intervention in judicial processes. On July 27 and 28, with fuller information, *Le Temps* attributed all the consequences of the difficult situation and all the blame,

should it lead to war, to Germany, since she could have avoided it with a single word in the ear of the Austrian cabinet.*

Le Matin, in spite of its extensive news service, did not know the Austrian intention nor even the nervous state which preceded the tempest until July 24. Only on July 25 did she awaken and, echoing European opinion, she noted the sudden drop on the exchange, especially that of the French national debt to three per cent, the lowest in thirty-five years. The following day the same newspaper expressed its faith editorially in the news that the German foreign minister, Herr Von Jagow, and the German ambassador in Paris, Baron Von Schoen, had both solemnly declared that Austria did not consult Berlin as to the Servian note. *Le Figaro*, so absorbed at that moment in the Caillaux trial, foresaw war and called France to union. Even *Le Gaulois*, the reactionary sheet, exclaimed: "On the banks of the Seine and in all France there is one identical sentiment—that of a national responsibility which will rise to whatever height events may demand." In short, this was the tone of all the press small in circulation but large in political importance—*Le Rappel*, *Le Radical*, *La Lanterne*. In this class only *L'Humanité*, Jaurès' paper, was contrary to the common journalistic opinion. Popular newspapers of

* *Le Temps*, July 27, 1914; "L'Allemagne veut-elle la guerre?" The same, July 28: "Du rôle de l'Allemagne."

big circulation joined in the general chorus. *Le Petit Journal* recalled another historic date on which Austria provoked war with the same violence. "Today the cabinet of Vienna confronts Servia in precisely the same way and with the same self-justification as she did the Piedmont in 1859. That is to say, after breaking diplomatic relations on March 22, 1858, she concluded by sending to Turin on April 21, 1859, a peremptory order of disarmament within three days, and set forth the *long and unexampled forbearance of which she had given proof during three years and in presence of repeated provocations*. This is precisely the attitude and language adopted to-day. But the same action of 1859 blasted all the hopes to which it had given birth. Europe rose with almost universal condemnation. Cavour rejected the ultimatum in the name of national dignity. Napoleon III did not hesitate to come to his side. Austria found a great power ready to fight with the adversary she had hoped to crush; and Austria, instead of triumphing, lost two provinces."

This apt bit of history unearthed by the French newspaper had probably slipped the memory of Austrian statesmen. Certainly they had forgotten its sad lesson.

In Russia public sentiment was even more roused. Internal troubles ceased as if by magic. Newspapers and public all understood that the shot aimed at Servia

had struck full in the Russian breast. Instantly there were hostile manifestations against Austria, which had to be repressed. *La Novoie Vremia*, the official organ, exclaimed: "The Russian government clearly understands that the ultimatum is really directed to Russia, and Russia will answer not only with words but with deeds. Servia shall not stand alone. If Austria does not withdraw her ultimatum Russia will not be a mute witness of the violence committed. . . . We want peace, but if war is forced upon us official Russia and all the people will take part in it." The following day the same newspaper affirmed in concert with the French press that peace was in the hands of the German government and that she could easily preserve it. The *Gazette de la Bourse*, of Petrograd, declared that Russia in 1914 was not the same as in 1908. The reminder was very apropos because at that date the same sort of conduct on Austria's part humiliated Russia and left her conquered without having fought a battle. Perhaps Austria herself, and Germany too, knew that she was not the same as in 1908, but preferred the Russia of 1914 to that of 1918. The *Courrier* went a little farther toward inflaming its readers: "The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum," it declared, "proves that Austria either wants war with Russia or else no longer considers Russia a great power." In another issue the same newspaper added that "the only answer worthy of Russia is the mo-

bilization of her troops on the Austrian frontier."

Statesmen, and in fact all functionaries, were no less agitated than the journalists. All classes felt the same. The Austrian blow had been deliberately aimed at Russia and the general belief was that Austria wished war or else their humiliation. On July 24 the cabinet met. Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced what had happened, and General Suchomlinoff, Minister of War, explained the situation of the army. Russia from the first moment considered the war a necessity.

Of the nations composing the Triple Entente, England, as was to be expected from her character, was least excited. Those who once more accused *perfidious Albion* of having wished war at that moment because all her alliances were prepared, ignore the great tranquillity displayed in the early moments by the public, the press, and the government. The *Times*, although surprised at the language used in the Austrian note, pronounced the form to be courteous; and admitting the moment to be difficult it exclaimed: "All who love peace must ardently desire that Austria-Hungary has not said the last word in the note to which Servia must give answer this night." The *Morning Post* tried from the beginning to make the public see the importance of the event and to rouse it out of a general apathy which was incompatible with the world's alarm. "It is indispensable that the

English people should be made to see how grave is the situation in Europe. At any moment war may break out and no one can say whether it will be possible to localize it. There is a tendency here to consider that the fate of the Balkan States has no interest for this country. . . . Can England contemplate European questions with indifference and decline to take any responsibility, or must she decide to play the part which History has reserved for her? This is the problem we put without indicating the answer. . . ." But the *Morning Post's* fears were not shared by other newspapers, nor by the Foreign Office, nor by Sir Edward Grey, in spite of his good intentions and great prudence. It is very certain that this sagacious minister was of those whom the *Morning Post* censured for believing that Balkan affairs did not interest England.

Let us now take up the countries of the Triple Alliance where, excepting Italy, opinion was just as grave but in a different direction. From the first moment Italy began to have doubts; the perplexities of the government in face of an unforeseen conflict were reflected by the public. Certain conservative and clerical newspapers like the *Corriere d'Italia* and the *Popolo Romano* believed that Austria was not far in the wrong, and that the Servian attitude had been a continuous offense to the name of friendship; others, liberal or nationalist like the *Messaggero*, the *Vittoria*,

and the *Tribuna*, considered the Austrian note immoderate. In examining either judgment, it must be kept in mind that Italy was predisposed against Servia, whose exaggerated pretensions to expansion threatened Italy's Adriatic interests. Italy, and especially before Austria aspired to be a naval power, always looked upon the Adriatic as a lake, all her own. Had it not been the direct field of action of the glorious Venetian Republic whose ancient splendor was the dream of renascent Italy? Sentiment aside, the nearness of the opposite coast constituted a real peril, and Italy could not look with kindly eyes on Servia's unconcealed efforts to widen her confines, particularly toward the sea. This she aspired to as a consequence of her victories over Turkey and Bulgaria; and this Italy along with Austria had evoked all her diplomacy to avoid.

Public opinion in Berlin and Vienna, however, was almost unanimous in favor of the Austrian act. In Vienna it was apparent that the note had served to give satisfaction to an anxious public and in Berlin it was apparent that it had served German ends. In the joyous chorus of the press, the angry voice of certain newspapers crying in vigorous Teutonic fashion for war or the humiliation of Servia, was at first discordant; but in proportion as events developed there appeared a uniform *communis opinio* influenced by,

and owing to, the counsel given by Wilhelmstrasse and the Ballplatz.

The *Neues Wiener Tageblatt* set forth this alternative: "Either Servia must consent with good grace [sic] to renounce her dreams and the manner in which she tries to realize them, or we will oblige her to. We are determined to preserve the integrity of that which we already possess and not to separate ourselves from the sea through the ambition of a small neighbor. If Austria does not force the Pan-Servian ideal to abdicate, Austria herself will have to abdicate."

The *Fremdenblatt* reflecting entirely governmental opinion went even further than the *Neues Wiener Tageblatt*; it suppressed half the dilemma, leaving only one of its horns—war. "War is an ugly word not easy to pronounce when one feels its full responsibility; but this time it is absolutely necessary. . . . We do not know whether at the last moment when our soldiers are ready to pass the frontier our neighbor will be more reasonable. War does not yet exist, but we are preparing for it. We have reached that point where there can be neither mediation nor arbitration. It is not a question of summoning our mortal enemies before a tribunal of justice, but of convincing them before the tribunal of history that they have no case; that the future does not belong to the Pan-Serb ideal but to our monarchy and that it is not Pan-Serbism which is the stronger, but that spirit which

for centuries has kept Austria-Hungary united."

The words of the *Fremdenblatt* are virtually those pronounced in Budapest by Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister (whose cabinet it will be remembered had no responsibility in foreign affairs). Speaking before parliament the Count said: "No one can reproach us with having sought war. I may say even more, that we went to the extreme limits of patience [loud cheers]. Convinced that our action is due to the vital interests of the Hungarian nation we are ready to face all the consequences." [Loud applause from all sides.] Count Andrassy, leader of the opposition, forgot those differences and even old rancors always so abundant in the turbulent Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, and insisted that the Servian attitude was intolerable and called upon Hungarians to unite and do their duty.* The Chamber, as in similar critical situations when resolutions are left to the executive body, suspended its sessions.

Among all the Austrian newspapers only the socialist organ, the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, was out of tune. In its issue of July 24 it declared that Austria was trying to take advantage of a weak neighbor, forcing her to rebel against unjust demands so as to later lay at her door all the responsibility of a war.

As a consequence of newspaper propaganda and

* Session of July 24, 1914, of the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies.

military preparation came the agitation in the street. In Vienna the masses began crying "Down with Servia!" and ended with "Down with Russia" correlative terms in the subtle instinct of the masses. In front of the German Embassy they sang the *Wacht am Rhein* and other national songs, and sensed in the very act that the time had come to make good the grandiose pretensions of the ringing Teutonic hymns.

In Berlin during the first moments the press had no fixed orientation but soon found one. For instance on July 24, the *Vossische Zeitung*, a liberal newspaper of great importance, on learning of the Austrian note, felt obliged to comment as follows: "It cannot be denied that every paragraph of this note is an attempt on the sovereign rights of the Servian state. We consider it very unlikely that Servia will submit to such conditions." But when on the following day it learned that Russia had asked for an extension of time in behalf of Servia (a petition which in normal circumstances would not have been considered unfair especially by the party who had pronounced Austria's claims beyond the limits of international law), the *Zeitung* expressed itself quite differently: "Yesterday brought us the gravest of news. Russia asks Austria to delay. Austria cannot accept a condition which would in any way permit Servia to take shelter behind a diplomatic wall." Than this a more patent contradiction could not exist.

Immediately after, the road was left free to those newspapers of well defined opinion, and hesitating ones like the *Post* or the *Rhein and Westphalia Gazette* were silenced. The matter passed into the hands of the military party so strong in Berlin, staunchly upheld by the whole army, and led by no less a person than the heir to the throne. When the *Post*, following the then general opinion to the effect that Germany had not been consulted on the note, said: "If advice concerning such a serious affair is not asked from an ally there is no reason to expect her aid," the *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger*, the official periodical, at once answered: "The German people feel better on seeing that finally the Balkan situation is to be cleared up"; and further declared that Germany "congratulates her ally on the strong decision taken and will give her proof of fidelity and sympathy in the course of the grave hours which are probably to be passed through." Identical are the sentiments of the popular *Berliner Tageblatt*: "The Austro-Hungarian note admits of no diplomatic negotiations. In spite of the desire of the whole civilized world to keep the peace it must be admitted that Austria could not act in any other manner. *She may count on the aid of her allies.*" With even greater precision the principal ultra-conservative organ indicated to Austria that Germany would fight by her side: "The German people are ready to fulfill the duties to which their alliance binds them. It is

well that it should be known abroad that Germany will not vacillate a single instant in deciding to march shoulder to shoulder with her Austrian ally." The *Berliner Nachrichten* took its own view and setting aside all question of alliance came out on July 25 with the following philosophic observation: "If we must have a European war it is better for us that it should be this year and not 1917. By that date, Russia would have terminated her military reform and France would have filled the gaps pointed out by Senator Humbert." This is a reference to the criticisms made by the French senator on the deficient military organization of his country; but the Prussian newspaper forgot that when he made them, the whole German press would not admit the gaps but alleged that it was merely a pretext to augment war preparations.

More dangerous for the people were the semi-official communications proceeding now from some high military personage, now from some high civil employee; and more exciting for them was the financial news. Influenced by one and the other the crowds filled the streets singing that hymn which embodies all their hopes—*Deutschland über Alles*.

Diplomacy did its work under the influence of public opinion somewhat as follows: Russia decidedly irritated; Austria ready for the worst; Germany prepared to defend her and make common cause with her; France aflame and serious; Italy taken by sur-

prise and anxious not to be dragged for another's advantage into a position contrary to her own national interest; England hoping to prevent the conflict and knowing that if it should break out she must depart consciously and voluntarily from her state of "splendid isolation." Only a great collective effort, only the good will of all, could have prevented the war made so imminent by the Austrian note. But only in those who had least reason to be interested in a struggle between Germans and Slavs did the good will exist.



CHAPTER XV

EFFORTS OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS

WHEN the war broke out the internal political situation of the various countries was most peculiar. Only Austria and Germany had no difficult problems to solve. In England the Irish question was assuming alarming proportions; the last effort at a solution by means of a conference of leaders of the two parties had just failed.* The Ulster fight was about to recommence with greater violence than ever and no one could foresee the result. In France the Caillaux trial kept the public in such a ferment that not a few believed there would be a repetition of the difficult period of the Dreyfus case. In the course of history French sentimentality has frequently proven that small causes can take possession of the public mind and produce disproportionate effects.

In Russia, according to a German authority,† they were entering on a new period of strikes which threatened a repetition of the revolutionary agitations of

* *The London Times*; July 25, 1914.

† *Berliner Nachrichten*; July 25, 1914.

1905 which, it will be recalled, led to bloodshed in the principal cities. In Italy they had not yet healed the wounds of violent labor troubles which took place chiefly in the turbulent Romagna; and worse still railroad employees were preparing a new strike which would shortly paralyze the commercial life of the kingdom. A writer of great psychologic insight, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, accuses Germany of having taken advantage of these conditions so propitious to her plans. "In Russia," he says, "there were disorders which as usual were exaggerated abroad. Great Britain was in difficult circumstances because of the antagonism between an Irish province largely Protestant and the other three largely Catholic. In France the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, made up of Socialists and united Radical-Socialists, though it was but a weak majority, appeared to foreign eyes to indicate a diminution of military tendencies and of the spirit of sacrifice. On the other hand Humbert's declarations in the Senate on supposed deficiencies in our armament and in our general war preparation were interpreted abroad with visible exaggeration as a sure indication of the weakness of our army. This conjunction of facts appeared to furnish Prussia who had long been lying in ambush with the occasion so fervently desired." *

* "La Guerre" in *l'Economiste Français*, August 3, 1914,
page 202.

Besides all these perturbations there was another state of things unfavorable to a rapid military adventure. The President of the French Republic, Raymond Poincaré, accompanied by the Prime Minister, René Viviani, was in Russia singing hymns to the alliance of the two nations. The Kaiser was off on one of his favorite maritime excursions. Ambassadors were away from their posts; at the Servian capital the Russian ambassador had recently died and the French was ill.

It is difficult to affirm with due impartiality that these convenient conditions induced Austria to deliver her blow against Servia. Up to the present we do not know the correspondence which Austria had with her plenipotentiaries. Time will undoubtedly reveal things which it would be venturesome to say to-day. But the internal political condition, especially of the nations composing the Triple Entente, is hardly a sure basis for assuming that Austria was taking advantage of their situation. For years past they had all been suffering these crises in their respective periods of transformation. England, before facing the difficulties of Home Rule, had experienced those no less serious occasioned by fiscal measures; in Russia there had been the terrorist agitations; in France the anti-militarist disturbance, etc.

In examining the diplomatic acts of the present belligerents it is of the greatest importance to know how

the Berlin government was consulted as to the famous Austrian note and how much influence it exercised. Everyone is now aware that the contents of the note were known and approved in Berlin. This explains Germany's subsequent attitude when she was so little concerned over approaching events that she did not care to advise the Ballplatz cabinet, although sure that any prudent counsel given there would have found a favorable echo. That Berlin knew what Austria was about to do and the seriousness of its consequences there can be no doubt, for Germany has publicly confessed as much in the paragraph of the official memoir to which we have already alluded. The advice to proceed violently against Servia was consciously given. "On making this declaration we knew perfectly that a possible armed action by Austria-Hungary against Servia would provoke intervention on the part of Russia and involve us in a war." *

Nor can it be doubted from the language of the official publication just referred to that it was the German government and not the Kaiser who was consulted; and we can only suppose that the statements of Von Jagow, German Foreign Minister in Paris, and Von Schoen, German Ambassador, in which they affirmed, July 25, that they did not know the Austrian

* *Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia*, official publication, page 5.

note* were due to Germany's not wanting it to be understood that the incident had been especially arranged in order to provoke a war. Judging from the view upheld by German diplomacy during the brief negotiations that lasted until August 1, Germany wanted the world to believe that she was trying to reduce the importance of the question and to localize the conflict between Austria and Servia. The plea of localizing the war could hardly have been defended had it been known that Austria, fully aware of the importance of the case, had previously consulted her ally; and much less if in those early moments the true attitude of the German Empire and the proportions which it expected the conflict to assume had been known. How serious Germany considered it was later defined in the following official words:

"If Servia had been permitted any longer to endanger the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with the aid of Russia and France, the consequence would have been the gradual destruction of Austria and the bringing of the whole Slav race under the sceptre of Russia; and Russia in turn would have made untenable the position of the Germanic race in the center of Europe." †

It is to be supposed that identical reasons induced

* *Le Matin*, July 26, 1914.

† *Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia*, official publication, page 5.

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, to declare to Sir Edward Grey that "the German Government had *not* been informed of the text of the Austrian note." * In this case the false statement takes on greater importance because it has a completely official character.

Dr. E. J. Dillon affirms that the Kaiser had in his hands the draft of the note and after reading it made suggestions emphasizing its severity, which suggestions were accepted by Austria.† This well-known publicist was representing the *Daily Telegraph* on the Continent during the crisis; his reliability in giving news is well known and he asserts that he did not merely suppose or deduce the foregoing, but that he knew it to be a fact.

German intervention, whether to the extreme of counselling Austria to intensify the note, as Dr. Dillon affirms, or whether only to the point of considering the matter her own, as the German government admits in the official publication, can be explained by the disturbed equilibrium of Oriental Europe resulting from the last Balkan War. Germany, as described, had made great efforts to attract Turkey within her sphere of influence. All the splendid work of Von Marschall during long years, all the military labors of

* *Russian Orange Book*, document number 20.

† Dr. E. J. Dillon; "Causes of the European War," in *The Contemporary Review*, September, 1914, page 319.

German tacticians including Von der Goltz, had had for result the double defeat of Turkey in Africa by Italy and in Europe by the Balkan League. The balance against increasing Russian force which Germany had sought in an entente with Turkey was neutralized by the latter's decrease in territory, especially as she was left with only one foot in Europe; and among other causes was the growth of the Servian military spirit and the powerful French influence in Greece, which overcame even the desires of the king of that nation. The European balance having thus inclined towards the Triple Entente, it was necessary to raise the stock of the Triple Alliance—to reëstablish the equilibrium, if not the supremacy.

German diplomacy has never been addicted to tranquil preparations and insidious occupation of new positions. On the contrary she has always been the nation of hard blows, violent threats, and brisk movements. Nations, like individuals, follow their favorite tactics.

After the establishment of the new Servian monarchy the relations of the Russian minister in Belgrade were of the most intimate (we have already mentioned that the Austrian ex-Minister Dumba compared him to a viceroy). When the Austrian note arrived, the post being vacant through the death of the last incumbent, Strandtman was at the head of the Russian Legation. On the 23rd he communicated to the minister of for-

eign affairs at Petrograd that Patchou, Servian Minister of State, had in the absence of Pachitch acquainted him with the contents of the Austrian note received at six o'clock that same afternoon. Servia, he said, would not yield to Austria's demands and appealed through him for Russia's aid.*

Servia had conjectured aright in expecting the aid of the great Slavic nation. The appeal of the Prince Regent found an echo in the heart of the Czar and that of Patchou in the heart of Sazonoff. There was to be no repetition of 1908 when Russia, helpless, had to witness Servia's humiliation and the ruin of her own prestige.

Sazonoff immediately communicated with the *chargé d'affaires* in Vienna (the ambassador being temporarily absent) and asked him to solicit more time in which to consider the ultimatum, so that the powers to whom it had been sent might, if they deemed wise, counsel Servia to accept at least some of Austria's demands.† At the same time the governments of England,‡ France, Italy and Servia were informed that this petition had been made. While making every effort to obtain the postponement Russia did not hide the gravity of the situation. The ministers were assembled and an official *communiqué* was given out to

* *Russian Orange Book*, documents 1 and 6.

† *Russian Orange Book*, document number 4.

‡ *English White Book*, document number 13.

show the concern of the Czar's government, and further, that an Austro-Servian clash would not find it indifferent.*

The extension of the forty-eight hours granted to Servia in which to answer appeared necessary even to less interested nations; that is, if a peaceful solution was to be found. Naturally neither Russia nor the other powers pretended to wish such extension out of a simple desire to satisfy Austria's demands a few hours later; but neither did they ask it for the purpose of stealing a march on her and accelerating their own preparations. It would be as unjust to suspect this second malicious intent as it would be ingenuous to believe in the first.

What all sincerely desired was a more adequate term for studying the serious and fulminating European situation. Russia did not wish the humiliation of Servia. Perhaps she wished it even less than Servia herself, for while the latter would have to submit because of the military disparity between herself and Austria, Russia could not advance the same reason without abdicating her post as a great power; the belittling of Servia would be that of Russia. Russia nevertheless made every effort to find a way out of the difficulty just as any nation would do on finding herself unexpectedly involved. Even the most ag-

* *Le Temps*, July 25, 1914; also *Russian Orange Book*, document number 10.

gressive state, like the most aggressive man, prefers to select his own moment for combat.

Sir Edward Grey was of the same opinion as Sazonoff regarding the impossibility of an instantaneous solution; more than this; on July 23, when he first learned from the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in London that such a note was to be sent and that it would demand an answer in forty-eight hours, he remarked that it was practically an ultimatum.* That such an ultimatum was out of reason and without political antecedent is evident for if Austria had believed it necessary to send a copy of the note to other powers, and if these had always intervened in Balkan affairs and had exercised over those states a collective protectorate, it was only just that the respective governments who received the copy should have time to study it in order to answer and take action. Nor should it be forgotten that Austria, to her own interest and with but scant courtesy, delayed in sending the text of the note to Petrograd, so that this government had not even forty-eight but only thirty-one hours for deliberation.† Thus while England from the first was given to understand through the German and the Austrian ambassadors how grave was the situation (this with the hope, as will presently be shown, that Germany might make sure of England's non-participation)

* *English White Book*, document number 2.

† E. J. Dillon; article cited, page 462.

Russia, whose preponderating influence in Servian affairs was well known, was kept in darkness.

Sir Edward Grey on insisting on more time made a suggestion that might have led to a solution, namely: the mediation of England, France, Germany, and Italy.* But Germany in answering this put the matter on other grounds. "It is impossible to summon our ally in her conflict with Servia before a European tribunal;" and the chancellor in a telegram to the German ambassador in London expressed himself to the effect that Germany desired above all to localize the conflict; that Austria must be given a free hand against Servia, that Russia must not commit any act of hostility against Austria nor even partly mobilize her troops, for if she did so Germany would not abandon her ally. Such words could only mean a European war. This evidently was desired, for no solution was forthcoming and the matter remained enclosed in a circle of iron. There was but one way out—the lamentable one finally resorted to.

Later Germany tried to twist Sir Edward Grey's suggestion into an entirely different meaning, and offered to accept mediation in case of an Austro-Russian conflict but not an Austro-Servian. This distinction was never intended by Grey and logically could not be made, for Russia had no disagreement with

* *English White Book*, documents 10 and 11; also *German White Book*, documents 12 and 13.

Austria other than that which rose out of Austria's with Servia. To settle one without the other was impossible, and however great and clever the resources of diplomacy, to give affairs this turn was a jest shorn of all mirth. Sir Edward Grey had shown from the first that while the Austro-Servian conflict did not interest him its far-reaching consequences did; therefore he would be obliged to weigh carefully. This was about the same as saying that if the rest were content with what Austria was doing with Servia, England, having no direct Balkan interests, would be silent; but if any of the great powers intervened, England too would enter into the fray.

And the fact is that this same minister, even after the forty-eight hours had expired, asked that military operations be delayed in order to give time for a settlement. This he did on the ground of the Austrian ambassador's statement that the ultimatum and the withdrawal of the Austrian plenipotentiary from Belgrade did not signify war.

The two ways of understanding the conflict were, then, face to face. On the one side, Germany and Austria wished to localize the combat in order that Austria might more easily hurl herself against Servia with detriment to Russia and to the countries of the Entente in general, after which the Balkan States might once more be made into a prop for the Triple Alliance instead of the danger they then were. On the other,

hand, the Entente, and along with them one of the Triple Alliance, Italy, who had been taken by surprise, wished to have more time in order to find the as yet unknown solution. These made every effort to obtain from Germany the desired extension of the forty-eight hour limit, and did their best to prevent a declaration of war and to urge the acceptance of mediation. But the prompt declaration of war which followed Austria's ultimatum to Servia put an end to all possible solution. The die was cast. So Russia understood it, and so Germany, and the remaining steps consisted merely in maintaining the customary good form incident to such occasions, and disavowing the more direct responsibilities of the approaching catastrophe.

Germany showed that she was ready to accept mediation between Austria and Russia in order to localize the war; and when war was declared she admitted that certain claims in the Austrian note, on which by her own confession she had been consulted, could not easily be accepted by Servia.* Russia on her side had no doubts as to her conduct. The mobilization already ordered in Austria was a sure sign of immediate war. The telegrams between the two Emperors were of no avail; deeds weighed more than words.

There has been much discussion as to who mobilized

* *English White Book*, document number 46.

first. In reality this has no importance since the mobilization was the consequence of diplomatic attitude in the respective countries. Russia more than all considered that she must accept war as due to her prestige, even though she did not want it and was not prepared, as later events have well demonstrated. During the course of negotiations Sazonoff understood, just as it was understood in Rome, Paris and London, that their fate lay in the hands of Berlin. If in that city peace was wanted, peace would be maintained. If not, the European conflagration would burst forth in all its frightfulness. Sazonoff on July 28, the day that Austria declared war on Servia, lamented to the Russian ambassador in London that Berlin had not taken a definite stand at the very beginning of the crisis;* and later in the same day he pointed out to the same ambassador the need of England's appealing to Austria not to crush Servia and thus make pacific solution impossible.† Even after the declaration of war he kept urging all the ambassadors to appeal to their various governments, and this he continued to do in spite of the communication received from the Russian ambassador in Vienna to the effect that the government of the Dual Monarchy was not inclined to

* *English White Book*, document number 54. *Russian Orange Book*, document number 43.

† *Russian Orange Book*, document number 48.

exchange ideas direct with the Imperial Russian Government.

It is certain that the German government echoed Sazonoff's good intentions but more than intentions they never were, since no practical solution had any chance of acceptance from her. The German theory was to give Austria a free hand against Servia, to prevent Russia's acting to save her Balkan prestige (the loss of which meant the loss of her European prestige); and, this accomplished, to show her great affection afterwards. Evidence against Berlin may be seen in the fact that Servia's sufficiently conciliatory answer to Austria was not published on July 28 by a single news agency or newspaper throughout the German Confederation; obviously because it would have diminished the bellicose humor of the masses. In this, Germany followed her old system of 1870—to exacerbate the people into ready and enthusiastic soldiers.

On July 29 the future belligerents knew that they would meet in combat. Russia notified France, and Germany notified Russia.* The latter, making a supreme effort at the last moment sent the following to Berlin: "If Austria, now recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, will declare herself ready to elim-

* *Russian Orange Book*, document number 58.

inate from her ultimatum those points which constitute an infringement on the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia will cease her military preparations." But Germany declared this proposition unacceptable without even consulting Austria.* Gabriel Hanotaux, French ex-minister of foreign affairs, has declared that Austria was ready to accept this Russian offer. "I am in a position to affirm," he said, "and will furnish proof should it not be encountered in the forthcoming *French Yellow Book* whose publication is impatiently awaited, that Austria-Hungary, perhaps seized with vacillations in presence of events whose terrible consequences she began to foresee, announced herself ready to adhere to the Russian initiative which would present an honorable way out for all." † Later, in his *Histoire de la Guerre*, Hanotaux again insisted that at the last moment, after Germany had declared war on Russia, the Austrian government tried through Berchtold to avoid the stupendous climax. However in this book the celebrated author is less positive than in the *Figaro* article previously cited. The foregoing should be considered in conjunction with Pierre Bertrand's affirmation that the current opinion as to Austria's having repented at the last moment was a fiction pure and simple. Austria, he says, never thought of

* *Russian Orange Book*, documents 60 and 63.

† G. Hanotaux; "Les responsabilités allemandes," in *Le Figaro*, September 26, 1914.

taking such a step and never recanted in the least.*

Sazonoff again modified his compromise in order to make it more acceptable but in Berlin the foreign minister broke off conversations with the Russian ambassador. This happened July 30, and the following day Sazonoff told Sir Edward Grey that the only solution could be found in London.†

But there was no longer a way out.

Germany, who had not wished to duly deliberate with Austria, wished on the other hand to forestall Russia's action and make impossible the conduct the latter was bound to follow. Germany pretended to see an aggression in what was merely the natural consequence of multiple contributory causes; she believed herself attacked because Russia was preparing; she investigated the Russian mobilization but would not admit that she herself was preparing with greater intelligence and eagerness, and certainly with greater efficacy; for, considering the careful organization of her army, her *proclamation of a state of war* was more practically effective than the Russian order of mobilization.‡ With Teutonic violence she hurled at Russia a sort of ultimatum demanding the suspension of all military activity within twelve hours;§ and at

* Pierre Bertrand; "L'Autriche a voulu la grande guerre," Paris, 1916.

† *Russian Orange Book*, document number 63.

‡ *German White Book*, addition number 11.

§ *German White Book*, addition number 24.

the same time sent a declaration of war to Petrograd to be delivered in case this demand was not complied with by five o'clock on the afternoon of the first of August. This declaration was presented and the state of war began.

In connection with this declaration of war a curious and extremely significant anecdote is published by Tomaso Tittoni who, as former Italian ambassador in Paris and also former foreign minister, had every opportunity of knowing both great international questions and small diplomatic incidents. According to him, Count Pourtalès, German ambassador in Petrograd, after pronouncing the fateful words to Russia in the person of Sazonoff, laid on the latter's table the written declaration, as is usual in such circumstances. On his withdrawal the Russian minister of war picked up the terrible instrument which was to be the death warrant of so many thousands of human beings, and found to his surprise that it contained nothing but friendly words. It conveyed, in fact, Berlin's thanks to Russia for having acceded to her demands. While Sazonoff was still staring in amazement Pourtalès returned to explain that he had made an error, and substituted the written formal declaration of war for the paper Sazonoff was reading.*

Evidently the Berlin cabinet had provided against every eventuality. Either submission or defiance on

* T. Tittoni; "Nuova Antologia," Rome, September 16, 1916.

Russia's part had been prepared for; but the excessively cautious German cabinet had not counted on the ambassador's carrying the double correspondence in his pocket when he made his final visit to Sazonoff.

It is strange that Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, a statesman esteemed for the rectitude of his aims and for his broad and clear mind opposed to all *Chauvinism*, a sound pacifist in the sense that he realized how the benefits of peace were vivifying the spirit of the nation—it is strange that he should be the one called upon to accept what the German document calls the *challenge* of Russia. Bethmann-Hollweg declared the war and on doing so all the constructive work of forty years crumbled.

History makes some unconscious revelations. Among them it is to be noted that in this incident which appeared to be provoked by Austria, the first of the great powers to send a declaration of war to another great power was Germany.

How surely do internal and hidden forces work up to the surface!

CHAPTER XVI

THE GENERAL CONFLICT

THE general conflict was initiated as we have seen by Germany's declaration of war on Russia, preceded by an ultimatum sent suddenly and at the very moment when hopes of peace had been renewed. Germany, attacking Russia, could no longer talk of localizing the quarrel, and this theory upheld by her in the case of Servia and disputed by Russia in the diplomatic field, was trampled under foot by her own acts. She knew the treaty obligations which bound France to Russia; therefore she knew that the war would be general. Once started, she had to anticipate events for it would have been bad policy to await them. Germany's attitude toward France, then, was logical, considering the first bad step taken, and as the theorists of the early nineteenth century would have said, it was in the natural order of events.

France proceeded with tact during the negotiations, and on hearing the trend of the Wilhelmstrasse govern-

ment counseled the greatest prudence. In unison with England and Italy she made every effort to maintain peace. Wounded by the humiliation of forty-odd years France wanted war whenever it was spoken of in the abstract or whenever patriotic hymns and speeches revived her past grief; but whenever danger presented itself she preferred peace and strove for it. Alsace and Lorraine, separated from the nation, were a constant call to war; Sédan and Metz were two insults which constantly cried for satisfaction; but so greatly had the French people prospered without Alsace and Lorraine, and so vigorously had they conquered a place in the industrial and financial world that, though they had not forgotten, an intense desire for peace animated them all. To the military and aristocratic régime of monarchical, especially Napoléonic, days, had succeeded the régime of the great middle class. Its small tradesmen, manufacturers, agriculturists, and modest financiers all enjoyed greater well-being in France than in other countries. Of a peaceful nature, little inclined for adventure, desirous of glory when not fraught with danger, fond of their own wealth, they asked only that their well-being be indefinitely prolonged. The upper classes, the high financiers and men of big business, had followed the middle class in these pacifist tendencies. Four decades of economic prosperity had wrought a change in French opinion, had wrested the directing of it from the aris-

tocratic class who found glory in the arts of war, and given it to business men who found in peaceful pursuits the only means of augmenting the national welfare. Along these lines, and in the interest of blissful tranquillity, the possessors of great fortunes had become pacifists outwardly and socialist-radicals inwardly. It is only in this way that one can explain the long-enduring patience of so many French cabinets in face of German irritations and provocations, as well as the course recently followed in face of the questions brought up by the Austro-Servian note.

Germany for a moment endeavored to rob the alliance which bound France to Russia of its fruit. By trying to force the former into a dispute with the latter, she hoped that French advice would not be followed and the nation thereby absolved from keeping the Russian compact. That is what Iswolsky, Russian Ambassador in Paris, heard on hastening back from his interrupted vacation. He got it from the lips of Bienvenu Martin, minister of justice, and also *ad interim* minister of foreign affairs. Martin had seen through the plan and communicated his analysis of it to Petrograd.* This circumstance disproves Baron Von Schoen's pretension that France suffered herself to be led into common cause with Germany; on the contrary, in all the preliminary diplomatic proceedings, and these, beyond all question,

* *Russian Orange Book*, document number 35.

focused on a *casus belli*, she removed the only pretext she could possibly have had for breaking the alliance, and decided to unite herself to Russia should the bellic moment arrive. This was confirmed to Iswolsky by Premier Viviani the very day he returned to Paris: and in order that Germany might have no illusions on the subject it was also confirmed to Von Schoen. In Petrograd the French ambassador was saying the same, but even more precisely, for his words to Sazonoff were that Russia could count on the armed aid of her ally.*

This solidarity had to be. The two countries were united by such strict treaty, by so many necessities of defense (involving no few monetary sacrifices for the one on the part of the other) that to separate in this trying moment would have been suicidal. Moreover, mere circumstance had just prepared them for closer union than ever. Had not the President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, and the Premier, René Viviani, just returned from Russia with all the flattering speeches pronounced, all the kindnesses received, all the promises of mutual help and reciprocal defense, fresh in their memory? On this visit both governments saw that they must make their contracts clear, especially with regard to the grave Oriental question—a precaution more or less necessary because

* *Russian Orange Book*, document number 55; also *French Yellow Book*, document number 101.

in preceding years doubts had arisen in France as to her part. She had not always sustained her ally, alleging that she had her own interests in Oriental Europe and that these were contrary to Russia's. For this reason Viviani and Sazonoff, acting in their respective capacities, gave out on the 24th of July an official communication both clear and to the point: "The visit just paid by the President of the French Republic to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia has offered an occasion when both governments, friends and allies, could satisfy themselves as to the identity of their views on various problems arising from a mutual solicitude for the general peace and the balance of power in Europe, especially Eastern Europe." *

In spite of these specific matters, as well as the treaty of the Double Alliance, being known to Germany, she made a last effort before the French Government on the day she declared war on Russia; she charged her ambassador to ask France's intentions; and he, having done so, was able to report that very same day, August 1, that France would follow her ally. The answer was laconic and left no room for doubt. Baron Von Schoen gave it as follows in a telegram to his government: "On my inquiring directly and repeatedly whether France would remain neutral in case of war between Germany and Russia the premier declared to me that France would act in

* *Le Temps*, Paris, July 25, 1914.

accordance with her interests.”* On the arrival of this telegram in Berlin war on France was decided upon, and the postponing of the declaration until August 3 was probably due to the fact that neither of the two parties, either because of international agreements or because of certain moral formalities, cared to be the first to make it. And so the two ambassadors, Jules Cambon in Berlin and Baron Von Schoen in Paris, kept up their visits to the ministers of foreign affairs.† But Germany had already decided to begin immediate war not only on the western front, as said above, but also on the eastern.

On August 1 the French cabinet took counsel, President Poincaré presiding and General Joffre being present. Mobilization had already begun, and the necessary economic measures for carrying on a war were arranged. Germany too was mobilizing, and on two frontiers; and the Kaiser was announcing to his people that he was unsheathing his sword “to fight an enemy who has been hemming us in while we were living peacefully in every sense of the word.”

On August 2 Germany violated the first treaty—that which guaranteed the neutrality of Luxemburg as signed in London in 1867. Against the protests of the government of the Grand Duchy she penetrated into

* German White Book; also French Yellow Book, document number 125.

† Paul Leroy Beaulieu; “La Guerre,” in *L’Economiste Français*.

it with armored trains. More than that, she penetrated that same day into French territory at various points although there had not been any declaration of hostilities. Yet the following day it was Von Schoen who entered a protest that the French had violated German soil, an allegation which the French premier denied most emphatically. However, these frontier incidents to which great importance was given at the moment have little bearing on the real case. The outstanding fact is that Germany prepared the more rapidly and that the violation of Luxemburg suited her plans, as stated by the ministers of the Duchy who certainly had no partiality for the French. But let it be repeated, these discussions are prolix now that we can look back upon the whole series of events. As soon as war was declared against Russia it was evident that France intended to aid her ally and thus make it necessary for Germany to fight on two frontiers. Further accuracy in war-time, and in commenting on a modern country which admitted the medieval axiom that "necessity knows no law," would be superfluous. Germany's advantage lay in rapid action; she was following the same hypothetic plans as in 1870 when she assumed an attack on two frontiers, to wit: rush upon France and obtain a prompt and decisive victory and then turn her forces on the other enemy. Germany's every manœuvre on the French border responded to her urgent necessities, and the

delay in declaring war on her ancient adversary can be explained only by her wish not to appear too aggressive in the eyes of England, whose neutrality she still hoped for, and of Italy, whose aid she counted on as almost certain.

On August 3, Von Schoen, having first packed up all the effects of the embassy, repaired somewhat ostentatiously to the Quai d'Orsay at 5.45 in the afternoon, and declared war; and the French nation knew that the hour of the great duel had sounded, and that victory was a peremptory necessity.

That France was forced to war at a moment when she was striving desperately to maintain peace is undeniable. Until the very moment when the disconcerted Von Schoen, without cause and without animosity, delivered the challenge, she had acted as if doubting that the storm would really burst. With much exactitude Bienvenu Martin could say that "neither act, appearance, nor word other than pacific and conciliatory could be imputed to France."* And with no less truth, or at least with certain right inasmuch as the cabinet then in power was concerned, could René Viviani, the premier, say in the same session: "Germany has nothing to reproach us with. In the interests of peace we have made a sacrifice without precedent, for throughout half a century we have si-

* Session of the Senate of the French Republic, August 4, 1914.

lently borne the wound in our breast which she laid open."

And all this time the Austrian ambassador still drove through the streets of Petrograd and the French ambassador through Vienna, and vice versa. From the moment of the Kaiser's brisk ultimatum to Russia, Austria, who appeared at that time disposed to adjust matters, receded into second place. But on the 6th of August Austria-Hungary finally declared war on Russia and on the 11th the French ambassador asked the Vienna government for his passports. This, it will be seen, did not occur till after Germany was in a state of war with four nations, until after she had violated both Luxemburg and Belgium, and after the British had come into the conflict; in other words, after the whole tragic problem had taken a definite form.



CHAPTER XVII

THE VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG

THE first act which cannot be put down to the credit of the German Empire is the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg. This violation has not resounded through the world like that of Belgium but merely because of its lesser political, not moral, significance. Morally each bears the same aspect; each is a question of a treaty broken. The case of Luxemburg was all the more unjustifiable because, as we shall see, it was Prussia who had displayed most activity in framing the treaty and who had most interest in its adoption. Even more, this violation of neutral territory on August 2 constituted an aggression against France before Germany had declared war on her; it therefore invalidated the formal complaints of the German ambassador in Paris to the effect that Frenchmen had made attacks in German territory. In violating Luxemburg, Germany revealed her whole war policy of surprise, rapid action, and contempt for the only thing which modern international law has

acquired for civilization after so many centuries. And it is all the more to be condemned because it is impossible to advance a shadow of justification for the act.

At the very time it occurred the German minister in Luxemburg was declaring that the neutrality of the Duchy was guaranteed above all question and would never be violated by Germany. This statement at the moment when war was already certain forces us to one of two painful conclusions regarding Germany; either the diplomatic and the military staffs were acting in defiance of each other or else the government was acting in complete bad faith.

The permanent neutrality of Luxemburg as an independent state was specially created by the Treaty of London, May 11, 1867. Its most important antecedent is found in the treaty which created Belgian neutrality in 1839. As one of the possessions of the house of Burgundy, Luxemburg in the sixteenth century fell into the hands of Spain. In 1713 it was transferred to Austria, and later to France. In 1815 it was created a grand duchy, but under the sovereignty of the King of the Netherlands. Being one of those regions which geographical situation or the course of events has put in the road of great conflicts, it has known great sorrows.

The Treaty of London was a solution in order to avoid or rather postpone a conflict between Germany and France. Napoleon III had just tried to buy this

territory which had been garrisoned since 1815 by Prussian troops, and keep its cession and its price secret. The proceeding would have been within the law since Luxemburg from the political point of view had ceased to belong to the Germanic community; but it did not suit Prussian interests. The secret was soon known for the Grand Duke himself, who was also King of Holland, while negotiating with Napoleon communicated the fact to the Prussian minister at The Hague and showed him the contents of the letter he had received from the Emperor of the French.* At the same time he declared himself ready to make the transaction provided Prussia approved.

Bismarck decided it was not the moment to give France a diplomatic victory or a military position; but neither was he desirous of war. Using his marvelous tactics—that mixture of audacity and reticence which he knew how to employ in difficult cases—he allowed himself to be interrogated twice in the Reichstag. Autocrat by instinct he could handle democratic institutions for his own ends; and so, answering the two interrogations, one from Carlovitz and the other from Benningsen, he manœuvred cleverly, giving France no motive for a *casus belli* but making it clearly understood that without the consent of Prussia the cession of Luxemburg was impossible. Then he gave the French Ambassador, Benedetti, to understand that

* E. Servais; "La neutralité du Luxembourg," page 78.

he could not favor the project, not because he was averse to it, but because blundering French diplomacy had obliged him to make premature declarations, and these had created an unfavorable public opinion. On April 2, 1867, Benedetti wrote as follows to his country's foreign minister: "I have again seen Bismarck. He complains of the difficulties confronting him, and appears to blame us for the turn given to the matter by the King of the Low Countries (the Grand Duke) in directing himself officially to the King of Prussia before talking with the cabinet of Berlin. These premature communications do not leave the Prussian government full liberty." The truth is that Bismarck took this tone solely because it was the most convenient one; because he feared, as always, that his king would be weak, he complained of their having talked first with him before treating with the cabinet, which latter was himself and no one but himself.

Later events show how far he was from any intention of yielding to the plans of Napoleon III; for when the Grand Duke finally decided to break off the sale, Bismarck was well satisfied and straightway asked the powers to meet in international conference in London in order to avoid war.

In the London of 1867, however, there was no more interest in Luxemburg and its neutrality than in the London of 1914. England was not looking for another difficulty nor did she wish to assume a future

responsibility in a matter of no interest to her. Lord Stanley therefore gave a weak answer to the proposals of Prussia. In a telegram to Lord Cowley, the ambassador in Berlin, he said: "Of what use is it to call a conference until Prussia has decided to state her intentions on the fortress (which she possesses) in Luxembourg, or at least until France has declared that she will submit to the decisions of the same?" Nevertheless, the conference was convoked and in it Luxembourg's neutrality was agreed upon. Its terms are clearly expressed in Article II:

"The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the act appended to the Treaties of April 13, 1839, under the guarantee of the Courts of France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, will henceforth form a perpetually neutral state. It will be obliged to respect this same neutrality toward all other states. The high contracting powers oblige themselves to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated in the present article. This article is and will remain under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the powers signatory to the present treaty, with the exception of Belgium, she herself being a neutral state."

The original draft did not contain the last lines relating to the sanction of a collective guarantee but instead terminated with the words: "the principle of neutrality as stipulated by the present article." The

remainder was proposed and defended as a condition *sine qua non* (incredible but true) by the Prussian plenipotentiary, Count Albrecht Bernstorff. In order that the reader may know the different attitudes assumed by the representatives of Prussia on the one side, and of France and England on the other, we reproduce the acts of the session in which the article and the amendment were approved.

To the second article Count Bernstorff proposed the following emendation: "This principle (neutrality) is and will remain under the guarantee of the powers who sign the present treaty with the exception of Belgium, since she herself is neutral." The Russian representative Count Brünnow said that he was authorized by his court to subscribe completely to the principle of giving the collective guarantee to the neutrality of Luxemburg. He hoped that this principle would be admitted as the best pledge that could be offered for the peace of Europe.

Count Apponyi declared that his government (the Hungarian) also accepted the guaranteed neutrality of Luxemburg. Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne stated that he had no instructions relative to the question of a collective guarantee; but he felt himself obliged to agree that this guarantee had been presented up to that moment as the natural complement to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; and even though the obligation which the powers assumed to

respect the neutrality of Luxemburg might in a given moment have a value almost equal to a formal guarantee, still he could not deny that the Ambassador of Prussia might not be right in his observations.

Van de Weyer, who was also without special instructions (from Holland) on this point gave the opinion that in an ample spirit of conciliation it might be considered that the guarantee of neutrality emanated aggregately from the treaties of 1839. Lord Stanley declared that he preferred Article II as it existed in the draft of the treaty and without the amendment of Bernstorff; but as most of the plenipotentiaries upheld the idea indicated by the representative of Prussia, he, Lord Stanley, would acquaint the members of the Queen's cabinet of the proposition which had been made and hoped to be able in the conference of the coming week to inform them of the decision taken.*

The result was that England later yielded to the wishes of the powers and in order to keep peace in Europe agreed to the guarantee, definitively approving the article with the amendment.

History presents great contrasts and at times great ironies. Prussia so eagerly desired the neutrality of Luxemburg that, not satisfied with the declaration made in the treaty (which as the French delegate pointed out presupposed the defense of the clauses of

* Reproduced in Servais; work cited, pages 163-65.

the same) she asked the signatory powers for a guarantee which would put that neutrality under the common defense. This then constituted more than what she desired, since the defense of the neutrality became so obligatory that one of the powers could oblige the others to enter into armed action in defense of the ordained pact.

Prussia having proposed the clause and the rest having accepted it, England understood its importance and accepted it, as we understand, when she saw that the other powers did not foresee the real future difficulties; and undoubtedly she had to assure herself that they did not grasp its full importance by means of those private conversations which form the most elaborate part of the program in all such conferences.

Bismarck in reality had again practiced his finesse on France, as he himself has admitted. Maurice Busch in his book on Bismarck attributes to him the following words which bear every evidence of the mentality and the style of the Chancellor: "Public opinion in all Germany would have been most favorable to us (Prussia) at that time had we wished war over the question of Luxemburg; the law, however, was not on our side. I have never confessed this publicly but today I can say it. After the dissolution of the German Confederation, the King and Grand Duke became a sovereign, and could do as he wished. To sell his country for money would have been a piece of

villainy, but it would have been his right." In this Bismarck was forgetting what he had publicly said when answering certain observations made at the time by August Bebel on a discourse of the Crown, regarding a fortress occupied in Luxemburg.* Bismarck in his answer upheld an exactly opposite point of view.

If the preceding is not sufficient to prove the neutrality of Luxemburg and the form in which it was dictated to have been principally the work of Prussia, and further, that this fact aggravates her present violation of the same, let us consider Prussia's own criticism during the war of 1870 when it was a question of Luxemburg's duty to defend her neutrality by arms. Bismarck on the third of December of that year sent from Versailles a telegram to the government of the Grand Duchy holding it responsible for violations of its neutrality. Both the reproach and the threat were unjust because by the treaty of May 11, 1867, the Duchy had been forbidden to keep an army. The only force allowed her was that necessary to maintain order, and consequently all defense of neutrality against belligerents was completely impossible. This circumstance certainly demonstrates to what a very great degree this neutrality was appreciated and understood by that same nation who in 1914 unhesitat-

* Session of the Parliament of the German Confederation, September 24, 1867.

ingly occupied Luxemburg's railroads for military uses, crossed its frontiers, and established herself as if in her own house; or rather with more rights and less concern than if she had been at home.

In reality it is a flagrant case of contempt of the principles of order and of obligations assumed. It prepared the world for the next transgression—the invasion of Belgium.



CHAPTER XVIII

ENGLAND AND THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY

THE war would not have attained its present proportions if England had not declared war against Germany; or to make a more prudent statement it would not have attained them so soon. The culminating moment of the initial stage was the violation of Belgian neutrality, and this was the act which involved England. When she claimed this intervention to be in defense of the Treaties of 1839 German writers doubted her sincerity. They accused her of wanting above all to assault Germany in this difficult moment and thus make good on the battle-field the previous diplomatic work of isolation. They further asserted that the diplomatic and subsequent military conduct was due to the growth of German commerce which was outstripping Great Britain's in all the markets of the world.* The English answered by alleging the necessary defense of the principles of

* Bernhard Dernburg, former German Colonial Minister; "Germany and England," in the *Saturday Evening Post*, November 21, 1914.

international law without which defense it would be impossible to solve any difficulty or maintain any agreement; they declared that English public opinion would never have consented to Germany's passing into France over the ruins of Belgium, but would have forced the government to armed intervention; and that knowing this the government decided accordingly.

It is not easy to say whether England would have awaited the opportune moment and entered the war in any case, or whether, true to her past reputation, she would have extracted the greatest benefit from it with the least effort. There is no doubt that England hoped this conflict would solve her modern problem. In competition with a powerful rival who was overtaking her in naval power and depriving her of a hegemony indispensable to her very existence, she dared not let the mighty occasion pass without its settling who was to be the winner. But in what manner and at what moment she would have made it do so is mere conjecture. It is probable that the practical sense of English statesmen did not prompt them to prepare a specific plan but rather to watch events closely and take whichever course might appear most favorable. What really happened however is that England, contrary to German accusations, entered the war at a moment not to her liking and after having tried cautiously to avoid all compromise and all obligation.

It is not to the point to repeat Sir Edward Grey's

efforts to avert an Austro-Servian war and his lack of interest in the Balkan conflict; nor the proposed mediation, nor the later attitude when Germany hurled first her ultimatum and then her declaration of war on Russia, for all these proceedings demonstrate of themselves the pacific mind of the Liberal English Government at that moment. Grey's answer to Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, when the latter asked for a declaration in favor of France should war break out, is enough to clear up all residue of doubt. To Cambon's argument that such a declaration from England could in itself prevent the conflict, Grey's answer was completely negative and to the effect that England did not feel obliged to uphold the interests of any other nation.* This conversation took place on July 29, and the question of respecting Belgian neutrality directed to both Germany and France is one more proof that England did not wish to enter the conflict at that moment; otherwise she would have let events take their course without trying to warn those whose acts might establish the justification for her armed intervention.†

Then too the declaration of Cambon was repeated in parliament when the minister of foreign affairs, setting forth the cabinet's attitude, said that England had made no promise to any power whatever, and that

* *English White Book.*

† *German White Book and English White Book.*

she would follow the dictates of public opinion.* When finally the conflict was announced, Lord Morley, John Burns, and Mr. Trevelyan resigned from the cabinet. (Of these the first two were of no small influence; the aged and highly esteemed Lord Morley being a Liberal of the old school and John Burns the most genuine exponent of the Liberal Labor Party; that is to say, they represented the two extremes of the Liberal cabinet.) The spontaneous exodus of these three men makes it appear still less likely that there was any predestined policy of intervention. Later events demonstrated that England, like France and Russia, was without sufficient military preparation either in men or war materials. She had to keep on preparing as she fought.

That the violation of the neutrality of Belgium constituted a great crime is a point on which there remains no doubt in spite of the efforts made to defend it. When it met with universal condemnation as an act which trampled in the dust one of the few conquests of international law, namely, the solemnity of a sworn pledge, it was claimed that the treaty of 1839 no longer existed. Such an affirmation is unworthy of argument in spite of its illustrious and audacious supporters.† No one could have made it seriously. Not

* Session of the House of Commons, August 3, 1914.

† Bernhard Dernburg; work cited; also Bernard Shaw and numerous German authors of renown.

only did the treaty of 1839 appear to Berlin as one to be respected by Germany herself but also by other nations, and had any of them violated it she was ready to make it respected. Herr Von Jagow, Minister of Foreign Affairs, never had any doubts on the subject. On the contrary when he urged the reasons of extreme necessity which had forced the German General Staff to throw its army through Belgium against France, the very excuse implied the transgression. On the day of the declaration of war, August 4, Sir W. E. Goschen, English Ambassador in Berlin, went twice to Von Jagow only to hear that Germany could not respect Belgian neutrality; that she must advance by the most rapid and easy route into France and crush her in the shortest possible time, since it was a question of life or death for Germany to anticipate the sending of Russian forces against her. Von Jagow added that rapidity of action was one of Germany's greatest advantages; and that very same night when England was threatening to declare war he summed the matter up by saying that to send troops through Belgium was a question of the salvation of the Empire.*

Nor did the Chancellor Von Bethmann-Hollweg advance any such hypothesis as the caducity of the

* Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, regarding the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German Government, London, August, 1914.

treaty of 1839; not even in his moment of greatest excitement when he pronounced the famous words "and merely for a scrap of paper England is going to war!" *—not even then did he offer such a defense. On the contrary he said that neutrality was simply a word which had often been disregarded in war time. The undeniable fact is that the treaty existed in full vigor and any argument to the contrary falls through its own premise.

Belgian neutrality was a product of historic necessity. In the successive historic periods Belgium had been coveted by whatever nation happened to dominate. Famous battles had been fought on her soil; Holland, Spain, Austria, France, had disputed its possession, and England's eye was on it even at a time when she was paying but little attention to continental politics in general. Everything indicated that there could be no European peace without neutralizing that object of discord, and political annals and international correspondence are full of the difficulties surmounted in order to accomplish the neutrality.

It was in 1830 that Belgium separated from Holland. On October 4 of that year, the provisional government in Brussels assembled, declared that Belgium had constituted herself an independent state; whereon the powers, at the instance of King William of The

* Dr. Dillon; "The Scrap of Paper."

Netherlands, convened their plenipotentiaries in London and drew up the protocol of the separation of the two countries.* In this document where Belgium first appears as a separate personality it is set forth in Article V that she is to constitute a perpetually neutral state and that the five powers signing the protocol are to guarantee said perpetual neutrality.

This agreement was not instantly accepted by Belgium, but later on July 9, 1831, her national congress voted the preliminaries of the peace, with its Article IX corresponding exactly to Article V of the protocol of London. That same year, on December 14, was signed the treaty called *Of the Fortresses*, by which England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia on the one side, and Belgium on the other, all agreed in the demolition of certain fortresses in Belgium and the maintaining of others, in virtue of the changes wrought in the country's condition—"her political independence as well as the perpetual neutrality which is guaranteed to her."† France, as seen, did not agree to the stipulations of this treaty, nor were certain of its clauses acceptable to Belgium. All the preliminaries were given final form in the Treaties of 1839, by which was

* Protocol of December 20, 1830, as agreed upon by the plenipotentiaries.

† Treaty of December 14, 1831, between England, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Belgium, preamble and Articles I, IV, and VI; reproduced in "L'Etat neutre à titre permanent," by Emmanuel Descamp.

settled the pending conflict between Belgium and Holland, and by which the principle of permanent neutrality for Belgium was fixed more firmly than ever. These treaties are three, and interdependent. In the first, Belgium was not one of the contracting parties; on the one side Holland, and on the other England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, all recognized the dissolution of the former union of Belgium and Holland and recognized that the pacts contained in the treaty made simultaneously between Belgium and Holland should have the same force and value as if they formed part of this same treaty. In the second, Belgium and Holland are the parties interested; it is a treaty of peace and friendship, and in its Article VII is set forth the principle of neutrality. In the third, Belgium on the one side and the five countries mentioned concur; its main premise is the recognition of the independence and neutrality of Belgium, and the obligation on the part of the great powers to defend this neutrality. These three treaties virtually are one and their subdivision was due to a mere formula whose object was to facilitate diplomatic labor and avoid a repetition of the difficulties of 1830 and 1831. A proof of their being one and the same is that in two of them the clauses of the other two are repeated, signifying that they have the same force as if they were clauses of that same treaty.

To discuss its validity might be admitted in popular

propaganda or justified by high-strung patriotic sentiments, but could never be tolerated in an impartial examination of the facts. It has been affirmed by those defending Germany's invasion of Belgium that the treaty of 1839 did not solidly recognize Belgian neutrality, especially when grave international interests were involved in the case; to reinforce their thesis they say that in 1870, when Gladstone was prime minister, England considered it necessary to concert a new treaty. The facts are that when the Franco-Prussian War broke out England, as at the beginning of the present era, initiated conversations in order to discover the intentions of the belligerents. The peculiar circumstance of the moment must not be forgotten—how Belgium was panic-stricken over Bismarck's publication of a secret proposal made to him by Napoleon III regarding the annexation of Belgium by France. The conversations crystallized in the treaties of April 9 and April 11 of that same year. The first was between England and Prussia, and the second between France and England. The two were identical and consisted of only four articles. In Article I France and Prussia each stated her firm determination to observe Belgian neutrality just so long as the other respected it, and England bound herself to coöperate by means of forces on sea and land with whichever of the two powers respected it, in order that it might be maintained then and after-

wards. In Article II the two belligerents bind themselves, as already stated in a different treaty, to maintain said neutrality with armed force and to take counsel with England on the necessary measures. The third Article sets forth a principle which undermines the defenders of Germany; and as it was not kept in mind by the German propagandists we give it entire for those who have not gone fully into the question: "This treaty will oblige the high contracting parties throughout the duration of the present war between France and the North German Confederation or the Confederation of the North of Germany and for twelve months after the ratification of any treaty of peace between these two parties; and when this term will have expired the independence and neutrality of Belgium, so far as the respective high contracting parties are concerned, will continue to be based as formerly on Article I of the Treaty of the Five Nations of April 19, 1839."

It is very clear that this double treaty did not and could not revoke that of 1839, and so plain and evident are its terms that they could not be improved upon by any other diplomatic document whatever. Nor can it be alleged that although the treaty of 1870 did not modify that of 1839 it nevertheless interpreted it in the sense that should a *casus belli* arise, a new stipulation would be necessary to give force to the previous one. Should such judgment be accepted

it would place the art of diplomacy in the group of speculative sciences, and the relations between nations in the field of abstract doctrine.

The creation of a neutral state and of a treaty to guarantee its neutrality are deeds merely positive; the acceptance of the treaty is a promise of fulfilment and admits of no omission. When Prussia signed the famous treaty with four other powers in 1839 she was not performing a useless act but was offering on her oath as a civilized nation to respect its clauses on neutrality, and to use her right of obliging others to respect them; and all this not in time of peace, but in the only moment when the concept of a neutral nation takes on efficacy, for neutrality and war are correlative terms. To suppose that a new treaty must be made previous to every international conflict is to deny the force of the first, and this would mean to throw onto the scrap-heap an international prescription still in full vigor.

It is easy to understand how without a careful examination of the problem one might fall into such erroneous argument. One may argue *prima facie* that if a new obligation was necessary in 1870 when the two nations who are today contending were at war, so in 1914 it was necessary to repeat something of the same sort in order that the belligerents should respect what they then respected; but this logic falls by its own premise. A treaty of neutrality does not

exclude a treaty guaranteeing that neutrality; on the contrary the latter renders homage to the former. The manner of maintaining Belgian neutrality was not and could not be foreseen. Belgium, on her side, and the powers signing the document, all bound themselves to maintain this neutrality; but none of them could at that time foresee the multiple occasions which the future might present and could not predetermine their solution. The application of the covenant had to be left until the necessary or opportune moment. Consequently in 1870 England looked for a way of guaranteeing the clauses of the treaty of 1839, and France and Prussia satisfied her by means of the treaties of April 9 and 11, 1870, binding themselves to defend with arms that which they had all previously compacted. The two posterior treaties, then, are nothing else than conventions for maintaining the preceding stipulations.

That this was so the text indicates, and so it was always interpreted. Baron d'Anethan in the Belgian Parliament of that day thus explained it: "The treaties, separate but identical, just concluded by England with the powers in war neither create nor modify the obligations incident to the treaty of 1839; they regulate the practical manner of executing these treaties in a determined case. They in no way weaken the obligations of the other guaranteeing powers, as their text attests. They leave entire the future obligatory

character of the anterior treaty, with all its consequences." *

Emmanuel Descamp, at a time when this question was simply speculative, wrote with great precision, as if he had foreseen the present objections: "The Acts of 1870 constitute temporary conventions for the regulation of the guarantee and are of the same nature as the conventions of 1831 already quoted. It is as absurd to interpret them as acts which have for their object to revivify a guarantee merely taken for granted, or guarantee outlawed, as to distort against the validity of any law the subsequent regulations which serve for its execution." † Another writer, Charles de Woeste, goes even farther, though in our opinion with less penetration, and says that the conventions of 1870 are useless since they merely constitute the application of the treaties of 1839 in a given case.‡ It is interesting to know that these and identical opinions precede by many years the present war, and that they were emitted in the purely scientific field and not animated by partisanship.

The fact is that Belgian neutrality was never even questioned until after it was violated. In Germany, France, and England, the countries most interested, no one gave it judicial consideration; and no one went

* Session of the Belgian Parliament, August 16, 1870.

† Emmanuel Descamp; work cited, pages 166-167.

‡ Charles de Woeste; "La neutralité belge," page 56.

seeking for antecedents until after the declaration, or rather confession, of the German chancellor in the Reichstag. Besides, the same chancellor had said in other days that Belgium had nothing to fear from Germany's growing strength and that the guarantee of neutrality given to Belgium gained at the same time. The very excuses presented, all of them emanating not from justice but from necessity, are enough to show that the neutrality treaty was a vital thing. Germany's necessities can be appreciated but they cannot exempt her from responsibility in the political field; for in the last analysis, to yield to necessity is to trample underfoot all good social relation, all the amenities of civilization; which conditions consist precisely in the limits imposed upon our own convenience by another's rights. Civilization puts the collective interest, immediate or remote, above the individual necessity. This criticism was aptly expressed by Lloyd George when he said: "If Germany violates treaties because it is to her advantage to do so, then we must prove to her that she will find even greater advantage in respecting them."

Going back a little, we find that in 1911, when the newspapers declared that Germany would violate Belgian neutrality in case of war with France, Bethmann-Hollweg sent to Belgium a concrete denial. In 1913 when Von Jagow, foreign minister, was interpellated by a social democrat before the budget commission

of the Reichstag he answered: "Belgian neutrality is fixed by international conventions and Germany is resolved to respect those conventions."*

In France, throughout her numerous political changes, throughout innumerable revolutions in the last century, Belgian neutrality was never questioned. The Orléans monarchy respected it as if it had been their own work; and in fact the Belgian revolution of 1830 was really a consequence of the revolution which placed Louis Philippe on the throne of France. After him, the Republic of 1848, trying to renew the 1793 policy of spreading the ideal of liberty among other nations, assured Prince de Ligne, the Belgian ambassador, that France had not changed except in her internal régime, and that the treaty would be respected. Lamartine, foreign minister of the Republic, made this declaration and his successor repeated it. The Second Empire did not modify this policy in spite of the evident Germanophile sentiments of the Belgian king. The question of the secret Franco-Prussian treaty which so alarmed Belgium, and with reason, was really a deceitful act of the policy of Bismarck, who, on this occasion as on many others, used the French ambassador Benedetti for his ends. That it was nothing more is demonstrated by the fact that Bismarck took no further step after having the famous draft in his hands, but guarded it most craftily

* *Belgian Gray Book*, document number 12.

so as to later make it public when hostilities had actually broken out between France and Prussia. He obtained the result he had schemed for; the League of Neutral Powers initiated by England to give Germany a free hand against France, was a consequence of the publication.* Written in Benedetti's own handwriting and on the official paper of the embassy, the draft was a grave indication that the very name Napoleon was synonymous with conquest.

Regarding Belgian neutrality the chief feature of the Second Empire was its attitude in 1870. It is certain that Napoleon III on acquainting Leopold of Belgium with the declaration of war against Prussia sent him a solemn promise to respect the neutrality and soon after confirmed it through diplomatic channels.†

Belgium, in spite of the treaties which the belligerents had made with England and in spite of the declarations received, prepared, then as now, to defend her territory from all violation, total or partial. She knew then, as later in 1914, that she could exist and develop only while this neutrality was effective, or at least while she showed herself able to defend it with that valor which the testimony of Cæsar and subsequent history has attributed to her. It appears cer-

* Henry Welschinger; "La neutralité belge," in the *Revue des deux mondes*, September 1, 1914, page 9.

† Henry Welschinger; article cited, page 10.

tain that General Wimpffen, vanquished at Sédan, had planned to enter Belgium to escape being routed, but the border was well guarded and the Belgian army made the enterprise difficult.*

The Third Republic proceeded even better than preceding governments and this at the very time when Belgium appeared to incline toward Germany, and King Leopold to have suspicious dealings with the neighboring empire; when the supposed revelations were gaining credulity with the general public, and when the Belgian fortifications which were being erected appeared rather to menace France than in defense against a German invasion.† There was actually a period from 1887 to 1895 in which France suspected that Belgium would not only admit an invading army marching rapidly on Paris from Germany but would even join it. And on the eve of this present war French statesmen knew the German intentions, knew the Kaiser had informed King Albert that he was no longer for peace, knew that Von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, had said that in case of war they must pass through Belgium;‡ yet in this crisis, just as during the forty-four years of suspicious and ascertained facts, the French cabinet

* Declaration of General Chazal before the Military Commission of 1871.

† *Nouvelle Revue*, July 1 and October 1, 1888; also certain numbers during the following year.

‡ *Bibliothèque universelle et Revue de Suisse*, December, 1914.

adopted no other attitude than that which the treaties and the word of the nation solemnly pledged demanded.

As for England, never since the Treaty of the Five Powers did she doubt for one moment the obligation assumed; she went even further and from 1839 made herself the champion of Belgian neutrality.

When Lamertine gave up the ministry of foreign affairs for France in 1848, Lord Palmerston, fearing the mob agitation fomented by French statesmen themselves, affirmed that "the powers have not only the right but the duty to guarantee Belgian independence, which duty consists in aiding by every means the parts subjected to aggression and to preserve, or insist upon the return of, the territorial possessions as determined by the treaties." Then to emphasize the statement he took a formal pledge to give the most decided aid if necessary. Gladstone, some years later, went even further. He took the matter out of the juridical field and put it into the moral, as was his system, and declared that the violation of Belgian neutrality "would be the perpetration of the most odious crime that had ever smirched the pages of history."* In the very year 1870, Lord Russell, speaking in the House of Lords, recognized, almost with verbal excess, the juridical debt of Great Britain. "Our obligations to this king-

* Emmanuel Descamp; work cited.

dom (Belgium) are of the most sacred," he said. "We have accepted these along with other powers and separately from them. We cannot choose among manifold solutions. We can follow but one road, and that is the road of honor. We are obliged to defend Belgium. The members of the British Government declare publicly and explicitly that they intend to respect our treaties, to loyally fulfill our obligations, and not to dishonor the name of England." Lord Salisbury, more inclined to the typical language of a statesman, said with justice: "The independence of Belgium is extremely important to the European powers and they are bound by compacts highly favorable to the independence of that country."* In the foregoing there is a slight lack of completeness; if Salisbury had added "and vitally necessary to England" he would have said the whole historic truth.

It is strange that Chancellor Von Bethmann-Hollweg did not comprehend the essence and therefore the *raison d'etre* of the "piece of paper" as he called the Treaties of 1839. That later polemists pretended not to understand it can pass; but that he, directing the affairs of the most powerful empire dominating for long years Continental policy—that he did not understand is inexplicable. His country had absolute prevision of the slightest happenings; its military men knew all the weaknesses of the enemies, their forces,

* Session of the English House of Lords, July 17, 1891.

movements, means of communication, fortresses, cities, inhabitants, and even the private fortune of these; it is inexplicable that in the diplomatic department of the country possessing all this exact information, the very real importance which England ascribed to the treaties of 1839 was not known, especially when even the most superficial historian was aware of it. It is evident that there are two Germanies, one of the military party admirably perfect in its way, and the other of the diplomats, completely negative.

The famous scrap of paper * did have its *raison d'être*. When drawn up in 1839 it was the outgrowth of all preceding history and in time came to be looked upon as a precious conquest which must never be abandoned, never questioned, but always respected even in the most difficult crisis.

History shows that English policy, excepting the colonial, revolves around the nearby coasts; these were a subject of constant dispute and the theater of long wars and continental conquests. Let us see what an eminent English writer said in an epoch not influenced by the events of today.†

Under the reigns of Edward I and Edward III our foreign policy had already begun to assume a definite form and to direct itself towards that national objective still

* Communication of the English Ambassador to Sir Edward Grey on the declaration of war.

† Esme Wingfield-Stratford; "History of English Patriotism," page 61.

adhered to by modern statesmen. The British policy of those reigns is dead because it has been consummated; but their European policy still survives after six centuries. Its resumé may be found in the fact that the key of our position in Europe is the Low Countries. The extreme to which this guiding principle of our diplomacy has arrived in the course of centuries is extraordinary, and from this the majority of our important wars have resulted more or less directly.

In these conflicts may be included the Hundred Years War, dating from the reigns mentioned, the short wars of Henry VIII and Mary Tudor, the Holland campaigns of Elizabeth, of Cromwell, and of Charles II; all the long struggle with Louis XIV, the War of the Austrian Succession, and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which began at the Scheldt and ended at Waterloo. And there are even those who predict that another war, greatest of all, awaits us if we are to make sure of the independence of those countries and our own.

We have here the origin of the long rivalry between England and France, a rivalry which some persons are convinced is permanent and incurable. But it was not against France as France that we were set, but against the power which threatened to dominate the Low Countries. Now that this danger is over it has been shown that it is possible for the two countries to come together and to cordially pursue a common policy. Until a very recent epoch the Low Countries had but little to fear from an eastern neighbor, unless this term be applied to the Emperor Charles V. These are the reasons why our

policy has consisted, generally speaking, in coöperating with Germany against France, a situation which is now completely reversed. As far back as the reign of King John we began to see this coöperation, and an Anglo-German army was defeated in Bouvines. Later we find Edward III at the beginning of the Hundred Years War exercising the functions of Vicar General of the Empire and conducting in vain a numerous and heterogeneous army to force the French defenses on the Flemish frontier.

In past epochs, however, the means of defense had not assumed the astounding form of today. The depths of the sea had not been conquered and the air was sacred to departed spirits and the gods. But today it is doubly comprehensible that England will not easily permit the second maritime nation of the world to instal herself on the opposite shore of the narrow Channel—the nation that wished “to clutch the trident of Neptune as firmly as it held the sword of Frederick the Great,” the nation that aspired with undisguised eagerness to an extensive colonial dominion, the nation that competed for the world’s commerce and struggled with Englishmen, both in Europe and abroad, in a fierce economic fight. It is strange that not only the chancellor of the empire, but also scientific men like Professor Hermann Oncken of the University of Heidelberg, should persist in considering that England’s cause for entering the war—defense

of Belgian neutrality—was a pretext of small importance. Professor Oncken says doctorally: “No one goes to war for such a poor motive.” It is true that he considers this question, following the opinion of many English writers such as the chief members of the Faculty of Modern History at Oxford,* as purely a moral question; but therein lies the greatest error. It is human nature for the English to make a virtue of their going to war, but that the Germans should not have understood that their doing so was a dire necessity, is completely inexplicable.

In sending her troops to the fields of Flanders, England was not defending the Belgians; she was defending her own rights acquired in fair contest and in perfect reciprocity by means of a compact signed by five powers, who guaranteed its observance by their word given before the world and with due responsibility.

To consider this as sentimentality on England’s part constitutes the whole error around which most of the writers have revolved, and is explained by the passion of the moment which distracted even the serenest minds. They really believed that English public opinion rose in defense of a treaty and of another nation, and obliged its government to declare war on Germany. Neither the English people nor their

* “Why We Are at War;” written by the members of the Faculty of Modern History of the University of Oxford.

government would be capable of any such error. Only one ruler in history would have committed it—Napoleon III—and certainly the system brought him no good results. England was not disposed to intervene when Austria, in spite of all her declarations, was preparing to hurt Servia by breaking the recent treaty of Bucharest virtually approved by the powers; nor when Germany broke the treaty of London of 1867 which guaranteed, under the signature of the English government, the neutrality of Luxemburg. England, full of great statesmen, would have understood all the ridiculous aspect of this championship which the writers tried to attribute to her. In a moment when the acute mind of Asquith was directing the cabinet, and that of Sir Edward Grey, who has been likened to Pitt the Younger,* was directing the foreign policy, the British government was bound to be devoted to the defense of state interests and to sustain a treaty which benefited these; naturally they alleged that the real cause coincided with one even higher—respect for a sworn pact, and defense of a people laborious, active, honest, worthy in every aspect of championship.

It is just as much of an error in historical criticism to glorify the act of the Belgians. The Belgians responded to a necessity. The calamity which has fallen upon them is one more of the many due to their geographical situation, one more which history

* James M. Beck; "The Evidence in the Case."

has been preparing for them throughout the centuries. If the Belgians had let the German troops pass, acquitting their conscience by presenting conventional protests, they might not have seen their houses destroyed, their cities razed to the ground, nor suffered the thousand other misfortunes so vividly related; it is probable that their industries and commerce and monuments would have remained intact; but one thing would most certainly have perished—their independence. Given a national life by the will of the great powers, and with the object of establishing a neutral state, Belgium, had she demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining this international situation, would have shown that her *raison d'être* as an independent state no longer existed. Yuste, studying the life of Queen Maria of Hungary, sister of Charles V, says in this connection: "Reason and experience showed Queen Maria the true role which the Low Countries, an industrial and commercial nation, should play. Only a *vigilant neutrality* could consolidate her prosperity and preserve her, perhaps, from dismemberment."* A writer of the present moment speaking with enthusiasm of King Albert I says something which is doubly true when he qualifies him as the "second founder of Belgium." †

* Yuste; "Vie de Marie de Hongrie," page 131.

† M. L. Dumont Wilden; "Albert I, second fondateur de la Belgique," in the *Revue des deux mondes*, December 1, 1914.

Neither in the case of Belgium nor in that of England do we wish to deny the importance of the sacrifice made by entering the present war. Nor do we mean to mete out any less sympathy to those who are so sorely tried during the invasion. On the contrary, we wish to express our conviction that a country is more admirable when it defends its national existence than when it fights for an abstract principle; in the first case ideality has the collective well-being for its basis, in the second ideality is the product of a morbid condition. From the day that Austria sent her ultimatum to Servia, the Belgian government understood the danger it was running. On that same day, July 24, the minister of foreign affairs sent a circular to the kings' ministers accredited to those governments signatory to the Treaty of 1839, which circular directed them, should events precipitate themselves rapidly, to read to the respective ministers of foreign affairs an accompanying letter undated, reclaiming respect of Belgian neutrality.* Five days later in view of what had happened the Belgian government decided to put its army on war footing, and on July 31 mobilization was ordered. At this state England had already taken action and continued addressing herself to France, Germany, and Belgium, demanding the fulfilment of their obligation. Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister in Belgium, begged

* *Belgian Grey Book*, document number 2.

urgently to see the minister of foreign affairs to declare to him that "in view of the existing treaties Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do everything possible to maintain her neutrality." And Davignon, the minister in question, answered him that "Belgian military forces, considerably improved in the recent reorganization, were in condition to permit of an energetic defense in case the territory should be invaded." * The same day the German minister declared to the general foreign secretary that he knew the precedents of 1911 and 1913 concerning declarations on the part of the German government to respect Belgian neutrality and that he was "certain that the sentiments manifested at those dates had not changed." † And on August 2, the same German minister in Belgium repeated that although he had no instructions to make an official communication he could declare that his personal opinion, already known, was that Belgium could feel tranquil so far as her neighbor on the east was concerned.‡

But on the same second of August came the ultimatum to Belgium, a work of gross perfidy and one which, though a precedent can be found in history, is nevertheless a dishonor to humanity. It appears evident that German diplomacy, tied to the tail of the

* *Belgian Grey Book*, document number 11.

† *Belgian Grey Book*, document number 12.

‡ *Belgian Grey Book*, document number 19.

Pomeranian steeds, was obliged to write this infamous sheet. In it was set forth the necessity of violating Belgian territory, and the intention of occupying it as a base of operations; an offer was made to "pay cash" for everything, to preserve the integrity of the territory after the war; but in case these conditions were not accepted Germany hurled the threat of treating Belgium as an enemy.* A great error both in matter and in form is this note. It breathes the same sentiment which prompted Frederick the Great to occupy Silesia; in it is the same utter disregard of another's rights, the same incomprehension of the limits of what may and may not be done. The great king used to say "I will occupy Silesia and soon pedants will not be lacking to uphold my rights." The German General Staff thought the same but it forgot that the times have changed. The moral isolation in which its nation finds itself, in spite of having produced so many men beloved of humanity, is the consequence of this great fault. The law of modern warfare cannot permit this outrage even in order to defend great tactical interests, even to rapidly destroy an enemy so as to then turn on another, even to settle the outcome of a war.

If this were not the case anything would be authorized; collective assassinations and the enslavement of

* *Belgian Grey Book*, document number 20.

a neighbor, the taking of his riches, the abuse of his person. No! Our modern age has created a force in the international field which is above that of arms; an effective force which can give a victory and impose a defeat; a force which is called international law. It finds vigorous supporters in all those who see in the principle of public order dictated for the public good and honestly lived up to, a guarantee of their own existence. Lloyd-George was voicing a universal conviction when he declared that if Germany believed it to be to her interest to break treaties she must be taught that it would be even more to her interest to keep them.



CHAPTER XIX

THE ULTIMATUM AND ENGLAND'S DECLARATION OF WAR

ENGLAND acted with extraordinary rapidity. On her asking France and Germany, as in 1870, for a confirmation respecting Belgian neutrality, France immediately gave a favorable answer and sent the same assurance to Brussels. This attitude of France, whether due to a high conception of her own duty or whether due to her military plans which did not include an invasion of Belgium, is altogether laudable. Germany delayed an explicit answer to England, but meanwhile was using other language in Brussels. Toward the English government she did not wish to assume the responsibility of pledging her word and then committing the outrage of breaking it; with Belgium she wished to hide the truth in order that the country might not be prepared, since the invasion beyond doubt was prepared beforehand and the German diplomats in Brussels knew it.

In short, Germany made her decision; and in face of England's threat to declare war on her, Von Jagow

did not know any other explanation to give than that of military necessity; and later Von Bethmann-Hollweg dissolved his own ideas in a sea of words and regretted that England should go to war for a scrap of paper.*

Germany was at war with Belgium on August 4. On that day she assaulted the nation which, since its birth three-quarters of a century before, had strictly fulfilled its sworn pact. That same day England having sent an ultimatum declared war on Germany. It was a grave day in that country, where they had not learned to reckon with the race that never pardons. It was a grave day in that country where political students and writers, lulled by a long peace and inflated by great prosperity, had not foreseen the danger of exploiting the credulity of the masses and the fanaticism of the governing classes.

Could England have failed to enter a conflict which was jeopardizing the nation that so flagrantly disputed with her the domination of the sea? Hardly.

German writers have talked much about England's intervening for the purpose of destroying the commerce of her rival. To give only this hypothesis for her act means ignorance of the magnificent figures which British commerce has shown in recent years. That the active and audacious German competition was

* Miscellaneous, number 8, 1914. Official document of the English government.

displeasing to Great Britain no one can deny; nor that economic jealousy was one of the causes, perhaps the principal, of the political complications. Was it not the Kaiser himself who had urged German mercantile activity as the reason for his larger fleet? Was not the international policy of the state, as necessary protector of commercial interests and as motive for those interests, his idea even before it was adopted by the "modern Phenicians" as the English have been called? Even before it became for a brief period the unfruitful program of an eminently industrial Republic like the United States?

The justification presented to the German people whenever new sums were asked for warships was that the expenditure would defend and augment their commerce; and *sotto voce*, and indeed sometimes aloud, for there was nothing to fear from British imperceptibility, it was said that it would serve to chase the English from the sea. To these English the Kaiser threw out a threat when he said "Our future is on the sea"; or his more picturesque phrase, "Without the consent of the German Sovereign nothing must happen in any part of the world." No one can suppose that England, to whom supremacy on the sea was her very life, could remain neutral when such threats were about to be reinforced, or at least tested, by a struggle with other powers.

Nevertheless, English policy in latter years appeared to incline to the maintainence of peace.

A certain phenomenon of these early moments must not be passed over without comment. On the Continent, after the declaration of war, the various cabinets were strengthened by men who the day before had been irreconcilable adversaries—Jules Guèsdes, in France; Vandervelde, in Belgium; while in Germany the great mass of those applauding the Kaiser was made up by the Socialists of the Reichstag along with his electors, all organized in regiments just as disciplined as those that had marched to the front. But in England at this crucial moment three prominent members, champions of peace at any price, left the cabinet. There was opposition even among the supporters of the Liberal government.

We do not mean that party differences regarding peace at any price did not terminate shortly after. The supreme voice of patriotism was heard by all, asking its sacrifice from Irish as well as English, and all responded. But there is no doubt that if Germany had not been so scornful of her neighbor's rights, of treaties, and of English interests, the tacit protest of Morley and Burns as they left the House of Commons might have materialized into a preventive action on the part of a Parliament whose majority was much more inclined to peace than to war. Old Gladstone Liberals and young members of the Labor Party, that

is to say, the two extremes of which the government was composed by the repeatedly expressed preference of the people, were agreed to work for peace. At the beginning of 1913 and again at the beginning of 1914 it appeared that this majority would split; that some would follow the fiery Winston Churchill and others the no less fiery Lloyd George, and all because of questions touching upon a possible war; only the authority of Asquith with his admirable statesmanship was able to prevent it.

It would have been difficult for the English government to choose an opportune moment. She had to count on a parliament in unison with the people, which state of harmony was an easy matter only where public opinion had been prepared and worked up as in Germany.

It must be remembered that Germany on her side was not able, in spite of her many efforts, to penetrate the intention of the British cabinet; for the British cabinet wished in any case to have its hands free.

When the German government asked the British what its attitude toward Germany would be if the latter maintained the Treaty of 1839, which meant Belgian neutrality, Sir Edward Grey did not wish to compromise himself and had to answer that he had not considered that point. The fact was, England could not consent to tie her hands. It was in the order of things that sooner or later, when the French shores

were occupied, her own interests would force her into the conflict. This step could be avoided only by one of those aberrations like blinded pacifism, which the masses, more enamored of an absolute principle than a reality, undergo; and from such danger the English people would not have been able to deliver themselves. Between entering later or entering at once the English government preferred that moment when Germany's merchant fleet was scattered, her warships off duty. Only in that way could she prevent being surprised as Russia was when the only declaration of war she received from Japan was the sound of the cannon of Chemulpo.



CHAPTER XX

TURKEY AND THE CONFLICT

THE nation that from the first resolved to follow the Germanic Empires into the formidable conflict they had undertaken was Turkey. Ever since Turkey penetrated into Europe she has suffered the heavy consequences of not having accepted Christianity. An opposition, tacit when not violent, has made her the victim in political life of her religious faith. It appears that the European world which could tolerate less logical creeds in remote continents would not compromise with Mohammedanism at the gates of, or within, Europe itself. Of that same Tartar race which long ago sent Bulgarians and Hungarians to settle in Europe's fertile places, and accept Europe's religion, the Turk has been the object of such animosity that, to his detriment, an ideal of civilization is absorbed in an international interest—to expel the Crescent from Europe and then annihilate it. This appears to be the watchword of the present century. In our social existence nothing is worse than the union

of sentiment with interest when the combination is directed to harming a given existence.

The glorious history of Islam has been for some time past the fullest of sorrows. The years have brought her a continuous, unalterable diminution of power and loss of territory, and this to the general satisfaction, if not enthusiasm, of the entire world. And yet the Turk is considered by those who have studied that part of the Orient to have a good disposition and great personal honesty. Although it is not to the credit of those practising Christianity to say it, it is nevertheless certain that of all the peoples in that part of the globe the Turk inspires most confidence and affection. Writers, diplomats, Europeans and Americans who reside there, and commercial travelers, all testify to this opinion.

After long appearing to be in a trance, the Turks awoke not many years ago and dethroned Abdul Amid, the *Red Sultan*, and put on the throne Mohammed V. This initiated a régime of liberty. The revolution of the Young Turks, which for years had been hatching unsuccessful plots, was at last able to conquer by a proclamation and without great battles.

But only in part did the revolution fulfill its mission. It was a question whether the new régime would be able to build up a solid barrier against either Slavic or West European ambitions, and to this task it was not equal. On the disappearance of the old routine,

foreign covetousness, stimulated by the fear that the Young Turk party might make conquest more difficult than formerly, awoke with more savage instinct than ever; and this very party, with its newly acquired ambitions for the old empire, encouraged in its turn European appetites.

In the diplomatic field also there was a change. England was withdrawing from the first rank she had hitherto occupied, and leaving it to Germany; and Germany was decided to open a road through Turkey to Russia, who had just come back with new zest into Balkan politics. The work of the German ambassador Von Marschall found the field abandoned. Turks of both the old and the new order understood that they could hope nothing from Russia favorable to their interests, while Germany on the other hand could not awaken immediate suspicion even in the most wary. There is no doubt that Von Marschall whispered theories of legitimate expansion in the ears of the most credulous or ambitious, and these theories must have appeared sincere. Germans and Moslems constituted two great compact masses, two races equally warlike and situated in favorable positions; the union of the two ought to mean their glory and prosperity, and together they ought to be able to expel the smaller races whose early boldness had acquired formidable positions and had carried them to dreams of governing of the world, to the detriment of more legitimate

interests. These and other theories explained prudently but in good faith, together with a realization of the international situation, inclined Turkey most decidedly toward the great Central Empire.

On the day when two German warships pursued in the Mediterranean took refuge in the Dardanelles, Turkey not only received them but decided to go to war. Russia, instead of taking prompt action, was slow to understand that the moment had arrived to liquidate forever the account that had been standing ever since the Congress of Berlin; and England alarmed for her African possessions, also threw off that arrogance which was characteristic of all the nations in times of peace, and adopted a too conciliatory tone.

Turkey for her part was in no hurry to enter the fight. For the moment she merely rechristened the *Goeben* after the famous Sultan, Selim Yaruz (whose companion in world domination was Charles V), retained the practical German seamen who manned it, prepared her fortresses, filled them with Germans,* and waited until, according to tradition, "the *infidels* would oblige her to give Europe peace by means of a war."

In all this period preceding the declaration of war Turkey acted with great duplicity. On August 4, 1914, the grand vizir had assured the English repre-

* *The Times*, December 11, 1914, account by Sir Louis Mallet.

sentative in Constantinople that Turkey renewed her assurance of remaining neutral.* When the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* entered Turkish ports he lied and said they had been bought, and with feigned tears induced the English Marine Commission not to abandon Constantinople. As to what happened concerning the two German warships, the same grand vizir made many salaams and tried to justify himself to Ambassador Tallet when the latter arrived in Constantinople after his vacation, August 18. By the same hypocritical procedure the Dardanelles were closed, and there was even more hypocrisy when the abolition of the capitulations was being discussed. This page in the history of Turkish diplomacy is hardly in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet.

It appears that Enver Pachá, ardent, patriotic, and ambitious to the point of aspiring to the caliphate, was the decisive factor in Turkey's entrance into the war. Enver is the same who as Bey resisted the Italian invasion in Cirenaica, and who led the vanguard into Andrianopolis when it was reconquered; more than all, he was the hero of the *coup d'état* by which the moderate ministry was overthrown (not without bloodshed) and fell into his hands and Talaat Bey's, with the present grand vizir and the minister of state as decorative figures. The prestige of Enver Pachá was great in the army, for which reason Mohammed V

* *Second English Blue Book*, document number 3.

and his heir (Mohammed had got the throne only through an army conspiracy) were not strong enough to oppose his plans. If in a country like Germany the military party was able to impose itself little by little on the whole nation, it could do even more in a country like Turkey. Seeing that under her mantle of neutrality she was actively preparing for war, the three allied powers sent a collective note asking that all Germans who filled public positions in Turkey should be sent out. While the cabinet was vacillating, the war party, helped and perhaps inspired by German officers, committed the aggressions that provoked war.*

The Sultan was to use the terrible weapon of the Holy War, kept as a threat, in order to make Egypt and India rebel against England, and Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco against France. His armies were to assault Russia and weaken her western frontier, while others hastened to the Suez Canal. By this means England, in order to defend Egypt, would have to abandon France.

It would appear up to the present moment that the Islamic world is not to carry out these enterprises. The Holy War has not accomplished the hoped-for result. Apparently the true instinct of the masses, an instinct not unknown to the Mohammedans, warned

* *The Times*, December 11, 1914; article cited; also *Second English Blue Book* and *Second Russian Orange Book*.

them that once more religion was being made to serve political ends, and that the statesmen in Constantinople invoked the Prophet without believing in him. Nor was the expected organization of the masses easy. Modern warfare demonstrates that the machine has taken the place of men and that the organization of an army is no simple task.



CHAPTER XXI

ITALIAN NEUTRALITY

WHY Italy remained neutral at the outbreak of the war is not generally understood in spite of the copious explanation it has received. The Italian government stated its course clearly and the press of the country not only supplied the public with a great assortment of data, but in polemics against both underhanded and open attacks, it set forth many just arguments. But the great mass of people are not compelled to analyze or even to know the factors in the problem; for them it was easier to deliver the superficial criticism that the ally in peace did not continue to be an ally in war. Not only did the mass express itself in this way, but also certain writers who, forgetting their mission of elucidating events, allowed themselves to be carried away by the passion of the moment into publishing the statement that Italian neutrality constituted treason.*

The remembrance of another neutrality, declared in

* Hugo Münsterburg; "The War and America," page 74.

1870 when the French government was hoping for Italian aid, lends some color to this accusation from disappointed Germans who, with reason or without, were hoping to see the Italian army on the battlefield of 1914 in their defense.

There is, however, a definite psychological fact back of this question. Without it the coincidence of help twice expected and twice failing in the decisive moment could not be explained; it is, that official Italy has never been sentimental in politics. Going a step further we may add that though the Italian government has never been sentimental the public has always been so. Admirable dispensation which the marvelous Latin spirit has conceived, and which northern nations like England and the United States, where government is bound down to public opinion, or like Germany where government dominates public opinion, cannot understand. Nevertheless it responds to a salient necessity in political ethics. The government is a superintendent of affairs. It must weigh advantages and judge motives. Its chief care must be to harmonize the immediate and tangible good with the intangible, and not to violate the principles of collective order; for these, accepted and respected by all, constitute a national interest; but neither must the government lose itself in abstractions and forget realities. The public on the other hand is the expression of the different phases of the human soul. It is sentimental, pas-

sionate, valorous, cowardly, fool-hardy, prudent, and at times brutal. It is a kaleidoscope of all the conditions, positive and negative, of the human morale.

And so we find Italians fighting on all fields and for all kinds of ideas. In America, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Italians have offered their arms and their lives. And although France did not see the armies of Victor Emanuel II fighting with her in 1870 as hers had fought with him on the plains of Lombardy in 1859, she could nevertheless admire Garibaldi's red-shirted volunteers in the Vosges Mountains and around Dijon.

Sentimental policy on the part of the Piedmontese government first or of the Italian afterward would have made Italian unity impossible; for had this unity been suddenly proclaimed instead of patiently achieved it would have been only ephemeral. Perhaps, indeed, Metternich's contemptuous "Italy is only a geographical expression" would have weighed eternally on the peninsula.

How differently was the Italian unity accomplished from the German. The latter could call upon the best army in Europe; three successful wars served her as a pedestal—1864, '66, and '70, all of that easy kind of victory which proves the enemy's inferiority. Moreover German unity was an amalgamation, not a renovation. The Italian on the other hand had only the reduced little Piedmont army—a few men without war material—and Garibaldi's group of soldiers. Its de-

feats were to be expected and its few successes could neither produce enthusiasm nor give hope. Moreover Italian unity was an entire renovation *ab imis*; it had to struggle against the head of the Church who had held Rome from the time of Charlemagne and even before; it had to struggle against the secular monarchy of the Bourbons who held Naples; and against Austrian princes very influential in the court of their birth. Those who know Italian history understand that much resourcefulness and astuteness had to be employed to hold Napoleon III to his task of defeating Austrians on the fields of Magenta and Solferino in 1859; and to hold the English as friends in 1860, and induce them to look with sympathy on Garibaldi's expedition.

Later, in 1866, and without alienating the good will of France, Italy allied herself with Prussia and recovered Venice from defeated Austria. Three years after, she attained her present extent by occupying Rome, which act Napoleon III, influenced by the Catholic Party so powerful in his court, refused to recognize in the name of that neutrality which he represented to France as benevolent, to England as a natural consequence of the League of Neutrals initiated by her, and to Prussia as a great service rendered to the cause which she herself was sustaining. Considering the machinations which beset modern Italy it is very patent that without this sort of secular genius, this utilitarian statecraft acquired in misfortune and prompting her

to secure her rights not by the sword but by words, she would never have been able to accomplish such results. Had the sentimentality of the populace been guiding public affairs, Italian unity would still be merely a patriotic dream.

Nearly fifty years have passed since Rome was made capital of the new Italian Kingdom, and these have been years of unbroken equilibrium and careful safeguarding of the country's sacred interests. Austria, hated, was turned into a useful ally while France, the Latin sister, became a feared adversary. Bismarck, with that characteristic astuteness which events have not discounted, wanted Italy to come into the Triple Alliance, led there by Austria in such a way that the two rival nations would be united from the start. Italy acceded with the approbation of most of her public men. To maintain, after unity was an accomplished fact, the same principles which had served its formation had to be the program of Italian cabinets, for the period of consolidation was equally difficult. There was the covetousness of foreign governments to guard against, and still more menacing, an internal enemy—the Catholic and Apostolic Church of Rome with the immense number of faithful adherents who kept up their protests and revindications, and who clamored unceasingly for the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope.

Speaking on the present war in the Chamber of
14

Deputies, Salandra, then premier, kept to this same practical policy. "We must be neither of one side nor the other," he said; "we must be exclusively Italian. Our neutrality is not the abandonment of positions conquered nor is it the act of Pilate washing his hands of responsibility; it is instead the solidest attitude for making our rights recognized and our aspirations satisfied."

Therefore cool-headed statesmen smiled benevolently at the noise of the market-place and the acclamations and protests of the hot-headed crowd. They knew how the masses applauded great ideas and aspired to noble actions; how they were ready to make themselves, even in their relative weakness, the champion of brilliant principles of ethical equilibrium; but they, the statesmen, must go their own way, laboring for the consecration *ad perpetuam memoriam* of the works which others had so successfully carried on.

Examining the matter in the light of this rational criticism it is easily seen that the Triple Alliance was a necessity for Italy. When it was formed, Germany was not the naval power that she is to-day and therefore her friction with England had not begun. Instead, although the increase in Prussia's power had somewhat diminished British sympathy, the two nations were still the natural allies they had always been. Italy on the other hand had a war fleet which was considered strong for that day and sufficient to neu-

tralize any naval action on the part of France against Germany. Moreover Italy maintained her traditional friendship with England. Germany's powerful army was a guarantee to the new kingdom, defending it by its prestige and upholding the authority of the reigning house of Savoy which was not recognized in the south of the peninsula; above all it put a curb on French inconstancy, for France already repented having aided in creating a powerful rival. Of this the occupation of Tunis convinced even the most stubbornly Italian and the most decidedly pro-French. It even alienated Garibaldi whose French sympathies had survived his ill-treatment at the Assembly of Bordeaux where, in spite of his having been popularly elected, they did not wish him as a member because he was not French. (This incident, it may be recalled, so disgusted Victor Hugo that he left the assembly.) On the occupation of Tunis Garibaldi wrote the following: "The treaty which France has made with the Bey of Tunis has shattered my good opinion, and if these unfair proceedings in Africa continue they will force us to recall that Carthage and Nice are no more French than I am Tartar; and that Italy has as much right to ancient Carthage as France has." *

For Austria the Triple Alliance, besides signifying defense against the Slavic world, meant the recogni-

* "La Triplice Alianza. Ricordi, note, ed appunti di un vecchio parlamentare." (Garibaldi's words are published in this book.)

tion by Italy of her holdings across the Adriatic and security from a former enemy at her back, always ready, as in the Austro-German war of 1866, to assault her in a trying moment.

Difficult days of conflicting opinion preceded Italy's entrance into the alliance with the Central Powers. Agostino de Pretis, the premier who in 1881 began to exercise almost a dictatorship which was bound to terminate in his death, advocated ignoring the Tunis affair and continuing the friendship with France; Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, the celebrated internationalist and scientist, was also for friendship with France but sought to harmonize it with intimacy with the Central Powers. A third diplomat, Baron de Blanc, then under-secretary of state and held in less authority than the other two, was most vigorous in insisting on the alliance with the Teutons as a necessary guarantee to Italy's future—a defensive alliance, for this was the only aspect which the matter then bore. This young diplomat saw most clearly into the problem and his argument triumphed. Bismarck insisted that Victor Emanuel's son Humbert I of Savoy should pass in penitence, so to speak, through Vienna on his way to Berlin; and Humbert I, responding to a political necessity, went to Vienna on October 27, 1881. (This visit was never returned by Emperor Franz Joseph in spite of the many succeeding years which misfortune granted him on the throne.) On May 20, 1882, was

signed the defensive treaty whereby Italy entered the already existing alliance between the two Central Powers, henceforth to be known as the Triple Alliance.

We do not know the complete text of this treaty; but judging from the repeated declarations of statesmen familiar with it in its entirety, and judging furthermore by the light of recent events, the alliance in its multiple renewals never ceased to be defensive.

When the present Kaiser came to the throne, Bismarck as is well known was asked to retire. He was succeeded by General Von Caprivi. One of Von Caprivi's first acts was to write an official letter to Premier Francisco Crispi of Italy. After notifying him of his new dignity of chancellor he declared that as long as he held that post the German Empire would work for peace "but without departing from the principle of always being a good friend to its friends. This is the message which my sovereign has charged me to send, and it is also that of my own conscience." Crispi answered with great cleverness detailing the duties his nation had assumed and insisting indirectly, as is the manner of diplomatic documents, on the defensive conception of the alliance. "As with Prince Bismarck" he wrote, "so with you will I continue conscientiously for the maintenance of peace. But if the unfortunate day should arrive in which Italy or Germany, *attacked*, should find themselves in the sad necessity of *defending themselves*, you will see me following the example of

the king my sovereign, and in unison with the whole Italian nation, ready to fulfill worthily and to the last, the duty which would be imposed upon us." *

These words, knowing the man who wrote them and the satisfaction with which they were received in Berlin, meant more than they said. Crispi was the statesman of his epoch most inclined to the Central Powers. Whenever he was not in power German interests wanted him back, and Emperor William II even resolved to journey to Italy especially to confer with him.† That Crispi was hated in France because of his political manœuvres is in itself significant. If any man in Italy could effect a change in the nature of the pact which bound the three powers, it was he; more than this he persistently tried to change it. In its existing form he considered it insufficient. It did not prevent the difficulties with France which Italy was constantly suffering, since its strictly defensive character compelled the allies to coöperate only in a *casus foederis*. But fortunately for Italy, every time that a change of this sort appeared imminent, Crispi's ministry fell, and also because the German government, being more prudent than its emperor, feared that this restless statesman might prove a dangerous friend and drag Germany into war at an inopportune moment for

* Francisco Crispi; "Questioni internazionali, diario e documenti," pages 3 and 4.

† Francisco Crispi; work cited, page 291.

a cause which was not hers. Hohenlohe used to say "Crispi keeps Caprivi uneasy just as he did Marschall and Holstein, for no one can foretell what this restless man will do next; especially as he has picked up a hot-head like Blanc for his minister of foreign affairs." *

When the Emperor made the visit mentioned with the idea of interviewing Crispi and changing, perhaps, the clauses of the treaty, Italian policy had returned to its habitual tendency; that is, it had given up imperialism by means of violent and audacious blows and had buried it in the field of Adua. It had realized that the African defeat was the natural consequences of all international acts which do not bear the right relations between the means employed and the object aimed at.

Since Crispi no Italian statesman has had imperial hankerings; but with due caution all have followed Cavour's policy of trying to establish bases for territorial growth without colliding with other nations bent on the same mission. They have sought to preserve the traditional English friendship, to make compacts with France that would do away with mischievous economic struggles and would regulate Mediterranean questions. In short they kept endeavoring to relax the too tight embrace of the Triple Alliance and save Italy from the risks which the other two mem-

* "Memoires du Prince Clovis de Hohenlohe;" Volume III.

bers ran, and from identifying herself too closely with the various questions which concerned them.

Thus the alliance began to decline and in 1899 the Foreign Minister Guicciardini affirmed openly in the Senate that even the *casus foederis* would not be sufficient to drag Italy into a war with England.* This statement, which neither Austria nor Germany challenged, is extremely interesting. Without knowing the secret agreements which may have existed it would be venturesome to suspect that Italy had been dissolved from her obligations in the event of a *casus belli* provoked by England. But whatever may have been the full meaning of Guicciardini's words, they undeniably indicated that the force of the treaty, far from increasing as Crispi had desired, had waned.

After the outbreak of the present war a revelation was made in the Italian parliament which demonstrates not only the permanently defensive character of the Triple Alliance but also that the present case, because it had had an identical precedent had already been the subject of interpretation by the Central Powers. Giovanni Giolitti, then premier, speaking with all the authority of that high position, pronounced the following words: "In order that our loyalty may be above all question I desire to make known to you a precedent which demonstrates that in proclaiming our neutrality

* Benedetto Cirmeni; *Deutsche Rundschau*, November, 1914.

the government has given an exact interpretation to the treaty of the Triple Alliance, and one admitted as exact by the other members of the Alliance.

"On the August 9, 1913, I received while absent from Rome a telegram from the Marquis di San Giuliano, then foreign minister, in which he said: Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of operating against Servia, and defines such action as a *casus foederis* for the Triple Alliance, which definition I do not consider applicable. I will try to get in touch with Germany and impede this action; but it may be necessary for us to say that we do not consider this possible action as defensive, in which case we would not consider the *casus foederis* to exist.

"To this I answered: If Austria operates against Servia it is evident that no *casus foederis* exists. It would be an action carried out on her own account and not in her defense since no one is thinking of attacking her. Therefore it is necessary to declare all this to Austria in the most serious manner, and we must hope that Germany will take some step to dissuade Austria from her dangerous venture.

"This was done and our proceeding did not disturb in the least our good relations with our allies."*

This revelation, which provoked long commentaries in all the foreign press, has never been denied either

* Session of the Italian Parliament, December 5, 1914.

officially or privately. This declaration made so solemnly was accepted by all not only as certain but as conclusive. Moreover the argument was so evident that to discuss it would have been stupid; especially as during Italy's war against Turkey, Germany and Austria applied the same theory. More than this they showed themselves hostile and limited her field of action in the war.

Thus we see that on the breaking out of the present conflict Italy's obligation was the following: To stand by her allies if the war was defensive; if otherwise, to reserve her liberty of action. In spite of all that has been written one way and another, and in spite of all the differences of opinion to which human events give rise, no one has been able to establish that the present conflict came about through an attack by Russia, France, England, Belgium or Servia. The contrary is self-evident. The judicial fact is that Germany first declared war on Russia; and as to the case between Austria and Servia nothing could be more incontrovertible than that the first-named declared war on the second, and that, up till August 1, the thesis declared and upheld by the Central Powers was that the question lay entirely between those two states. The material fact differs in nothing from the judicial, for even if Russia was arming herself she was doing it in order that her prestige in the Balkans might not suffer; she was seeking a solution by virtue of which it might

not appear that Austria had full power over the Balkan States, forcing them through fear, while Russia left them to her mercy. Still further do the facts support the case, for it was not Austria who complained of the attitude of Russia and declared war on her, but Germany—unexpectedly, and at the very moment when it appeared as if an agreement might be brought about.

This declaration of war coming from Germany and not from Austria is the most explicit proof that the *casus foederis* did not exist and that Germany was bent on forcing Austria's hand and involving her in a European conflict.

Writers most benevolent to Germany, and also the official documents of that nation, have synthetized her thesis in the following terms: The Triple Entente, under the perfidious guidance of England, were preparing to make war when conditions were most advantageous to themselves; Germany knowing this, chose the moment instead of waiting for her enemies to choose it. This may all be true; it is admissible that these were the reciprocal intentions of the belligerents; but setting aside all the occasional causes which might have presented themselves for avoiding the conflagration, as they always do if given sufficient time, and admitting that Germany rushed into an offensive war today in order to avoid a defensive one tomorrow, all this does not alter the problem so far as Italy is con-

cerned. The Triple Alliance stipulated nothing in regard to a preventive war, and in any case Germany should have taken counsel with all members of the Alliance if she wished their aid. The present war should have been decided by all three powers with equal voice.

But instead, Italy was never consulted, never warned. Austria's note to Servia surprised Italy just as much as it surprised the Triple Entente. Indeed it surprised her more than it did England, since it appears that something of its contents had been revealed to the latter in order to obtain from her a promise of neutrality. Everything indicates that it was feared that Italy's good offices might avoid the audacious blow which Austria wished to strike, and so she was left completely in the dark. It is not thus that a nation can be inveigled into a war for a cause not her own. Even had the Treaty of the Triple Alliance been offensive Italy would have had every reason for declining to comply. With justice might she have said to the Central Powers, "I am your ally but not your slave." Once more had Teuton diplomacy fallen short of its aim. Decidedly Bismarck had embodied all the diplomatic talent of a whole epoch.

Italy being absolved from marching to war beside the Central Empires, to have done so unnecessarily would have been treason to her own interests. To begin with it would have broken her traditional friend-

ship with England which, though a little less close in the last few years, had never ceased to be sincere and useful. As a result of this break, Italy, with hundreds of miles of coast exposed and with a fleet inferior to that which the allies could assemble in the Mediterranean, would alone have suffered the consequences of naval warfare. Her commerce and her railroads, nearly all coastal, would have been destroyed; her principal cities would have been at the mercy of the enemy, for although, by the uses and conventions of maritime warfare, these should have been inviolate, we have seen how little respect the rules laid down in time of peace receive in time of war; a pretext could easily have been found for bombarding them. Another matter to consider is that the Italian people have not the German conception of the state; they are not accustomed to an iron social discipline. And soon, with industries paralyzed, exportations and importations made most difficult (for deprived of the sea no route would be open except through Austria and Austria herself engaged in war) there would have been seething dissatisfaction; add to this the unpopularity of the cause, and one may see that public agitation might have risen to any degree.

Although Italian military leaders have always held in high respect the German military organization, the general opinion has nevertheless been that England could not be beaten; that her indisputable dominion of

the seas would neutralize every enemy victory on land and put her at last in a position to dictate peace terms. Thus no battle lost by England could redound to the adversary's practical benefit. Only when the enemy is at the mercy of the victor can terms be dictated and compensation received for all the sacrifices of blood and money; and even in this case, considering the suffering and ruin which modern war presupposes, the compensation is never adequate.

Even more; granting that fortune had smiled throughout on the arms of the Triple Alliance, Italy would not have come out benefited. As has been said, after the French occupation of Tunis and the Franco-Italian conventions of September 28, 1896, Italy had directed her energies toward the eastern end of the Mediterranean. She looked toward the trade highways of Asia. Later we find these aspirations coinciding with those of Germany and Austria, and affecting the interests of Turkey. Austria was trying to reach down to Salonica and dominate those waters; Germany was dreaming of a great empire from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf; and Turkey, having been stripped to almost nothing in Europe, naturally wished to maintain her Asiatic possessions.

Another Italian aspiration, and one necessary to the defense of her own coasts, was Albania. Her interests demanded either a weak state there or her own flag; but Austria also wanted Albania. A war vic-

torious for the Triple Alliance would have meant that Italy must abandon her policy in Mediterranean Asia. As prelude to this she must withdraw her troops from those islands in the Ægean Sea which she had been occupying since the war with Turkey. It would also have meant the installing of Austria in Avlona and Durazzo, facing Italy's own southern coasts and only a few hours distant. Italy might have received in exchange Tunis and Corsica; at least it is affirmed that these were offered to her if she would side with the Central Powers. But Tunis and Corsica were of little importance compared with what she was aspiring to. They meant but little in the commercial sense and nothing in the military. Weakened at the back and with the then existing equilibrium of Europe broken, Italy would have passed from an ally into a vassal of the Central Powers. Without a doubt Germany and Austria would be united more closely than ever after a favorable war and after the death of the aged Francis Joseph, perhaps in a common national bond. If this were consummated it would throw back the international situation of Europe to the times of the Holy Roman Empire, which period, as history shows, was not one of great fortune or great glory for Italy.

On the other hand defeat of the Triple Alliance would also have signified disaster for Italy. It would have endangered all her colonies and probably Sicily

and Sardinia, islands which are really an integral part of her territory.

These reflections on the results of the war ought to be sufficient even to the theorists and defenders of German acts to explain why Italy did not adhere to the Central Powers. Such writers have defended Germany's act in breaking the Belgian Neutrality Treaty, because to do so was a necessity of state. Chancellor Von Bethmann Hollweg from the tribune of the Reichstag enunciated the theory that a treaty could be broken for urgent reasons of state; Von Jagow expressed the same to the English ambassador. Using this same theory, Italy, in spite of her treaty to coöperate with her allies in case of war, was justified in disregarding the piece of paper which imposed upon her an anti-national obligation. The foregoing is said, however, merely to demonstrate how slippery is human logic when influenced by passion. It is necessary to insist on the fact that there was no treaty obliging Italy to go to war against her own interests, when this war was offensive, almost aggressive. The Italian government was right then, when on August 3 she declared her neutrality to all the belligerents.

Even with this much settled, a serious question remained unanswered: did the Triple Alliance still exist or had it terminated? This problem, profound from the theoretical point of view, also involved great practical consequences. Evidently a treaty, like a private

contract, terminates when the time expires for which it was concerted. But also a treaty like a private contract cannot exist when its cause has ceased to exist. The Triple Alliance had for basis the reciprocal defense of the contracting parties in case of attack. Germany and Austria having entered war *de facto* could not have fulfilled this obligation toward Italy had she been assaulted by a third power outside of the entente. Nor could Italy expect such aid had she joined them in the armed conflict, for the clauses of the compact would not then have applied. Italy being attacked, and it being proven that the case came within the clauses concerted, it would be patent that during a war which seriously compromised Germany and Austria, Italy might remain neutral; and in a war that compromised Italy, Germany and Austria might remain neutral. The legal precautions would not be understood. The justice that could measure either case does not exist in international law; for in international law more than anywhere else, self-interest dominates, and even had the two powers been able to stand by the treaty they would not have done so unless opportune for themselves.

A war is the dissolvent of international cohesion. Weakening some nations, strengthening others, it breaks the compacts which bind them. Even a victorious war changes the relation of the victors. Whatever the future may bring the treaty which now binds

Germany to Austria will certainly be changed. A war changes the whole field of diplomatic action and therefore all kinds of relationship; and certainly it changes all treaties unless these refer to fixed situations. The Triple Alliance was invented in order to maintain a supposed European equilibrium in the interests of general peace. It was to serve as a check on the French desire for revenge against Germany, on Russian domination in the Balkans to the prejudice of Austria, and on the expansion of France to the prejudice of Italy. In short its mission was to prevent war. On this rested its defensive character.

The Triple Alliance disappeared both in deed and in word the day that Germany declared war on Russia and France; nor could Italy, after her declaration of neutrality, expect any aid whatever, nor could the Central Powers give it to her or receive it from her. The treaty, then, had terminated for failure of its *raison d'être*. To suppose that it still existed would be to oblige Italy to renounce all benefit from the conflict, to render her powerless to defend her own interests, and to condemn her to maintain a shadow without a substance.

All this discussion leads to the question whether Italy was free to incline to one side or the other. Italian statesmen like Salandra, like the late Marquis di San Giuliano, and Sonnino, his successor as foreign minister, all considered that she was. Of the same

mind were students and eleventh-hour pacifists and socialists like Napoleon Colajanni and Arturo Labriola. Men like Enrique Ferri, Sacchi, Bissolati, the aged statesman Giovanni Giolitti, never even admitted that it could be otherwise when speaking in parliament; and so the Bettolo resolution to that effect was voted by the whole Chamber and the whole Senate, except for weak protests from a few orthodox socialists.

For Italy the war was now narrowed down to a question of opportunity and advantage. If peace could satisfy the national aspirations it would be maintained; if not she would go forth on the battlefield and claim what was due her, thus to make sure that her confines might not be limited by the peace concert.

The *National Zeitung* took occasion to remind Italians of Macchiavelli's opinion on neutrality as once expressed to Vettori; but the caustic journal overlooked the fact that it was not this same kind of neutrality which the Florentine Secretary was condemning, but another sort inspired by his own extraordinary doctrines—doctrines not sufficiently understood or appreciated by the simple-minded average person, who is sentimental only where another's interests are concerned. Here is the *Zeitung* paragraph in full: "It is exactly four hundred years ago this fourth of December that Macchiavelli had the opportunity of expressing his mind on neutrality. In answer to Fran-

cesco Vettori, Florentine envoy in Rome, who asked him what ought to be the attitude of the Pontifical State as between France, England, and Venice, on the one side, and the Swiss, Spain, and the German Emperor, on the other, Machiavelli replied that to be neutral was of no use to a state unless it was stronger than the belligerents. The neutral was exposed to the hatred of the vanquished, to the contempt of the victor; it was obliged to make contracts first with one then with the other, and each one of them thinking it might be cheated; the neutral's fate was often to be taken over by the conqueror." *

The words of Machiavelli applied to a neutrality which could trust the words of the belligerents and the principles of international law which guarantees, or ought to guarantee, to neutrals the undisturbed enjoyment of peace. But the good German critic knew perfectly well that to trust in the statutes of international law is not as tranquilizing in this century, especially after the cases of Belgium and Luxemburg, as it was in the fifteenth. Italian statesmen did not have to recall the words of their illustrious compatriot, and still less did they need the veiled threat of the Berlin newspaper. This has been demonstrated by subsequent events.

* *National Zeitung*, December 5, 1914.

CHAPTER XXII

ITALY'S PARTICIPATION

NEUTRALITY having been declared and having been accepted patiently by the Central Empires and joyfully by the Entente, it was not difficult to detect that other events were shaping themselves which would cause Italy to act more in harmony with her interests. These interests were concrete and popular —to consolidate her national unity, to assure her dominion in the Adriatic, to hold the Ægean Islands occupied since the war with Turkey, and to establish a sphere of influence political and commercial in Asia Minor. Thus far it had been her two allies who objected most to these aspirations. To Austria the first two enumerated were especially unwelcome. For her to voluntarily cede Italian provinces forming part of her empire so that Italy might complete her unity, would mean raising the most dangerous internal questions. To the multiple peoples tied to the chariot of the Hapsburgs it would teach a solution of their own problem which they are now prevented from contem-

plating by the iron principle of integrity. All this Austria knew only too well; hence her constant negative to every Italian claim.

As far back as December, 1914, when Baron Sonnino became foreign minister, Italy, with precision and ability, brought up a question which was bound to present itself and which slowly led her to declare war. Sonnino instructed the Italian ambassador in Vienna, the Duke of Avarna, to ask the Austro-Hungarian government what compensation it was disposed to make to Italy in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty of Alliance, the claim being based on the Italian occupation of certain territory in the Balkans.* The aforesaid Article states with all clarity that if one of the powers should make territorial occupation it must previously fix the compensation which the other would concede. Its clauses had prevented Italy from acquiring European territory while she was at war with Turkey; and Austria then applied its terms with such severity that in case of not being heeded, or rather not being obeyed, she prepared to invade Italy; this was in accord with the plans of the General Staff whose chief, General Conrad Von Hertzendorff, most vehemently desired such invasion. Now Italy through the subtle penetration of her statesmen was reciprocating and using the same arguments, all of them drawn from the very notes

* *Italian Green Book*, document number 1.

which Austria, unconscious of the future, had sent during the Italo-Turkish war.

Count Berchtold, in the name of the Dual Monarchy, affirmed that the military operations against Servia did not signify territorial occupation either permanent or temporary. Baron Sonnino replied that because of the precedent which existed in the war with Turkey he could not accept this argument. "At that time Austria-Hungary" he said "on the basis of Article VII, prevented us not only from making momentary occupations but even from the most simple war operations." * In Sonnino's note, which is a magnificent document of strict logic, three despatches are reproduced: one sent November 5, 1911, by which the Italian Government is informed of Count Ahrenthal's declaration "that any Italian action on the Ottoman coast of European Turkey or on the islands of the Ægean Sea would not be admitted by either Austria or Germany, because contrary to the Treaty of Alliance;" the second despatch, of November 7, 1911, says "that Count Ahrenthal considered the bombarding of ports in European Turkey, like Salonica, Cavala, etc., contrary to Article VII of the treaty"; and in the third, dated April 21, 1912—the time of the Italian attack on the Dardanelles—Count Berchtold himself says: "If the Royal Italian Government wants back its liberty of

* *Italian Green Book*, document number 6.

action the Imperial and Royal Government could ask the same; but it cannot admit that Italy should carry out such operations or any others contrary to the point of view manifested in previous conversations. If such operations were carried out the consequences would be grave."

Faced with precedents so concrete the Austrian minister changed his tactics and began to temporize. He had to transfer the defense of his point of view to another field.

Meanwhile Prince Von Bülow was sent to Rome to replace the German ambassador Von Flotow. Both these men were well known Italophiles, the former having married into one of the most distinguished Italian families, the Camporeale. (It may be remarked in passing that the late mother of the Princess Von Bülow, in her youth a beauty at the court of Napoleon III, nearly occupied the throne of France instead of the Spanish Eugenia de Montijo.)

Von Bülow arrived in Italy with both good and bad intentions. His prestige was at stake, and he had to show the emperor who had relieved him of the chancellorship that he knew how to serve his country on all occasions. The good intentions consisted in obtaining for Italy the most favorable concessions from Austria. The bad consisted in suborning the internal politics of the country by fair means or foul. With the coming of Von Bülow, all that strength which the

German Government can call into play in a nation which had long depended on her, began to make itself felt.

But there is a popular instinct which easily understands events and foils all intrigues. The masses—even the pacifists, antimilitarists and socialists—all rushed to the public squares and in loud voices clamored for war against Austria.

In Austria, the recently appointed chancellor, Baron Burian, a man careful and clever, abandoned the thesis of Berchtold and adopted another, namely: that it was impossible for Austria to cede territory because while in a state of war she could not give that which a treaty of peace might not leave in her power. By this thesis Burian interpreted the Seventh Article of the treaty in the sense that territorial compensations could only come out of conquests. A few days later, in February, he amplified it, formulating an accusation against Italy and demanding compensations from her because she had shortly before occupied a part of Albania, and also because of the Ægean Islands occupied long before.

Baron Sonnino and the Duke of Avarna replied that Italy was not asking for territory which would be the object of conquest but of territory which belonged exclusively to Austria, since Article VII spoke of compensations, not of partitions; they claimed that the occupation of Avlona was in fulfilment of the pact of

London which obliged the powers united or separate to maintain order in Albania; and if, as it happened, Italy had gone alone with her army, it was because she was the only one of the signatory nations who was not a belligerent; and as to the Ægean Islands their occupation depended on the fulfilment of the Italian-Turkish treaty of peace signed in Lausanne, and that Count Berchtold, in a telegram of May 23, 1912, had "renounced on that occasion the right to receive compensation."

In the second half of February the Duke of Avarna plainly informed his government that "the Imperial and Royal Government will never consent to make cession of territories belonging to the monarchy in the present conditions." * And at the same time Sonnino virtually indicated to Austria that if she would not accept Italy's interpretation of Article VII, the treaty would be considered null and void.

Burian multiplied his arguments with admirable fertility and spun his web cleverly, but Italy was not to be caught. Instead she obliged him to withdraw much of his thesis, and so conversations were kept up and time was running on. It was not until the beginning of March that the Austrian government consented to go to the bottom of the question, forced to do so evidently by the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. But then arose another point no less serious—at what

* *Italian Green Book*, document number 27.

date must the cession of territory be made. The Italian government insisted that it should be immediate and the Austrian, at the end of the war. And this time she had Germany's full support.

About this time the Italian parliament was expected to open and Von Bülow began to operate, so to speak, on the men composing it. Most important among these was Giovanni Giolitti, and he it was who received most of the busy diplomat's attention. It is to be recalled that not long before, Giolitti had voluntarily resigned from the premiership in favor of Salandra who, separating from his political leader Sonnino, had lately attached himself to Giolitti, while Sonnino, yielding to the difficulties of the moment, consented to become Salandra's foreign minister; but the majority of the cabinet was still inclined towards the former premier, Giolitti. He, as Von Bülow knew, was pacifist by temperament and would have preferred to satisfy popular aspirations without entering a war whose issue he considered doubtful.

Lobbying was incessant and gave rise to much suspicion. None fell on Giolitti but much on his *alter ego*; and the suspicion of subornation was confirmed in an imprudent moment by Von Bethmann-Hollweg.* Popular agitation increased considerably, and parliament, for the most part contrary to abandoning neutrality, was won over little by little.

* Discourse of Von Bethmann Hollweg in the Reichstag, May 29, 1915.

By the end of March Austria put aside the previous questions and got to the point of formulating concrete propositions. In exchange for benevolent neutrality she offered a part of the Trentino, but Italy was to renounce every other pretention both during and after the war. Baron Sonnino answered by sending a draft embodying the following: *The Trentino must be ceded in its totality; the Italian western frontier must include Gradisca and Gorizia; Trieste and its hinterland must constitute an autonomous state; the Curzolari Islands in the Adriatic must be ceded to Italy; Austria must recognize Italy's sovereignty over Avlona and its surroundings, and renounce her interest in Albania. In consideration of all this Italy would bind herself to strict neutrality and renounce all later compensations.*

Meanwhile the rumor ran that Germany and Austria would make a separate peace with Russia; and both groups of the belligerents let it run undenied, each hoping that it would cause Italy to decide. Austria thought she could impress her into accepting what had been offered, while the Allies supposed that the fear of a prompt termination of the war would hasten her.

Count von Burian did not accept the Italian counter-proposition in its entirety—merely consenting to giving up the Trentino.

Then Italy, whether for fear that matters were drawing to a conclusion or whether for other reasons, repudiated the Triple Alliance with the entire approval

of her people, asked parliament for full powers, and prepared for war. And on May 24, 1915, it was announced that "His Majesty the King declares that Italy considers herself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary from tomorrow."

During the pourparlers both nations were preparing. Italy had changed her artillery, filled the arsenals which the war with Turkey had depleted, and reformed her armament. Austria had fortified herself in the Alps and the Isonzo, had organized new army corps, and improved her intrenched camps till they were supposed to be impregnable.

The people of the two countries, who had always been opposed even when the famous alliance was at its meridian, were filled with choler and hatred. The Italo-Austrian war represented an historic necessity, and Italy knew how to choose the moment. Von Bülow was right when he said in his *Imperial Germany* "Austria and Italy may be either allies or enemies"; for the day that the alliance terminated which Bismarck and events had forced on them, they were enemies.

Von Bülow now had to abandon his post in Italy, for although war was not declared against Germany, diplomatic relations were broken. The declaration came later as a logical consequence; and in the present encounter of the Teutonic and Latin armies on the fertile plains of northern Italy, history is repeating itself.

CHAPTER XXIII

BELLIGERENT AND NEUTRAL BALKAN STATES

THE European War was initiated in the Balkans and there, in that agitated peninsula, source of so many past political contentions and pretext for German imperialism to engender the present one, it will end. This is an opinion which has found many adherents in both belligerent camps. With this conviction the Germans and their allies prepared and carried out the Servian invasion at the risk of other frontiers where they were heavily engaged by superior enemy numbers; and with this same conviction English, French, Italian and Russians, sent or prepared military contingents. It was this belief that made them, the Allies, fear the grave consequences of an adverse action, a fear which produced important consequences in the political field, such as the retirement of Delcassé, and later of Viviani and his cabinet. It was this fear which brought about the retirement of Sir Edward Carson and the reform of the English cabinet as to its functions; also the reappointment of a chancellor in Russia, a post which

had been vacant since the time of Gorstchacoff, and the resignation of Sazonoff who, as foreign minister, had been for years promoting good friendship with England and strengthening the alliance with France.

Among the nations at war only Italy failed to pay serious attention to recent events in the Near East. Her disregard was probably influenced more by opposition to Servia and Greece in their Adriatic aspirations, than by her clear vision of things. In such an agitated period when the slightest move might bring irremediable consequences it was not easy to discern the safest path.

In this war it has been affirmed that England has twice been tricked—once by Turkey, once by Bulgaria. The reproach for this falls on those calculating statesmen who worked on that party passion, always plentiful in democracies in spite of sacred unions, and magnified certain ill-advised events with that judgment which comes so easy the day after. Also it is affirmed that the Allies committed a grave error in not acting with rapidity and violence against Bulgaria and Greece. This is another easy judgment which may be tolerated in the abstract but which cannot stand practical examination. The fact is that no one parliamentary critic or publicist was able to indicate what should have been done in the respective cases. England could not proceed against Turkey without first explaining to the suicidal government of the latter the benefits of neu-

trality, and recalling past relations to her that had been more than friendly. Undoubtedly the British ambassador must have besought the grand vizir not to bring up the problem of Constantinople by entering into war, for it would serve to arouse new aspirations on the part of Russia, and these to the detriment not only of Turkey but also of England.

It would appear that, granted the hatreds, the ambitions, the enormous convergence of difficulties, and the general greediness of the Balkan States, their problem can be solved only by the sacrifice of one of the component parts. Neither the Treaty of Paris nor that of San Stefano, nor of Berlin nor Bucharest, could successively say the last word because of the confusion of races in the peninsula, and the prolonged crisis which they, so long under a foreign yoke, were then passing through. Whether important or not for the objects and success of the Great War, this last Balkan complication effaces all the past hard work which Europe had to do in their behalf. To know this past work is necessary if one is to appreciate what is to be done in the future and to anticipate the consequences of the present struggle.

In a mountainous region of limited extent, with scanty vegetation or mineral riches, are gathered together less than nineteen million souls of many different races. They represent opposing civilizations and as a

consequence of their successive domination within the group they hold different ideals; and the wars they have made on each other are legion. Greece bathed by the Ægean Sea can recall a race and a grandeur of other days, the quintessence of a whole illustrious era. Bulgaria on the Black Sea and with one insignificant port on the Mediterranean, holds a mixture of Tartars and Slavs who under their Czar Simeon in the ninth century dreamed of conquering Constantinople, and the Russians, and all the Latin peoples. Servia, on the central mountain chain, represents the purest branch of the Jugo-Slavs, who still sing the deeds of the Nemesios de Ettiene and of Duscian, emperor of Servia and Greece, to say nothing of the less distant heroisms of Kara George and Miloch. Albania near the Adriatic is a mixture of Greeks and Wallachian-Slavs. Montenegro to the south has a population of Servian origin but which has diverged into customs of its own. These people had a political affinity with Russia of such long standing that far back in the time of Peter the Great they were declared vassals of the Muscovite Empire. In the northeastern part of the Balkan Peninsula is Rumania, whose population of Dacio-Latin origin is the rarest tessera in all this rare mosaic of races. The Rumanians can look back to the glorious services they lent to Christianity in its long struggle with the Turks, a struggle in which Mircea the Elder, John the Terrible,

and Michael the Brave made immortal names. In the southeast are the Turks with a past which few nations can surpass for heroism; and here and there, all over the peninsula, are mixed indigenous elements of the Roman period, Turkish elements which did not withdraw from the region when their empire lost it, Bulgarians whose presence might be construed into an anticipation of their country's political aspirations, and Spanish Jews, and Greeks, and Italians. And within any one of these groups are subdivisions caused either by ancestral ties or by customs acquired during years of political attachment to other groups.

Swept thus together in the "racial dust-bin of Europe" these various elements have had to defend themselves against invaders and against each other. The very inclemency of the region has saved them from being politically absorbed; likewise it has helped them to maintain their personality against foreign occupation and to congregate in their mountain fastnesses and resist contact with the conqueror. But against these good qualities must be set a lack of public spirit in most of them. It is this which has prevented them from forming into a single state for common defense, an easy matter in the past century when their arch enemy the Turk was falling into decadence and when the current of thought was favorable to the principle of nationality. But Greeks, Slavs, Tartars and Latin colonists had no conception of the state. All

of them in spite of their different origin possess one common patrimony—love of the small autonomous or independent municipality. That this form of government proved to be an obstacle in the historic evolution through which they were passing is more than evident. They needed and lacked a coördinated army for energetic action against a common oppressor. Rumanian, Bulgarian, or Servian greatness, when separately achieved, could only fall after a brief period because victories cannot in themselves constitute greatness but merely stepping stones toward it; confronted by an enemy better prepared and with a better interior organization, even victories do not mean final triumph.

When fighting the Turk, the Balkan States, thanks to Europe, were able to gain their independence. Such was the influence of the moral (rather than religious) idea in the past century. But they would never have conquered the Crescent had they not united to form the Balkan League. For one brief moment they knew the strength of union; then before they could enjoy the spoils of victory or even sheathe the triumphant sword, they began to attack each other.

It is a case where the difference of race, of past, and of psychology could not converge toward that solidarity which would have given them, as fruit of their triumph, both greatness and the respect of the world.

The most important Balkan state is Rumania with

Wallachia and Moldavia, the two great provinces awarded her on the partition of European Turkey. Rumania contains seven million inhabitants and had an annual commerce exceeding two hundred million dollars. During three centuries the Rumanians suffered the direct domination of the Mohammedans. Sheltered sometimes by Russia, they found intermittent respite from the horrors of a régime of ferocious opposition. The Treaty of Koutchouc-Kainardji bettered their situation but this lasted only a short time. The privileges conceded by the *hatti sherif*, or imperial rescript, and later by the treaties of Bucharest in 1812 and Adrianopolis in 1829, created a new state of things. The Rumanian principality was henceforth free to carry on commerce, to name princes from among its nobility at first for seven years and later for life; and best of all, it was left to the local authorities to fix taxes.

The Congress of Paris could not look favorably on any Balkan state and least of all on Rumania, contiguous to, and protected by, Russia. This was the period of the "Slav peril," one of the many hoaxes that have frightened the world; and consequently Rumania, in spite of her protests and in spite of the usual justice of Napoleon III's policy, could not obtain the satisfaction she hoped for, and saw herself organized into a sort of federation over which presided the Sul-

tan of Turkey with full authority over everything except legislation.

But an internal movement annulled Europe's diplomatic measures taken in favor of Turkey. Wallachia and Moldavia named, contrary to the statutes, the same *hospodar* or political chief. This was Alexander Conza who in 1861 assumed the title of Prince Alexander John I, and became the great reformer of Rumania, the great initiator of her modern organization, and the direct forerunner of her independence. A Turkish decree of September 10, 1861, recognized Conza as vassal prince, and authorized the constituting of a single assembly and a central administration for the two Turkish provinces.

As always happened in the Balkans the victory which Turkey and other foreign foes could not win by arms alone was given to them by internal dissensions. The new prince was attacked in his work of regeneration by the former interests—local aristocrats on the one side and revolutionists on the other. His premier was assassinated June 20, 1862, just after having addressed his adversaries in the legislative assembly in these vigorous terms: "Do what you will you cannot frighten me. You may crush me, but while a drop of blood runs in my veins I will defend society, the family, and public order." Four years later Conza himself was forced by a military conspiracy to abdicate in favor of the journalist Rossetti, chief of the

plot; and thus closed the most brilliant parenthesis of Rumania's history. More bound to Turkey now than during the grave question of secularizing religious properties (which had been done with courage and decision by Conza), the Rumanians thought of taking a foreign prince whose family influence would save them from whatever future international difficulty might permit Turkey to exercise a sovereignty; for already they were looking upon her sovereignty as only nominal. In short they offered the crown to a brother of the King of the Belgians, the Count of Flanders; but Napoleon III did not approve and suggested instead Charles Hohenzollern, who was substituted for the national Rumanian prince.

It appears that again on this occasion Bismarck resorted to his customary duplicity and pretended that the King of Prussia, head of the house of Hohenzollern, would not give the necessary authorization; by which ruse he made Napoleon beg it all the more insistently. As was hoped, Napoleon's candidate, a prince of one of the most powerful houses of Europe and sanctioned by the King of Prussia, brought to Rumania all the personal prestige which would protect her from the jurisdiction which Turkey in accordance with the treaties claimed.

In 1877, Rumania having helped Russia with great forces, her independence came as a natural thing. It was provided for by the Treaty of San Stefano and

ratified in the Treaty of Berlin; but it cost her the province of Besarabia which she was forced to cede to Russia in exchange for a swampy and sterile district. Rumania as an independent kingdom enjoyed a long era of peace and began to nurse expansionist dreams. She wanted to unite all Rumanians still living under foreign domination under the sceptre of the Prussian prince, and to vindicate her right to all those regions which they inhabited.

These aspirations however have been kept within prudent limits. Rumania has followed the wise policy of not mixing in dangerous adventures nor yearning for excessive dominion; instead she appeared to understand that the greatness of a race does not consist in the number of square miles it can claim, and that even the justest of causes must bide its time since, as happens in international relations, there is no organism for the dispensing of justice.

More than this. Rumania was able to establish friendship with the former oppressor, to keep up a cordiality with Russia, to live in peace with the other Balkan States, and even to avoid giving any uneasiness to Austria who held many Rumanians under her jurisdiction. When the Balkan Alliance was formed against Turkey it was impossible to persuade Rumania to join it. The Bulgarian premier even went so far as to indicate to the Rumanian, Majoresco, the necessity of arriving at some agreement in case of a possible

catastrophe to the Ottoman Empire; but the latter refused to enter into conversations, answering that when the catastrophe arrived it would be time to talk, and that meanwhile there would be no misunderstanding between Rumanians and Bulgarians. Later when the Bulgarian minister in Bucharest brought up the same matter, Majoresco made the same answer. The Bulgarians were afraid, and rightly as subsequent events showed, to leave an undecided neighbor at their back.

When the Second Balkan War broke out, not against Turkey, but to the shame of all concerned, among those who had just been joined to defeat her, Rumania went in, hoping to arbitrate the destinies of the combatants. She allied herself with Greece and Servia, sent her army to threaten Sofia, and forced the Bulgarians to sue for peace. On the opening of the present conflict, and for some time after, she maintained an attitude of vigilant neutrality. Like Italy, who was her ally in Balkan affairs, she knew how to navigate in troubled waters without shipwrecking either her dignity or her interest. Germany filled the country with spies and intriguers of all sorts. Bucharest saw an influx of the class of women specially useful in that capacity. But in spite of Germany's efforts, Rumanian neutrality was punctuated by frequent manifestations in favor of the Allies.

When Italy joined the fray it was expected that

Rumania would instantly follow. But the government wanted still more time to consider and prepare; and this excess of prudence was her undoing. Her declaration of war against the Central Empires came late, when they, animated by new enthusiasms, could dispose of seasoned troops to hurl against her. The deep indentation made by Hungary into the middle of the Rumanian scissor-like frontier favored their quick invasion of the unfortunate land.

Greece was the first nation to separate from the Balkan empire which Turkey constituted in the period of her splendor. This can be explained on the ground that in the prerailroad days the current of Western European civilization could more easily reach this sea-bound country than those inland. But there was also another and less practical reason, and that was Greece's past gift of art and beauty to the world. The Hellenism of the early nineteenth century contributed much toward overcoming diplomatic doubts.

On January 13, 1822, after a brief revolution, a Greek assembly met in Epidaurus to proclaim Greek independence and draw up a constitution. This is the period of the Holy Alliance. Sovereigns felt the need of strengthening their positions. They had not yet recovered from the consternation which France caused in 1789 and 1793; and on hearing the word revolution governments as well as sovereigns trembled. The

very people themselves, worn out by the harrowing Napoleonic period, were longing for a term of tranquillity, even of debility with its peril of cruel relaxation. But not the Greeks. Greece was really animated by those very principles which were inspiring so much terror; it was the reverberation of the great revolution that roused her from her lethargy. Back in 1793 the *Hetaria*, a cosmopolitan association which had for object the complete expulsion of the Turks from Europe, was founded; and soon it spread from Vienna over the entire continent. Later, in Athens itself, was organized another called the *Friends of the Muses*, of literary guise, but in reality with the same political purpose back of its cult of Hellenism.

The new preachings incited the Greeks to deliver their country from the yoke of a race so opposite in origin and religion, and to again raise it to its apogee of glory. The study of the great Greek monuments of art and literature by the two cosmopolitan societies named stirred Greek ambitions; and these are still far from appeased in spite of the satisfactions time has granted.

At the head of the agitation were Capo d'Istria and Ypsilanti. They seized upon the insurrection in Albania as a favorable starting point for their own projects, and straightway Greece and the Ægean Islands flew to arms. Ypsilanti hastened north in the hope of getting the Moldavian and Wallachian dis-

tricts to rise, but in vain; they could not be led by a foreigner. Meanwhile Ali, Pashá of Janina, had rebelled against the Sublime Porte and was in arms. The provinces of Epirus, north of the Gulf of Corinth, and Morea, south, proclaimed the revolution from Patras, and the revolutionaries occupied Rumelia.

But the sovereigns of Europe, seeing the bonfire lighted, feared for their thrones. In that very year, 1821, voices were heard on every side reminiscent of past liberty; conspiracies were unearthed; the police everywhere noticed a something strange bubbling irrepressibly to the surface; in short, there was a feeling of revolution in the air. And so, in spite of the Hellenism that had attracted France and England, in spite of Russia's advantage in ejecting the Sultan from Europe, and finally, in spite of the Christian ideal and religious influence, the powers of Europe, from the very first moment, took the side of the Mohammedan Empire against the little Christian country which was struggling with such ardor and success.

The Sultan was not impressed by the first Greek success; in face of the danger he had only to do what is impossible in Christian Europe: to declare a Holy War and call all his coreligionists to come and defend the green banner of the Prophet. The effects of the Holy War however were not to be visited on the revolutionists alone, but on all Christians; and thus while the Mohammedan army, exalted by religious fervor,

went conquering the weak little Greek forces, the excited Islamic population in Stamboul committed horrible massacres of the Christians.

Excess of defense was the system always adopted by the Turks and proved to be the cause of their many misfortunes. Greece was losing all the battles. Of the districts, or provinces, which had risen in favor of nationalism there remained only Morea or southern Greece and a few islands. There was every prospect of complete victory for Turkey, when Europe, hearing of the massacres, saw that she could no longer leave the Christians of the Orient defenseless. It was not the time to oppose such legitimate aspirations as those of Greece. It was not the time for sovereigns to fall back on reactionary generalizations which permitted their own moral interests to be prejudiced by such spectacles of blood. Among the many devotees of Hellenism was Czar Alexander I, who saw that his prestige and his *amour propre* would suffer if he, as protector of Christians living under the Turkish Empire, should consent to such slaughter.

Next England entered the lists. Under pressure of public opinion, which for centuries has been a potent factor in that country, she tried to reconcile her role of moral protector to the Ottoman Empire with the dictates of western civilization. France also experienced a wave of opinion directed by Greekophile committees which were sending arms and munitions to

the little nation. But the circumstance most propitious for Greece was the misgivings which began to insinuate themselves in the various European cabinets. Each feared that the other might solve the grave problem in its own favor, or at least force a general crisis which might be contrary to the interests of the rest; and so the very same reactionary conspiracy which had been alarmed at seeing in Greece the beginning of many popular revindications (which were later in the middle of the century to explode terribly) now began to consider the question from another point of view—European equilibrium and Christian sentiment.

Thus it happened that when hope was least expected it came from those very powers who had shown themselves hostile at the beginning. Nicholas I, successor to Czar Alexander, began by declaring that he wished to intervene alone and straighten out the difficulties, in disregard of the principle of Ottoman integrity. Rather than this, when Athens was taken by the Turks in June of 1827, a convention of the powers raised a voice and obliged Turkey to give autonomy to Greece under penalty of combined military action.

This much accomplished, successive mistakes on the part of the Turks promoted her from autonomy to full independence. As the Sublime Porte would not accept the ruling of the convention, Russia declared war on him and arrived at the gates of Constanti-

nople. On February 3, 1830, another conference of the powers convened in London and determined that Greece should be created an independent state with a Christian king. Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the first chosen, declined the post (and was soon after elected King of Belgium) and it was given to Prince Otto of Bavaria.

But Greece had not the moderation of Rumania; her ambitions kept growing. Logical enough, considering that her independence was born amid shouts of praise and sentiments of the highest idealism. She and all her sympathizers were dreaming of "the glory that was Greece," and forgetting meanwhile that to recover the soil of antiquity and live on it could not in itself bring grandeur and power. In the eyes of the patriots the little kingdom appeared a small thing hardly worth the bitter struggle it had cost; soon they wished to extend their independence to other Greeks.

Disturbances began and King Otto declared war on Turkey with the support of the whole nation; but the Greeks, being defeated, made their king pay the penalty as was their custom. Dethroned by the revolution of 1862 he was succeeded by Prince George of Denmark, head of the present dynasty. As this king never identified himself with the spirit of the country he governed, he could with more calmness handle difficult situations and assuage the undisciplined passions of his subjects.

Nothing but a moment of weakness could have sent this house to war in 1908. It was an inexplicable disaster for Greece. Thanks once more to Europe peace was not purchased too dear. The Greeks were to retrieve themselves a few years later when the Balkan Alliance nearly drove the Turks from Europe, and to regain their military prestige soon after in the war against Bulgaria.

In both these wars the Greeks were intimately allied to the Servians and continued the alliance. They bound themselves to support Servia in war should any Balkan nation attack her; but present events show how the Germanic theory that treaties are mere pieces of paper makes easy converts. Greece under the influence of King Constantine assumed an equivocal attitude. There was talk of an entente with Bulgaria, which if not formal and direct, existed through the medium of Germany. There was talk of having reserved the right, because of her maritime situation, to maintain a benevolent neutrality towards the Allies. It is probable that the cabinets of Athens, Berlin, and Sofia, had never even taken up the matter, but again as in past times national interests and family ties were the main influence, as explained in Chapter XXVI.

Greece had so long languished under the Ottoman yoke that her liberation did not at first awaken great enthusiasm for commerce and agriculture. Only in recent years did the economic renovation commence.

The country lacks a *hinterland*; the coastal regions suffer from a scarcity of water, and the remoter districts suffer from lack of communications; only recently were the few railroads constructed. On the other hand sea traffic has progressed enormously. The gross tonnage of steamers under the Greek flag amounted in 1914 to 820 thousand tons, having risen from 139 thousand in 1898; this increase of fifty percent is something which no other nation has attained. Exportation doubled itself in the last nine years preceding the war, having gone from 80 to 158 million francs; but the replenishing of war material after the defeat of 1898 and the subsequent victorious wars exhausted the Greek exchequer, and the nation had frequently to turn to France. France and England held Greek prosperity and even Greek political expansion in their power, but Germany controlled the throne, the court, the general staff, and the greater part of the press.

Of all the Balkan States, Servia has always been the most turbulent. She was the principal cause of the Eastern or Byzantine Emperor's calling the Turks into the peninsula centuries ago; and today, if not to blame for the German invasion of that same peninsula, at least she was the pretext for it. This Slav people first appear in history about the year 600 when they came from beyond the Carpathians and, with the permission

of the Eastern Emperor, established themselves in the rude mountains which are today called Servia. Little by little the Servians developed and began to dream of unbounded grandeur; their hero Duscian wanted to march on Constantinople to save which the emperor, who still enjoyed a vestige of the old Roman prestige, called the Turks to his defense. Servians and Turks met at Kossovo, in 1389, and that battle destroyed every illusion and prostrated the land under five hundred years of oppression. The Servian Empire had succeeded in comprising the present country of that name, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Dalmatia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. The right to Greece also existed in the title assumed—Emperor of Servia and Greece—but was not consummated. It is to the brilliant epoch of Duscian that Pan-Servian aspirations hark back, as if the great historic periods were parantheses to be opened and closed at will.

The logical consequence of Ottoman cruelty was Servian revolt. At the beginning of the last century the semi-political brigandage gave way to coördinated rebellion. In 1803 the chiefs of the little country, in laying their grievance before the Sultan, made known a political and moral state of surpassing horror. “Our life, our religion, our honor, are threatened. Not a husband can be sure of protecting his wife from outrage, nor a father his daughter, nor a brother his sister. Cloisters, churches, monks, popes—none are

safe from desecration." In spite of the Sultan's conciliatory words the consequence of this petition was more repression, and out of the goading of the people rose the figure of Kara George (George the Negro) as the Turks called the national hero George Petrovitch. By his Turkish appellation he has come down to fame and by it the dynasty which he founded is known.

But the hero is not always the victor, and by 1813 the Sultan had triumphed. Nevertheless he had promised in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed the preceding year, that *de motu proprio* he would grant certain autonomy to Servia. Shortly after, he made use of Miloch Obrenovitch, who later became head of the second or rival Servian dynasty, to organize this autonomy. But after bridging over the moment of danger the Sultan did not keep his compact and Miloch Obrenovitch began a new revolt, at the same time doing away with Kara George by having him assassinated in his sleep.

By the convention of Akkerman and the Peace of Adrianople, Servia secured better treatment; and a little later, in 1830, a *hatti sherif* gave the principality organization and legal personality. In 1856, the Treaty of Paris, of celebrated memory, put this statutory organization under the guarantee of the powers. Soon after, the last Servian fortress was evacuated by Turkish soldiers; and the Congress of Berlin held in

1878 recognized Servia's complete independence. With this the green banner of Islam ceased to float over the land. Of all this amelioration Russia was the moving spirit.

The Obrenovitch dynasty was to pay dear for the unscrupulousness of its founder Miloch. King Milan put himself at the service at the house of Austria and with his hands in Francis Joseph's pocket, decided the fate of his kingdom and initiated the difficulties of the modern Balkan period. At the instigation of the Vienna government he attacked Bulgaria in 1885; but his first small successes were later turned into decisive defeat. He was forced to abdicate and his son and successor was the king who, along with his queen Draga, was the victim of the well-known tragedy of 1903. This shocking assassination, including as it did the queen's brothers and several cabinet ministers, put Servia for awhile beyond the pale of civilization.

But the new king, Peter I, a descendant of Kara George, prudently gave Servia a Russian orientation which later led to the Balkan League and Servian expansion. The league was principally the work of Servia and Bulgaria. It was a splendid conception which might later have produced favorable results for all concerned and have been a blessing to Europe and the cause of civilization; but Balkan appetites were as ever exorbitant; and just as in physics, no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time,

so in politics no one territory can belong to two nations at the same time.

Servia's program, as we shall see, included conquests difficult to make and detrimental to other nation's interests; she had to be brought within more modest bounds. Turbulent, agitated, always causing new complications, she has long been Europe's chief anxiety. Her proximity to Austria was partial justification for her temper, for it is well known that all peoples who have misgivings get a certain amount of reactionary influence from the adversary. The mentality of the Servian masses, like all collective mentality, could not dissimulate. Therefore confronted by Austria who wished to check her development, her ambition enlarged till it became a veritable lust of territory.

Economically subject to the Dual Monarchy, she became tributary to it to such a point that in 1884, when Milan was king, seventy-eight percent of her exports went to Austria who sent back ninety percent of the importations. Austria, with that sinister intuition characteristic of her dealings with subject countries, knew of the situation and tyrannized over Servia economically. From 1906 to 1910 she declared a tariff war which impoverished the country still more.

Servia's total foreign commerce in normal years amounted to less than 200 million francs; while her public debt at the beginning of 1913 reached nearly

659 million francs. From that time her commerce continued to decrease and her debt to augment. Today she is a ruined nation fighting heroically, feeling the full weight of a war of annihilation; and in the European peace concert she will have an implacable adversary, Austria; an enemy, Germany; a reluctant friend, Italy, two sentimental allies, England and France; one decided but inefficient defender, Russia.

On each one of these post-bellum elements depends her future.

In 1907 Bulgaria by way of celebrating her liberation from Turkey unveiled the statue of the Czar Liberator. Her homage to Russia was of the fullest. In that nation she recognized the source of her independence. The following year Ferdinand I took the title of Czar of the Bulgarians and formally declared the independence which had already been verbally acknowledged by the Congress of Berlin and by innumerable subsequent acts. The somewhat presumptuous title of *Czar* easily found heraldic experts to corroborate it by unearthing the precedent of *Czar of the Bulgarians and the Greeks* which Bulgarian rulers had assumed in her period of greatest splendor, when she was dreaming of conquering all the Latins and the Slavs.

Bulgaria has no upper middle class. Lacking it, there is no great concentration of riches; property is

quite evenly divided and agriculture is the only source of income. Her history as a free state is her present-day history, and her political inclinations are emphatically liberal. The race is more liberty-loving than the Servian, more vigorous in political life than the Greek, and less diplomatic than the Rumanian. Many consider her the most consistent of the Balkan States.

The origin of the Bulgarian has not been determined with exactness, owing to the many elements which have gone to his making. He came originally from the shores of the Volga. To this Mongolian stock was added Thracian-Illyrian-Slav, and after that all the ethnic mixtures possible in that locality. Somewhat akin originally to the Turk the Bulgarians have always tried to differentiate themselves from their kinsman during their long period of subjection, but have succeeded less than the Servians.

Like the other Balkan peoples the Bulgarians had their day of power. Their capital Tirnova pretended to outshine Constantinople, which city their Czar Simeon would have occupied had not their rivals the Servians attacked his army in the rear. At its height of splendor the empire extended as far as the Adriatic, comprising Thrace, Macedonia, Servia, etc.—in brief, the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. Bulgaria has made war on Greeks, Rumanians, Venetians, Hungarians, and all others within reach; only to be conquered with them all at Kossovo by the common

enemy the Turk. This sealed Bulgaria's doom. She was effaced from the map.

It would appear from a study of the psychology and history of the Bulgarians that the blood of the primitive Volga stock in their veins counts for more than their early annals indicate. They can rise rapidly in grandeur, stand firm in victory; but let misfortune overtake them and they sink into lethargy. This explains why the "Bulgarian Atrocities" which so roused the righteous indignation of Gladstone found but faint echo in the subjects of these atrocities. Looking back over Bulgarian history we find that while the Greeks were heartened by the French revolution, while the Rumanians were trying to throw off the Turkish yoke, while Servia was appealing to the great Napoleon for aid, Bulgarian men submitted to seeing their women violated and bent their own backs to the heavy blows of the Kurds. Not until 1876 did they rebel, and then but timidly. The movement needless to say was quickly submerged by the oppressor's Bashi-Bazouks under a sea of Bulgarian blood—the "atrocities" which so revolted the noble soul of the English premier.

Russia, partly by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1877 and partly by her insistence at the Congress of Berlin the following year, was able to present Bulgaria with an informal independence, which was ratified into the absolute and formally recognized condition a little later; hence the statue to the Czar of Russia. Rumelia

was added in the course of events and nominally separated from Turkey, both acts being corollaries to a problem already solved.

Like Greece, Bulgaria has known two reigning houses within a brief period; first the Prince of Battenburg who soon relinquished the honor, and next the present ruler Ferdinand who, by custom and inclination is Germanic, in spite of the blood of Louis Philippe which flows through his veins.

While the economic organization is favorable to an equitable distribution of material benefits it does not produce a rapid development of riches. Thus Bulgaria's condition of independence has not brought her the prosperity she hoped for. With an area of 96 thousand square kilometers and a population of nearly four and a half million she had, before the Balkan War, an exportation of 184 million francs and an importation of about 200 million. Her public debt was over 600 millions and this sum doubled itself and more after the Balkan Wars. Both politically and economically the Bulgarian situation is grave. Politics have been generally in a chaotic state and some of the most important men in the kingdom have been imprisoned on the government's order; and as to the nation's credit, a loan made in Germany shortly after the war began, was at the rate of seven and a half percent, and with other usurious conditions besides.

There have probably been more loans at a higher rate since.

Until the aggressive conduct against her quondam allies which provoked the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria enjoyed the general sympathy of Europe. In much greater degree than Servia she stood for liberal institutions and was simple, thrifty, disciplined, and of a high order of military virtue; but that unexpected and crafty assault on those who had been her brothers in arms the day before, apprised Europe that the Mongolian with all his traditional defects was in her midst. Next she turned against Russia; and to-day the Russian Czar Alexander, the Liberator of Bulgaria, must smile from his bronze pedestal as he watches soldiers march through Sofia and listens to the roar of the cannon on the Varna. And if his disembodied spirit has taken cognizance of the presence of Turkish troops in that land which he freed from them at the cost of so much Russian blood, he must be convinced of the madness of the whole human family.

The Bulgarians will probably continue to regard the statue with respect while they carry on their policy of unlimited ambition, of hatred and vengeance against Servia; but, at the same time, they will never be persuaded of the faithlessness of their present attitude. Did not Radoslavoff, one of the most important statesmen of the Stambuloff interregnum, announce to an

astonished world that Bulgaria had long been in a state of legitimate defense against Russia? When it comes to such a statement the conscience has lost all equanimity and is incapable of judgment.

Montenegro as a state is a negligible quantity, but not so as a moral entity. The little race which composes it has written epic pages in history. Of Servian origin the Montenegrins climbed from the shores of the Don to occupy the high mountains and have held these tenaciously against inclement nature and contentious enemies. This mere handful of the earth's inhabitants offers more poetry than sociology to the student. Isolated in their mountains they did not hesitate to resist the Byzantine emperors, the Bulgarian invasion, and the ever-returning Ottoman. War was their mission, violent death their destiny; and to this day when a child is baptized at the font it is with the pious prayer "God save thee from dying in thy bed!" When the Turks had conquered all the Balkan regions, conquered the Hungarians, reached the gates of Vienna, the Montenegrins were still defending their territory with heroism and success.

Nominally dependent on the Sultan when not actually at war with him, they nevertheless had their own dynasties ruling with a sort of semi-theocracy, and keeping up direct relations with other states. It was not until 1878 that the Sublime Porte recognized Mon-

tenegro's independence after thoroughly despoiling her, with the complicity of all Europe and the active aid of Albania, of all that territory which had been accorded her by the Treaty of San Stefano. But in spite of its small extent the present king, Nicholas I, who succeeded on the assassination of his uncle Danilo, accomplished much for his people. By means of clever diplomacy, by his frank and sincere conduct, by the important marriages made by his children, and by the admitted and admired valor of his subjects, he succeeded in raising his little kingdom to international importance; and yet its whole wealth, its debts, its assets, its commerce, would not equal that of an average city. Nicolas I played his part in the Balkan Wars but European interests deprived him of his share of the spoils. What they gave him was not the prize he sought. Throughout all he continued faithful to Servia and has kept at her side in the present war. Once more the Montenegrin warriors are seeking violent death, and chanted war songs are the daily bread of the people.

The only time the Balkan States were able to conquer the Turks was the day they united. In that historic moment they forgot the suspicions and enmities of the past and stood together with a common interest. They at last apprehended the necessity of suiting their acts to their interests, a conception formerly too diffi-

cult for them to grasp. But unfortunately, both for themselves and the peace of Europe, this correlation between action and the common good lasted but a short time. Covetousness and passion again gained the ascendancy which they hold over weak states just as they do over weak individual consciences.

The Italo-Turkish War of 1911 was bound to weaken Turkey and diminish her prestige; consequently it was natural that those nations who still had hundreds of thousands of their own race subjected to the Turk should try to get some benefit from the defeat. Europe however was not at all anxious to see the conflict extend to the Balkans and forbade Italy to carry the war farther than Africa and the sea. The Balkan States, as we have seen, were products of successive European Congresses, and were living in continuous tutelage of the great powers; but the famous phrase *Italia fará da sé* was repeated by the politicians of those countries, and their increasing military strength gave each one of them the right to apply it to herself. Let the Balkans, they said, also do for themselves whatever their interests dictate.

To allow a favorable situation to pass by would be a great mistake; so the idea of an alliance surged up spontaneously, and the members of the various governments, either through diplomacy or directly, set forth the grounds on which they could agree. Under the

pressure of circumstances they arrived at signing a treaty.

The preamble of this compact is extremely significant in the present moment. It begins: "His Majesty Ferdinand I, King of the Bulgarians, and his Majesty Peter I, King of Servia, penetrated with the conviction of the community of interests and the similarity of purpose of the two sister nations, Bulgaria and Servia, do hereby, etc., etc." It is well to keep this language in mind when examining subsequent acts.

After the treaty came military conventions and secret appendices which all virtually form an offensive alliance against Turkey, with the design of taking from her all her European possessions except Constantinople. This was to be done under the patronage of Russia who, from protector of the Christians living in that part of the globe, had become the active friend and defender of all the new Balkan States.

From the first moment grave obstacles to the alliance presented themselves; the discussions revealed deep jealousies and suspicions, from which it was easy to predict what afterwards actually happened.

When Guechoff, the Bulgarian premier, had an interview with Milovanovitch, the Servian premier, both were simultaneously enthusiastic over the idea of the union; but later when Rizoff, Servian representative in Rome, and Stancioff, in Paris, took up with Milovanovitch the question of how Macedonia

should be divided (when won) difficulties arose. The same thing happened after the Greek representative in Bulgaria, Panas, declared officially that "if Bulgaria could promise her participation in a war in which Greece might be attacked, he was authorized to state that Greece would reciprocally participate in a war in which Bulgaria might be attacked." The Bulgarian cabinet agreed unanimously to the clause, but later came difficulties which could not be settled without resorting to posterior arbitration. The Czar of Russia was selected as arbiter. In fact, Article II of the secret addendum to the treaty between Servia and Bulgaria terminates thus: "The two contracting parties bind themselves to accept as definitive frontier (of the future conquests set forth above) the line which His Majesty the Czar of Russia, within the limits indicated above, may find most in conformity with the rights and the interests of both parties." And in Article IV of the same addendum more scope is given to the arbitration by the clause: "All differences which may arise as to the interpretation and execution of any clause whatsoever of the treaty, or of the present secret appendix, or of the military convention, shall be submitted to the final decision of Russia."

In the minds of some of the statesmen arranging these affairs there was a presentiment of future trouble in spite of their efforts to provide a solution for every question. But this was offset by the belief that Russian

influence would count for much and that the Czar's judgment, given in the interests of peoples equally friendly, would be respected.

The diplomatic situation and the military organization being all prepared, and the public mind worked up to the proper pitch, partly through Turkey's own acts, the war broke out. Turkey could do little to defend herself and victory crowned the efforts of the Balkan allies. These efforts, as the following figures show, were not uniform: Bulgaria had over sixty thousand dead and wounded, Servia about fifteen thousand, and Greece less than eight thousand. Bulgaria it will be seen bore the principal burden of the war.

All Europe, but especially Russia, followed the campaign closely. She alone, as hers was to be the grave responsibility of arbiter, knew the secret compacts. In those days Europe was living on a volcano and any new Balkan trouble might have widespread and terrible consequences.

When Bulgaria threatened Constantinople and could easily have taken the last trench which opposed her invasion, she was checked. Russia, although favorable to expansion, had fixed its *Columns of Hercules* in Adrianopolis. The occupation of Tchataldja was vetoed. And this because Constantinople constituted the age-old aspiration of Russian policy. Its possession meant a brilliant and assured economic future for the whole south of the immense empire. Therefore

Russia preferred to see it remain in the hands of a decadent state like Turkey, who was bound to be expelled one day or another from Europe, rather than in the hands of a young and vigorous nation like Bulgaria. The Muscovite Empire had given its full support to the Slavs or Slavized population of the Balkans. She had fought for them many times, had thrown the weight of her European influence on their side, and had covered them even when they were in error with the mantle of her power; but she was not ready to give them her most precious aspiration.

And so, although the allied Balkan States conquered all along the line and occupied all the former Ottoman possessions, Europe decreed that they should not cross the line of Tchadaldja nor partition Albania and thus arrive at the Adriatic—a curious phenomenon which demonstrates once more how relative are human affairs; these same states had been vanquished by Turkey and in their very defeat they had found, because Europe willed it so, the satisfaction of many of their ambitions; now they had vanquished Turkey and by will of that same Areopagus of powers they were to be deprived of their prize. In the first instance they did not inspire fear and Turkey did; now it was just the contrary.

The two Adriatic nations, Italy and Austria, were of Russia's mind. They did not wish a young, violent, and audacious state established at the entrance to

their sea, so they too placed their veto and in far more brutal form than Russia's. By it the Balkan States of Greece, Montenegro, and Servia, saw the territory they had expected to divide considerably reduced. To have bowed to superior force would have been prudent. Had they not felt its benefits in other days? Should not the one have compensated the other?

But they could not see it that way. In misfortune the statesmen of the three countries mentioned lost the serenity of more fortunate days. Discussions and accusations began; and while they were disputing, the various armies started fighting each other. War broke out, and the victory, as is known, did not favor Bulgaria. Attacked at three points she could not resist and had to submit. The treaty of alliance was broken by the sword and with it went the question of Russia's arbitration.

Bulgaria had to suffer the blame. Perhaps as a nation she did not deserve it but certain it is that the nation, either by order of the king or by military edict, accepted the deeds committed. There could have been no cabinet resolution to this effect for the cabinet still hoped for the arbitration provided for in the treaty, and which meant Russia's support: its representative Danoff was in the Russian capital at that very moment to secure it; yet no one can deny that the whole nation, cabinet included, was full of joy over the first small successes obtained.

(The Servians and the Greeks, as pointed out in an article in the *Le Temps*, hardly appeared grief-stricken by the affair and it is probable that the assault carried out by the Bulgarians was not altogether contrary to their own desires.)

When peace was restored, the Balkan States in spite of their reprehensible conduct did not suffer grave consequences. Bulgaria to be sure did not receive what she wished nor even what was at first offered; and yet she was able to add twenty percent more territory to her kingdom, by deducting it from the region ceded to Rumania, and sixteen percent to her population. Her new 23 thousand square kilometers were in Thrace and Macedonia and with them she received 633 thousand inhabitants and a port on the Ægean Sea. The cession of Cavala, so hotly disputed, was forcibly upheld by Russia in spite of the fact that Bulgaria's leaning toward Austria was already discernible; but it was impossible to take it from the two conquering states. Servia got seventy percent more territory and a million and a half more inhabitants, which meant an increase of fifty percent over her previous figure, and Greece received eighty-eight percent more of both land and population, the latter doubling by the fact.

Thus we see that compensation was in the inverse ratio to sacrifices made; Bulgaria who thought herself entitled to so much came out with little. She, a country of agriculturists, dreamed of playing in the

Balkans the same role that Prussia played in the German confederation, and so the remaining states, through fear, limited her powers.

Germany's decision to carry the war into the Balkans bears the stamp of an offensive tending to avoid an aggression. Germans possess a special mentality which has led them to believe too much in acquired rights; but in a war of this importance only the treaty at the end can determine what those rights are, and a nation can be conquered even while it holds enemy territory. It has been said that General Joffre, cold-bloodedly measuring events, exclaimed : "That France should be a battlefield afflicts me, and I grieve for my compatriots in the occupied territory; but as for conquering the enemy, it does not matter whether the field of action be in France or elsewhere." This apt thought which on the face of it might have emanated from an English brain, applies to past wars also; Frederick the Great might have handed it down to his descendants.

To invade Servia meant to ungarrison the new Russian fronts, reduce the forces on the western front, and increase the danger of an Italian invasion; that Germany took such risks must have been the consequence of one of two facts; either Turkey threatening to make a separate peace, must have implored aid with such insistence that it could not be denied, or else, warned by the Balkan monarchs of the possibility of

their joining the Allies under the influence of public opinion, the German governing powers with the Kaiser at their head wanted to terrify their enemies by sheer power and take all the warlike spirit out of them. No other hypothesis appears admissible.

To follow the road which would threaten Egypt has all the pretentiousness of an expedition in the Napoleonic style—that into Russia, for example, but with the addition that the Servian campaign would have the same form as the Napoleonic wars in Spain. To suppose that Germany went to Turkey to get men would be to suppose her ignorant of Ottoman affairs, which was not the case; or that she went to Constantinople in order to make the Sultan declare a Holy War; for the fact is that the Holy War lost its *raison d'être* the moment Turkey allied herself with a government not Mohammedan; furthermore Germany must have known that the Arabs feared an increase of Turkish power and that the Arab was the only element that the Turk could make into an army.

Whatever the German design may have been her activity in the Balkans modifies the whole Balkan question. Before, there may have been some predetermined scheme; today there must be another radically different.

The prospect of a satisfying partition, of commercial outlets in the Adriatic, of the internationalizing of the Dardanelles, were all possible, even easy. The Quad-

tuple Entente had tried to find a solution which for a moment appeared to be acceptable. It gave satisfaction to all and annulled the Treaty of Bucharest which had been the cause of so much resentment. But Bulgaria committed under the inspiration of this very solution the same error that she committed the day she ordered her armies to assault her allies. After two wars in which the flower of her youth perished, after an expenditure of more than a thousand millions, we find her within three years' time in another war, allied to a nation whose interests are contrary to her own, who holds the theory of domination by virtue of brute force, and who used to declare that the Balkan nation was not worth the slightest effort. Such an act must have been dictated by passion not by reason.

The fact is that each one of the Balkan States is aspiring to again build up an empire such as existed in an entirely different epoch, which will comprise identical territory whose centers will vary. For the convenience of the moment they can accept an arrangement, but real alliance is impossible. Considering the insatiable ambitions of each one it is necessary, if an equilibrium is ever to be attained, that one of the states must be sacrificed. There must be an epoch of general agreement to make them understand that they must submit to the interests of stronger nations which have historic reasons or acquired rights. When one is weak he must respect these rights. Above all their

many disillusionments should have made them see that there is no attaining all in a single moment; and that after the results of the war against Turkey they should have felt satisfied and contented for a reasonable period. Even Bismarck, whom no one exceeded in ambition, was content to rest on the laurels of his victories.

The question of the Dardanelles and that of the Adriatic are more ancient than the Balkan question, but are related to it geographically if not politically.

Whatever may have been the immediate reason for Italy's not sending a contingent to the Orient, and whatever may have been the direct cause of Italy's policy of reservations, the latent antagonism to Servia was at the bottom of it. If conventions and treaties existed these had not been able to alter it, and to the Servian antipathy must be added that against Greece, also based on conflicting interests.

On these two states being formed and with relative strength, Italy, farsighted, looked toward Rumania to whom she was attached in sincere friendship. Between these two Latin nations a treaty exists but its terms are unknown. Certainly it must have for basis the Balkan *statu quo* in the interests of Rumania, and especially the *statu quo* of the Epirus and of Albania in the interests of Italy.

But the Pan-Serbs aspire to dominate the whole eastern coast of the Adriatic from Trieste to the sea.

They base their aspirations on the rights of the ancient Illyrians; they claim to represent the Eastern Roman Empire; they declare the Servians to be the successors of all the eastern tribes who imbibed their ideas from this same empire; they remember the greatness of their king-conquerors. They go even further,—they claim that Venice and the coast south of it were once in their hands and that the city was founded by Slavs.

Historically true or false as these statements may be they have the defect of ignoring all posterior history, of forgetting the work done by the Venetians, or that done long before by the Romans, or that of the Popes; they overlook the Italianizing process that had gone on for centuries, and above all, the actual present-day state of things.

Even setting aside all these precedents the Servians would reduce to uniformity the mixture of races, types, and tendencies that exists on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. And yet they have not been able to harmonize their interests with those of one tiny portion of Albania which they have occupied. The tribal rainbow in that part of the Adriatic not only is diverse through origin, but because of its lack of social discipline it could never submit to any state unless that state could rapidly endow it with commercial riches and the political force of well ordered administration.

Italy at this moment is not fighting Austria in order to create at her back an enemy even more ambitious.

Any one who does not know the preceding cannot explain Italy's anxiety.

In the Dardanelles it was the same story. Russia fought for centuries against Turkey, created one Balkan state after another with the one sole object of being able to liberate her products from the tyrannous master of the Straits who might choose not to let them pass through. When Bismarck inclined Russia toward Asiatic expansion he knew that she might thus attain enormous proportions but not enrich herself. Russia might have acquired vast new regions, whole Asiatic nations, and an immense number of square miles. She could have become colossal in the German style; but not great according to Latin ideology. Russia has no outlet, for she can export her products by the north only during a few months of the year; in the south she is tributary to Turkey or whomever may possess the Dardanelles; in the west she is at the mercy of Germany and to a certain extent of Sweden; and in the east she is far from the coast. The present war has demonstrated that Russian vastness is not greatness, since it has no sure sea route.

For centuries Russian statesmen have understood this and all their international action has been directed toward obtaining Constantinople. It appeared outrageous to Russia that little nations of three or four million inhabitants without industry, without sufficient strength to serve as a guarantee—nations who like

Bulgaria owe their whole existence to her—should come to dispute this right with her. That England, who made herself mistress of the Mediterranean, of India, and then of Egypt, and who secured great influence in Persia—that England should have fought to prevent her occupying Constantinople was easy to understand; that England should have always upheld the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and thus dissembled her self-interest, was almost just; that France, England and the little Piedmont kingdom should have joined in the Crimean War was explicable; but that upstart tribes of yesterday, elevated to the category of states, should wish to oppose the vital ideal of their protector, was truly exorbitant.

Russia entered this war with a fixed idea of securing Constantinople. To defeat this end is Turkey's only extenuation, for the war for many reasons is contrary to her interests. It is said that when the present French president, Raymond Poincaré, was foreign minister he signed an agreement by which he bound France, in case of a general war, to support Russia in the occupation of Constantinople. It is further stated that this secret treaty was unknown to the English until after they had intervened in the present conflict. If this is true, and it is entirely within probability, the English action in Gallipoli would appear a consequence of the secret Franco-Russian treaty rather than a necessary military action. If the Russians get down to Constantinople

they will hold the city, they will hold the Straits, they can have a commerce; but even then they will not be the masters of the eastern Mediterranean, nor will they dominate the road to India. If the Germans can realize their dream the Bagdad route is already intercepted.

The Balkan tangle has its explanation, but it is not such a serious thing as to be decisive in the life of Europe. For years it has been a thorn in the side of statesmen, but today it is chanting its *de profundis*. The Balkan intervention in the general conflict is the *tramonto* of an old, old question. Others will be the problems of the future.



CHAPTER XXIV

BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS IN LATIN AMERICA

WHEN President Wilson declared war on Germany, it was with the hope that the greater part, if not the whole, of Latin America would follow him into the conflict. Had this happened it might have created an international wave of condemnation as efficacious as armies; or even had it yielded less result than its illustrious author expected, it would nevertheless have affected the cause of civilization most favorably. It would have weakened *kaiserism* not only in the three nations which today serve as a pedestal to that cult, but also within the confines of Germany itself.

But it must be confessed that Latin America responded only in small part. Later, as Teutonic violence became more unbridled on the seas, the countries in question appeared better disposed to understand the serious duties incumbent on them in the present tragic period. In November of 1915 we published in *Le Matin*, of Paris, an article declaring all moral neutrality to be a crime;* today we go further and declare

* *Le Matin*, November 15, 1915; "Une neutralité qui est un crime."

all judicial neutrality a crime at a moment when the fate of the world is compromised. Not to participate in the struggle favors the cause of social retrogression championed so strongly by the Central Empires.

The first to follow President Wilson's lead were Cuba and Panama on April 7 and 10 respectively. On the 11th, Brazil handed the German minister his passports but did not reach the point of declaring war till some eighteen months had passed. Bolivia broke diplomatic relations on April 13 and Guatemala on the 28th. On May 18 and 19, Honduras and Nicaragua followed suit, and on June 9 and 11, Haiti and Santo Domingo. Last on the list come Peru, San Salvador, and Uruguay, who found that they could no longer treat with German representatives who were propagandists rather than diplomatic agents.

Cuba had the honor of following the United States immediately. Liberals and Conservatives, the only groups represented in the parliament of the little republic, promptly decided to commit their country's fate to the immense international conflict. This was a logical step. Unlimited submarine warfare being the issue between America and Germany, an island country could not consent, through silence, to the hallowing by force of a principle which handed neutrals over to the mercy of belligerents. Least of all could the largest and most important of the Antilles do so. She who had suffered much did not feel herself called

upon to submit to hunger and desolation for other peoples' quarrels. The German theory would have endangered Cuba out of all proportion to her size and wealth.

The Cuban congress put a touch of sentiment to the decision. As the step taken by the United States was its first act of international hostility since the war with Spain undertaken precisely for the purpose of liberating Cuba, it was natural that the latter should now respond by a generous support which would repay, as far as possible, the debt then contracted. Moreover, Cuba, while still a Spanish colony, had always kept alive the principles of civilization and progress and had given to the world her modest contribution accordingly; in her struggle for independence she always sought to relate this personal or national effort to the general cause of human liberty. In reaching her decision regarding the world war she did not forget that in the conflict with Spain in 1898, Germany would have put a check on the nation who championed Cuba's cause, and would have sought some other solution than the natural one had England not prevented.

It cost no effort for Panama to follow Cuba. She of all nations could least afford to remain neutral after the United States had taken a stand, for she owed her life to its ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, who, to favor the high principles of progress, did not hesitate before an act of international violence (which he

had the courage to leave nakedly as such with no attempt to clothe it in the dubiously sentimental mantle of modern diplomacy). Panama's neutrality would have put the Canal Zone in grave peril. It might have permitted Germany to use the ports temporarily, or German citizens to flock into the small republic in great numbers and form perhaps terrorist nuclei acting on orders from Berlin. The United States did not terminate France's work of uniting the two great oceans for the purpose of putting it at the disposition of fanatics. She knew too well from her own experience what the compatriots of Von Papen and Boy-Ed were capable of. In deciding to protect it the Panama Republic anticipated the desires of the White House and gave proof of discreet foresight.

Supposing on the other hand that the United States were defeated, it is easy to sketch the story of Panama as the prey of German land-lust. The second step in the march of German hegemony over the earth would bring it to the fertile and weakly governed states of Central America. In which case the Panama Canal would play a more important part than the Suez Canal plays in the present stage of history. Once in possession of it Teuton power would receive its eternal consecration, for it would dominate the two great oceans and with them the commerce of the world. If, understanding this, Panama had remained neutral either because she selfishly expected salvation through the

efforts of others or because she thought her influence negligible, she would have shown that she was unworthy of her present political status; her secession and the act of Roosevelt in her behalf would have had hardly the justification of success.

The nations of America who have not responded to the call and who do not stand beside the United States and the Allies, are acting contrary to the dictates of their own interests. The human struggle now being enacted does not admit of spectators; he who watches indifferently the frightful *débâcle* which may hurl humanity back into medievalism is a traitor to the high principles of civilization. Latin America, standing by unconcerned in such a moment, gives the lie to both history and geography.

No serious-minded student of the question can doubt that a German victory would reinforce *kaiserism* with all its principles of military strength; it would serve as a pedestal to the emperor; for the whole nation, even those who have clamored for their rights, would prostrate themselves before the colossus. The history of the Hohenzollerns tells us that their ambition knows no limits. From the little corner of Brandenburg to the wide expanse of modern Germany they have found the road easy in spite of Napoleon and in spite of Austria. Nor does history give us any promise of a change of their tendency; excepting the moribund Frederick II, of brief reign, they have all had one

single idea, clung to tenaciously by opposed fathers and sons alike—one single principle, one single faith: an insatiable greed for territory.

Should they succeed in their present designs it is not difficult to foresee the future state of the world. Germany dominating it, and some Friedrich or Wilhelm dominating Germany from the Gulf of Riga to the Straits of Calais; England reduced to a second-class power, France a vassal, Italy again invaded, Russia Teutonized, and the seas in the grip of the conqueror. All the past which Rome bequeathed us, destroyed; all the political regeneration which England has been compounding in the enormous crucible, lost; all the idealistic grandeur of the French Revolution, vanished; the Latin soul, practical and sentimental, and the Saxon, analytical and sedulous, swept away into the mists of the past.

That this should not come to pass is worth a super-human effort on the part of the nations; and those who will not make the effort may sit to-morrow in self-reproach or in that deep remorse which is the enervating price paid for improvidence.

If Latin America voluntarily excludes herself from the great current of events, if she envelops herself any longer in an emasculated neutrality which is blind both to great human ideals and to her own interests, she will put herself out of the concert of civilized powers. It still appears, in spite of the decomposition of Rus-

sia and the defeat of Rumania and Italy, that the Allies would win their cause. The day after there will be no room for those Latin-American nations who have lagged behind listening to the far-off roar of the furious battle. The little American republics who have not feared danger will be part of the new society of nations, but not so the larger ones. It was Faust who said that liberty was worth conquering anew each day; and so in international politics, recognized rights are always the corollary of a historic duty fulfilled resolutely and without flinching.

Whatever be the victory of the Allies, complete or partial, let us repeat that neutrality will still have been a crime so far as the interests of the Latin-American nations, separately or collectively, are concerned. The hegemony of the United States on each side of the canal would remain recognized and sanctioned. It would be theirs for having sacrificed their blood and their material interests with a generosity unprecedented; it would be theirs for having responded even at the cost of interior disturbances to the appeal of a historic duty, in an hour of supreme necessity; and finally it would be theirs because they would have welded themselves in close friendship to the European nations who, in future international affairs, would accord them a freehand in all the American continent. There would be no grounds for expecting anything else, and some future secretary of foreign affairs

could say, with regard to Patagonia, "these territories interest us because the sphere of influence which we exercise over them obliges us to observe a continuous and vigilant tutelage." It would be but a repetition of what the present secretary, Robert Lansing, said in his report on the purchase of the Danish Antilles and apropos of the people of the Caribbean Sea.

Argentine, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, all having discontinued diplomatic relations with Germany would, by declaring war, insure a brighter destiny for Latin America and give her a place in the society of nations which is forming on the battlefield where imperious necessity has brought into being that which the exhortations of students and dreamers was powerless to create. Were these countries to declare war, the United States would not have the right to affirm before History, as she may with more than justice if the present conditions continue, that while her armies went forth and her citizens gave their lives and money, the greatest republics of Latin America were sunk in selfishness. Were these to declare war on Germany they would pay a debt of long standing and one from which their circumstances have exempted them until now. It is just about a century ago that a reactionary wave swept over Europe. It culminated in the formation of the Holy Alliance and the reconstituting, *mutatis mutandis*, of the *statu quo ante*. The reactionary spirit, like the spirit of liberty, flies swift and far

and from the coast of Europe it looked toward that of South America. It was when Europe was struggling hardest for liberty that South America freed itself; and in the minds of the governments interested and of their reactionary statesmen who were directing the Holy Alliance, the restoration of the *statu quo ante* was projected to that new continent. Then as now, but in very different proportion, the United States was the most important power in the New World; the attempt to revert to former times was not aimed at it, but at that portion which had belonged to Spain. Vessels lay anchored in the Bay of Cadiz awaiting the word to sail, and even from remote Russia aid came for the project.

The United States, weak economically and without an army, imposed the first veto, and in doing so jeopardized her national existence. The scheme failed; and without going into a discussion as to whether the failure was due most to her action or to other factors, the truth remains that she was a powerful instrument in fixing the status of South America, raising it from a colony into a free continent both in fact and in letter.

This debt has never been paid. There came no end of suspicions and reciprocal misunderstandings of the sort that fill the annals of international relations. But in presence of a tremendous crisis like the present, the hollows and depressions in the waving line that de-

scribes the relations of states should be overlooked, and only the high peaks of generous intention and service rendered should hold the eye. The question, for Latin America, narrows down to this: Is it the just spirit of President Monroe that animates her various peoples or is it that of a triumphant Kaiser coveting the domination of the seas. The answer is not difficult to give.

As all know now, the ruling passion of the German mind is the dominion of the seas. This comprises not only a hegemony over Latin America but also its conquest, by which the retrogressive spirit of the Holy Alliance of 1815 would be renewed. That such aspirations were entertained in Germany has been revealed by Pan-Germanic Leagues of all shades, and even more so by German scholars who in the countries in question often play the role of moral vanguard to the armies. Gustave Schmoller, the eminent rector of the University of Berlin, expressed the desire to see in Brazil a new German empire in the form of a very powerful colony supported and defended by Central Europe. Wilhelm Sievers pronounces Latin America the *res nullius* in the political world and claims it for Germany, since she is the last power to arrive on the colonizing field. Adolph Wagner, Alfred Funck, Lange Friedrich all think the same, and Richard Tannenberg, who partitions the world among the elect, awards Argentine, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay,

along with a third of Brazil and the southern part of Bolivia, to Germany.*

In all Latin America, Germany with the "disinterested" object so indiscretely revealed by her writers, has been busy opposing North American influence by a system of intrigue. In Mexico every incident, large and small, was turned to use. The German minister there, Von Eckhart, a man of much tenacity but small talent, tried to apply the same methods as those which will go down in French history as *Boloism*. In Colombia, German propaganda struck deep roots after the segregation of the Republic of Panama. Everywhere the efforts were furthered by the Conservative element, the Catholic Church, and the immigrants from Spain; but likewise they encountered a barrier in the traditional spirit of liberty and rebellion characteristic of that part of the world.

* Edgardo de Magalhaes, article in the *Nineteenth Century*.



CHAPTER XXV

SPANISH NEUTRALITY

FOR many long years Spain has sat aloof from the concert of nations. In international politics the Pyrenees have represented a real barrier, and the fact, instead of keeping Spanish diplomats on the alert, was made an excuse for abandoning themselves to a state of helplessness. At the time of the war with the United States in 1898 Spain was sleeping, and even losing the last remains of her great colonial empire hardly served to awaken her. Every nation has its peculiar qualities and its traditional defects, and the fact is that Spain, a great nation in many ways, is not so in the field of international politics. Her public men approach the subject in a spirit of benighted chivalry which is little short of fantastic in the careful and practical business of treating the relations between states. Spaniards do not like obligations nor cleverly prepared rulings; they prefer the success of force and the satisfactions of *amour propre* which in the eyes of the masses constitutes national honor, and in the

eyes of statesmen, a vanity gratified. Spain's whole history, long and glorious as it is, is full of such deductions; the most casual observer cannot fail to find them both in the past and present.

In the agitated events which the world has been witnessing since 1914, in the confusion of ideas and interests which naturally followed, Spanish diplomacy has been vacillating, insecure, unable to find a view point which would permit the country to participate in the struggle and claim some of the benefits. Nor has the government of Don Alfonso XIII made a program of practical utility out of neutrality but instead, a species of dogma, of abstract conception that cannot be discussed, of *noli me tangere*, in the same way as years ago the Carlists made the Virgin Mary generalissimo of the armies of the Pretender.

Spain has long nursed two traditional aversions: England and France. Her two great glories selected with as much lack of logic as of historic truth, are the "Second of May" and Trafalgar. From time to time both deeds supply the theme for brilliant orators to turn their best phrases before an enthusiastic public. Time has diminished but not effaced these aversions. In this tenacity we see the same inflexible temperament which spurred the Conquistadors to prodigious deeds in America. Gibraltar, held by the English, is a thorn in the side of every Spaniard, and the invasion by Bonaparte's soldiers is a never-to-be-forgotten

nightmare. Today England is fighting fraternally beside Frenchmen, and on the very fields where she once fought against them; Italy is struggling with an enemy who yesterday was her ally; Prussians and Austrians have put aside Sadowa: Bulgarians are shedding the blood of the Russians who liberated them. To the uncompromising Spanish integrity such things are beyond all understanding and that is why, having lost the power which one day made Spain rule the world, she has gone on ceding her place as a first rate power to new nations. She lacks that peculiar ability or rather flexibility which others have known how to substitute for strength.

To grievances of long standing was recently added the conquest of Morocco by France. Over this territory Spain not only claimed rights but, so far as the part nearest her own peninsula was concerned, she had made good her claims by conquest. Certain painful incidents made it difficult to maintain friendly relations between the two and in every instance Spanish diplomacy was unequal to the task of defending the interests of the kingdom; instead of prompt action it had recourse to the usual posthumous regrets and rancors. In the Conference of Algeciras, the Marqués de Almodóvar del Rio, Spanish plenipotentiary and president of the gathering, instead of trying to extract some benefit for his country out of the situation created between France and Germany, passed his time making

declarations as to his probity. With Spain's approval and even coöperation the question of Morocco was consecrated by the conference, yet it only served to augment the useless rancors in the souls of the Spanish people.

Nevertheless, there have been two friendly conventions between Spain and France and England: that of 1907 and that of 1913. One was signed by Antonio Maura and the other was fathered by Count Romanones, two ex-premiers who are the faithful exponents of the two parties which until recently stood in close formation and alternately disputed the power —the Conservative and the Liberal. The conventions in question brought Spain out of her isolation for a moment and gave her the chance of raising her voice in Mediterranean affairs, but they were two separate acts and not part of a system or policy. Later, the men who carried them out almost tried to excuse themselves for having done so. Count Romanones affirmed that by putting through the convention of 1913 he had merely followed in the footsteps of the Conservatives; and Maura affirmed that imperious circumstances forced him into the convention of 1913. "Those agreements did not respond to any effort of the imagination but to a reality, to a conjunction of incoercible, imperative, evident realities." *

* Discourse of Don Antonio Maura in the Royal Theatre of Madrid, April 21, 1915.

The marriage of King Alfonso XIII with the Princess of Battenberg did not bind the English government to the Spanish; we might almost say that it hardly united the two royal families to any appreciable degree. Nor did the frequent and dangerous visits of the king to Paris and of the president of the French Republic to Madrid have any results. Official colloquies of this sort usually prove to be useless or else are a revelation of something previously prepared; but between France and Spain there was never anything well prepared. If it were possible for Spain to act in the present moment it is probable that the balance would fall to the side of the Teutonic Empires. The Army and the Church, the two great forces in Spanish politics, are decidedly Germanophile. The masses, though divided, are in the majority similarly inclined. The aristocracy has made an *article de luxe* out of Germanism and the bureaucracy, a most important element, has the same ideas. Only the literary men take the opposite side. The young generation, inspired in the French school, understand the problem which is being resolved on the battlefield. One great dramatist, Jacinto Benavente, is rabidly pro-German, but nearly all the rest, headed by the aged Galdos, the most patriotic and broad-minded of all Spanish writers, are favorable to the Allies.

In countries of fervent Catholicism, the literary man counts for little in the forming of public opinion. In-

stead this is formed from the pulpits and the sacristies. The word of the artist does not rouse ready echo like the word of the confessor. For this reason it is truly extraordinary that in such a hostile atmosphere, Spain's literary men have been able to take a just and well-defined stand; for it is generally admitted that in all times the man of letters has followed the counsel of Æschylus, to be "prudent and cautious and to obey always the one in command."

In short, public opinion is that which commands, and in Spain public opinion is contrary to the tendencies of the enlightened class. The press, a very great power, although discredited in all nations, is emphatically pro-German; and a few sheets in Madrid which formerly hardly managed to exist today are prosperous and have a great circulation, precisely because they constantly predict the imminent and decisive victory of the Central Empires. The *Correo Español*, an ultramontane organ, and *La Tribuna* lead the movement; then come the *A. B. C.*, which pretends to be impartial but is hardly less passionate, and the *Universo*, a clerical organ like the *Correo Español*, but less aggressive. The publications of the so-called Newspaper Trust cover all the ground from a strictly maintained moral neutrality to a weak defense of the interests of the Allies; and also on their side are some republican newspapers of small importance. Generally speaking

the Germanophile dailies have the greater circulation and make a greater impression on the public.

In spite of the agitated state of the country, politicians have maintained great prudence in their words. An exception is the factious orator, Vasquez Mella, who represents the Carlist Pretender, Don Jaime, and the Church. Mella knows that Don Jaime will never sit on the throne of Spain, but it pleases him to take the apocalyptic tone so beloved by races of little judgment. When he says "there can be conciliation with France but never with England" the public applauds with frenzy. This road leads the ultra-Catholic orator to the same exaggeration which made up the vigorous synthesis of the Torquemadas, the Cisneros, the Ribandaneiras; and in the face of the blood of innocent non-combatants he can laud ecstatically "the audacious Zeppelins which know how to extend their wings like the triumphant wings of victorious Germany." But Mella is an exception, let it be repeated. He belongs in every way to the fifteenth century.

Maura is also clerical, but although of saner language, in the depths of his soul he feels anything but affection for the enemies of Germany. In the speech in the Royal Theatre of Madrid, already mentioned, he answered the Germanophiles in the following sense: *We have no other solution than the present one since we are not at liberty to go into the fight in favor of the Central Empires.* Melquiades Alvarez, the Radi-

cal leader of the Chamber of Deputies, completed the idea by stating, "Those who wish to unite us to the cause of Germany would commit suicide; therefore I say emphatically that if it should be necessary some day to abandon neutrality, which I hope not to be the case, we ought to put ourselves most decidedly on the side of Great Britain and France. The solidarity of interests which has united us to both these countries is such that their hostility would mean the ruin of Spain." * In another discourse he amplified this by saying that "only these two countries could threaten the independence of our territory." † These two political chiefs, Conservative and Radical, are the antithesis of each other in fundamental ideas, but there is the same thought back of each one's words, namely: The geographical situation of Spain leaves us only one way out—a benevolent attitude to England and France, for they could easily destroy us in short time. It was natural that Alvarez, modern and republican, should feel a sympathy toward these two liberal nations; Maura, who gave the head of Ferrer to the Jesuits, bowed to necessity but champed at the bit.

Count Romanones, official head of the Liberal party, was the only politician of any responsibility who lifted a frank and friendly voice for the Allies. The Count

* Declaration by Melquiades Alvarez in the *Imparcial*, August, 1914.

† Speech by Melquiades Alvarez in Granada, May 1, 1917.

had to change his tone, had to go on believing that this empirical Spanish neutrality was "a neutrality that kills," had to be silent and yield his power later to the chief of the dissenting Liberals, García Prieto; this to the great scandal of those who had applauded for so many years the close-knit organization of the two Spanish parties regularly succeed each other in power. Also the Revolutionist Lerroux, feared though but little esteemed, raised the banner of the Allies from the very first moment. His action was more unfortunate than that of Romanones; in fact, the fighting deputy on returning from France was stoned in the streets and had to return instantly whence he came.

The clergy and the army are two corner stones on which the whole Spanish edifice rests. So it was in the Middle Ages, and so it is to-day. Of little culture, excessively intransigent, without a notion of modern ideas, the Spanish clergy is refractory to all spirit of liberty and hostile to all reform. It has taken possession of the popular mind and moves it according to its designs. It intervenes in public affairs, creates mayors, names deputies, influences ministers. It does not use the pulpit for preaching the doctrine of Christ, but for directing politics and dictating rules of life. It exercises both functions with the same intolerance with which in former days it used to order *autos de fé*.

From the very first moment of the present war the Spanish clergy took the side of the Central Empires.

The Kaiser is considered the restorer of the faith; for the Spanish firmly believe that he only awaits the moment of victory to throw off the Lutheran so antipathetic to his soul, and announce his conversion to Catholicism; just as the Mohammedans believe that he only awaits the moment of victory to proclaim his conversion to Mohammedanism. In the churches, which are supported by the state (and the state claims to be neutral), German propaganda takes the most astounding forms. Belgium destroyed and martyred deserves her fate for having raised in Brussels a statue to Ferrer; France invaded is being punished for having separated Church from State; Italy is condemned for holding the Holy Pontiff prisoner after having robbed him of his temporal power; and the slaughter of innocents everywhere is a punishment of God. A medieval spirit animates this propaganda to such a point that the ideals of the German Emperor find even more echo in the little towns of the Iberian Peninsula than in his own country. It is evident that another factor besides the similarity of ideals has been at work, and over which no one in Spain makes any mystery—bribery. Later it will be possible to confirm the rumor, for German statesmen do not cover up these acts any more than they concealed the gifts they put into the full hands of Spanish statesmen when trying to place a Hohenzollern prince

on the throne of Spain—an aspiration which led to the Franco-Prussian war.

The Spanish army has been an army of *pronunciamientos* or insurrections. The whole last century was one of successive changes under the influence of military meetings. Those popular revolutions of which the rest of Europe saw an abundance never triumphed in Spain. One day it was a general who assumed the government, the next day a group of generals, the next, even the sergeants had their revolutionary movement. This cycle appears to have closed forever, thanks to the organization which put Alfonso XII on the throne; but nevertheless there has always remained a political factor in the army, and the military disasters which preceded the loss of the colonies appear to count nothing against the prestige of the body.

When the present war burst the Spanish army like the clergy was instantly seized with an epidemic of Germanism. Over the military mind the Kaiser exerted an influence almost divine; for them, Germany hardly existed and still less Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey—only the Kaiser, the expression of force and grandeur, who overshadowed his country. In him they saw the Emperor Charles V come back to life, and for them German power, as in the sixteenth century, was Spanish power.

Moreover the attitude of the army has been threatening in the last few years. The so-called *juntas de*

defensa (defense leagues) organized within the army interfered with the established military discipline. They began to show a restless spirit; they became exacting; they dictated new rules and regulations and insisted that their demands, which it must be admitted were just, be recognized. Moreover they forced the presentation in the senate of a new and well drafted military law. This reform, however, has the grave defect of going too far for a country determined to remain neutral at any price, and falling short of the requirements for a country which might be about to enter a war.

The state of mind we have indicated must have given rise to profound resentment, the full expression of which we are prevented from knowing by the excessive prudence of the Spanish censor. In London and Paris, and later in Washington, there was no mystery as to Spain's attitude; therefore the limited allotment of coal and the restrictions on her exports. Furthermore certain incidents regarding submarines and espionage were well known to the Allied governments. As to these last the Spanish government has cleared itself but without putting in its promises any of that good will which alone could make them efficacious.

One such incident, when it came up in the French Chamber, evoked a brief speech from ex-Premier Ribot. "I willingly admit the question," he said, "and

reply that it is not admissible that enemy submarines should find refuge and protection in the ports of a country which calls herself neutral and friendly to France; we therefore protested. The Spanish Government has signed, somewhat tardily, a decree prohibiting German submarines to enter Spanish waters in the future. The espionage organization should also have been prohibited but let us not ask too much. . ." *

It appears that the international policy of the past has not been acceptable to Spain, and that, banished from America in the manner which her own lack of flexibility imposed upon her, her new political orientation in Europe and Africa was not looked upon with much cordiality. To admit this much is mere justice; but it must be added that the lack of success in new ventures is due to Spanish cabinets rather than to those countries who were more skillful than she in defending their own interests. To do so was their duty, and even Germany herself, though far removed from Spanish concerns, imposed her will on the Madrid cabinet regarding the Caroline Islands.

Today there opens before Spain a whole road of political renovation. She has a chance to follow a path which will unite the interests of the moment with the best traditions of her past. She can shake off the reactionary demagogism which has always swayed the

* Session in the French Chamber of Deputies, July 31, 1915.

people and can hand over the directing of public affairs to more able minds. At this moment the instinct for scenting out such a path and following it would, if she possessed it, lay the foundations of future rehabilitation. But García Prieto, Marquis of Alhucemas, says that he has again accepted the posts of premier and foreign minister in order to maintain Spain's neutrality; in other words, to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors and allow dogmatic neutrality to be his policy.

In the present crisis an alliance with France and England could revivify the international life of the land, stimulate commerce very considerably, obtain, very likely, compensation for the French occupation of Morocco, and heal forever the wound left by the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Any public man who knew how to formulate an adequate program along these lines and impose it upon the people could soon win them over by the demonstration of its utility; but he would first have to exclude from Spanish politics those two deep-rooted forces, the Army and the Church. Only thus could he rouse the people who for centuries have been sleeping narcotized by a religious régime which refused to confine itself to the moral sphere and insisted on invading politics. Only thus could he bring about that "revolution from above" which Don Antonio Maura, enamored of the phrase rather than what it means, has

talked about. Any public man wise enough and strong enough to do this would be the second founder of the Spanish nation.

Thus throwing off isolation and feeling the stimulus that comes from active contact with the world, Spain would be materially and morally renovated. Such an attitude would give the lie to the repeated affirmation that her moral solidarity with Germany in the present conflict is due to the identity of their psychology; that the ideal of might oppressing right inspired both in their respective periods of hegemony; that both nations have, at intervals of three centuries, conducted themselves in the same manner in the regions now so cruelly martyred. When these statements are disproven by a radical change of policy, the high-sounding prophecy of a certain conservative newspaper in Madrid, "The hour of peace will be Spain's hour" will have meaning as well as sound.

All who know the vigorous and industrious Iberian character, the highly personal artistic genius of the people, their extremely interesting literary efflorescence in latter years, love Spain and wish her well. They hope she may succeed in conquering her parasitic classes, and that the more wholesome forces of Spanish life may have free play and establish a sound and respected international policy.

CHAPTER XXVI

GREECE'S DOUBLE ATTITUDE

AFTER Greece refused to fulfill her treaty obligations toward Servia, the King and the Cretan statesman Venizelos became two opposed foci of public opinion. The abandonment of Servia was exonerated by Athens on the grounds that the Greco-Servian Treaty was eminently a Balkan treaty and that the war just broken out had assumed far more ample proportions than those provided for in the compact. Servia, already involved in the struggle, had no choice but to admit its rapid propagation, and the successive presidents of Greek councils, not omitting Venizelos himself, never reminded the people that an ally who had kept her faith with them was in the throes of death.

Both Constantine and Venizelos were resting on the laurels of recent Balkan triumphs. These triumphs, still vivid in the public memory, being claimed by both men, their inability to satisfactorily divide the glory changed the two, who had stood so solidly for un-

limited national expansion, into bitter enemies. Constantine especially was obdurate, and after his discourse at Potsdam which he was forced to rectify in Paris, the breach between the two was beyond all bridging.

It will be recalled that the King, still flushed with victory, went to visit his brother-in-law the Kaiser and his former comrades in the German Military School. Carried away by his cordial reception, no doubt, he told them that the Greek victories were due to the study of German methods. This statement could not but produce resentment in France where it was well known that French military commissions, the only ones of importance, in fact, that had ever trodden Greek soil, had taught the Greek armies the tactics which had enabled them to conquer not only the Bulgarians, but also the Turks in 1898. Furthermore, all France knew that it was the defeated armies that had been instructed by Germany.

It had been arranged that Constantine was to go to Paris from Berlin, and thither Venizelos had to precede him and announce that his king would rectify his wild statements. This he did, but with the natural result that the enmity deepened between sovereign and premier.

But in spite of these personal differences the two were bound by a common political purpose. Both dreamed of unmeasured greatness for Greece; both, at different times, cast longing eyes on Constantinople; both outlined a vast empire in Asia Minor; both

planned for Greek supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean including possession of Albania and with it the key to the Adriatic. However, while the objective point, or rather points, were the same for both, the means of attainment were differently understood. Constantine believed that Germany would prove to be Greece's best champion; Venizelos, France and England. Venizelos even claimed a positive indebtedness on the part of his country toward the Allies, and urged that Greece would run great danger in ignoring the obligation. In France, Greece had met, for centuries, with such helpful moral support that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that Greek independence was conceived in the brains of French authors even before it was formulated in the brains of Greek leaders. Moreover France, with the hope of balancing the ever increasing Italian power, wished to elevate Greece into a first class power, and friendship of this scope should not have been despised. England too had favored Greek interests ever since Hellenism crossed the Channel. With so much coast, so many islands, so many maritime interests to safeguard, England's protection was not to be esteemed lightly; and though a king of Danish origin might underrate it, not so a true-born descendant of Gorgias, like Venizelos.

And yet the fact is that Constantine, not Venizelos, won out. French ascendancy waned speedily while Baron Von Schenck, the Berlin envoy, began his Germanizing work with unlimited audacity. Nearly the whole of the press was put at his service; Zaimis and

Skoudolis were replaced by ministers of the king's choice without regard to constitutional procedure, and Venizelos and his adherents were persecuted.

All this was a shock to the devotees of Hellenism. One disappointed admirer wrote "After the beginning of the nineteenth century Hellenism made a noble and judicious effort as manifested in the constitution of the Greek state, the occupation of different territories, and the whole expansion of the race outside of Greece proper; but unfortunately in recent days Hellenism has not evolved in accord with the political exigencies of modern Europe." * And with as much disappointment, but less openly expressed, the author of *Europe on Fire* says "We all love and admire Ancient Greece, and that is one thing; we respect, and ask nothing better than to love, Modern Greece, but that is another thing." † In France, England, and Italy, the newspapers opened a rude campaign against the Greek monarchy, for treason was in the very air and though there was as yet no proof, the public felt intuitively that Greeks were preparing, outside of Salonica, some plot, in miniature, like the legendary one which Ulysses and Menelaus prepared outside of Troy.

Thus it was that the same powers who created Greek independence had to oblige King Constantine to abdicate and permit the irregular succession of his second son. Venizelos was made arbiter of the public destiny and began his difficult task in as hostile an atmosphere as could be imagined.

* André Duboscq; "L'Orient Méditerranéen," page 90.

† Charles Benoit; "L'Europe en Feu," page 14.

To the anti constitutional activities of the court there had been no limit. The railroads, private codes, army courriers, all were put at the disposal of Colonel Falkenhausen, Germany's military attaché in Greece. Among the most zealous spies were the sovereigns themselves. Queen Sophia, sister to the Kaiser, gave vent, as will be seen in the following telegrams to her brother, to inelegant bitterness. The correspondence in cipher between Berlin and Athens is about to be published, but much of it is already known officially. The queen, for instance, telegraphed on December 2, 1916, to the Greek ambassador in Switzerland, who was to transmit the message to the German Emperor, "I believe the game is lost. War (by Greece) on the Entente must be given up for the present." * She had previously wired "I am in despair. I must have your opinion which is the only thing that can better the situation." In fact, she kept repeating that she was in despair, and on January 10, 1917, she completely lost the royal manner and became an irritated German woman. "How I suffer!" she wired again. "May those infamous pigs receive the punishment they deserve! I embrace you with all my heart. Your lonely and afflicted sister who hopes for better times."

The court of Athens was hoping that the assault made on Sarrail's soldiers in Salonica would provoke an attack on the Greek troops, which would have made the French general's position extremely difficult. In

* This correspondence is obtained from the Stefani Italian Agency and is of unquestioned veracity.

the beginning the Greek army tried to act by itself but soon the lack of artillery and ammunition took all the enthusiasm out of it. In vain the German agents, who hoped at least to plant future discord between Greece and the Allies, insisted. At court, up to the very day of the monarchs' flight, they kept urging the Bulgarians, Turks, and Austro-Germans massed in Macedonia to plunge into Greek territory and make war on the intruder. Even Constantine was under Hindenburg's orders if we are to judge from his telegram to the German generalissimo about the handing over of certain artillery should the Entente demand it. "His Majesty the King of Greece to Hindenburg with regard to his proposition, which is accepted. The following measures will be taken to prevent said material from falling into the hands of the Entente: Armed resistance against a possible attempt to take it by force, or its destruction if necessary, in which case it would be replaced by Germany at an opportune moment."

The Greek cabinet followed the lead of the court. It treated secretly with the Berlin cabinet and offered to destroy war material. The Greek minister in Berlin received orders from his king, queen, and cabinet alike.

As all know, there were organized in Greece armed bands whose object was to keep attacking the Allied forces and doing all the damage possible, but without compromising the Greek government. The following telegram dated January 11, 1917, shows how directly this was the work of the court. The message was sent

via Berne, and took a long and roundabout journey before reaching the person destined, who was no other than Falkenhausen, now in camp in Macedonia. "In case the post should be late in reaching Presna I beg you to await it. It is most important that you should speak personally to Frankhizco, an officer of the reserve, concerning the future organization of the bands."

These and many similar episodes explain fully the last act of the drama—the journey of Constantine and his whole family, except the second son, out of Greece; also the leaving behind of the second son, he being considered the least dangerous of the family to place on the paternal throne.

Greece's whole mistake has been her inordinate desires for expansion and her willingness to court whatever power may favor those desires. If imperialism is a dangerous path for strong nations to follow, it is even more so for weak ones. To have accepted Sir Edward Grey's offers and ceded the port of Cavala to Bulgaria who needed an outlet on the Mediterranean, would have been the policy of wisdom. Bulgaria would then not have entered the war on Germany's side, and Greece would have remained one with the Balkan block. This cession would have been in accord with two letters written by Venizelos to the king on January 11 and 17 respectively, in the second of which he said "to give up Cavala is certainly a great sacrifice and one that it grieves me to the depths of my soul to advise; but now that I see

what national compensations our sacrifices will bring us, I do not hesitate. I feel that the concessions in Asia Minor which Sir Edward Grey has indicated could, especially if we submit to other sacrifices in favor of Bulgaria, assume such proportions that another Greece, as large and certainly no less rich, would be added to the Greece already doubled as consequence of two recent victorious Balkan wars."


But at that time the voice of Venizelos was not the voice of Greece. Greece saw two adversaries, Russia and Italy, opposed to her future aspirations. The first, by moving toward Constantinople, was barring the road by which she hoped to reconstruct the Eastern Roman Empire under the sceptre of Constantine; the second, by occupying the narrow entrance of the Adriatic was preventing her expansion in that direction. These two logical limitations appeared like spectres that made her forget what a grave danger the Austrian expansion would be, with its necessary seizure of Salonica and possibly a hinterland as well.

In addition to what has been described, dynastic interests and all the petty squabbling between individuals and parties played their role in the recent drama.


Greece was on the point of perishing. Today a new era is being initiated. Let us hope that she will understand that it is her favorable historic moment, and that favorable historic moments, like the wheel of Fortune, never turn back.

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